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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Are there genuine issues of material fact precluding 
summary judgment on the basis of misrepresentation in the insurance 
application? 
A. Misrepresentation: 1. Did Lynn Hardy inform 
Prudential's agent of his 1974 heart attack? 2. Did Prudential's 
agent represent to Lynn Hardy that the old heart attack need not be 
disclosed in the application? 
B. Intent to Deceive: Did Lynn Hardy intend to 
deceive Prudential? 
C. Materiality: 1. Was the omitted information 
material to Prudential's risk? 2. Does Prudential's rule of disre-
garding medical history beyond five years old render the omitted 
history immaterial? 3. Does Prudential's waiver of a rating on the 
disclosed information render immaterial the omitted information? 
D. Reasonable Reliance: Did Prudential rely on the 
omission and was that reliance reasonable? 
II. Was Prudential on "inquiry notice" so as to equitably 
estop* it from asserting the defense of misrepresentation? 
A. Was Prudential on notice to conduct a further 
inquiry? — 
B. Did Prudential conduct a reasonably thorough 
inquiry prior to issuing the policy? 
III. Did the trial court err in granting rescission on 
the basis of claimed misrepresentations outside of the insurance 
application? 
IV. Is Prudential precluded from obtaining rescission by 
its own discriminatory and bad faith handling of the claim and by 
the inequitable result that rescission would produce? 
A. Did Prudential unfairly discriminate against Mrs. 
Hardy in denying the insurance proceeds in violation of the Utah 
Insurance Code? 
B. Did Prudential violate its duty of good faith and 
fair dealing in handling Mrs. Hardy's claim? 
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i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover the proceeds due under a life 
insurance policy issued by the Prudential Insurance Company of 
America on Lynn Hardy, the plaintiff's deceased husband. Prudential 
counterclaimed for rescission of the policy on the basis of misrep-
resentation in the insurance application. Third District Judge Dean 
E. Conder granted defendants' motion for summary judgment rescinding 
the policy. (Record pp. 1041-43; Addendum pp. 1-3.) Plaintiff filed 
a motion to reconsider under Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., on the grounds of 
material misrepresentation of facts by opposing counsel. The court 
reexamined the file and reaffirmed its prior decision. (Rec. p. 
1146.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Application and Underwriting 
Lynn Hardy was a truckdriver by vocation. In 1977 he 
married the plaintiff, Cheryl Hardy, and together they started their 
own trucking business. They built the business up over time until 
they had acquired on contract five trucks and eight trailers. 
(Hardy Dep. pp. 5-7.) About that time, Prudential's agent, defen-
dant Wayne Rigby, contacted the Hardys and interested them in some 
mortgage life insurance on Lynn to cover the debt on the trucking 
business if he died. (Frankel Dep., Ex. 1, hereinafter referred to 
as FDE-1, p. 142; Hardy Dep. pp. 35-36, 38-39; Rigby Dep. pp. 36-
37.) 
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Agent Rigby brought a life insurance application form to 
the Hardy home on August 4, 1981. Rigby completed the answers to 
Part 1 of the form as Lynn responded to the written questions. 
(Hardy Dep. pp. 41, 43-44.) The amount of coverage applied for, 
based on the approximate amount of the business debts, was 
$300,000. The named beneficiary was Lynn's wife, Cheryl, and Lynn 
was to pay the monthly premium of $161.65. (FDE-1 pp. 81-82, Add. 
pp. 4-7.) During the completion of Part 1, Lynn told Agent Rigby 
that he had a heart attack in 1974, seven years earlier. (Hardy 
Dep. pp. 47-48, 60, 62, 73, 128. ) 1 Rigby responded that the heart 
attack would not affect issuance of the policy and that the informa-
tion need not be included in the application because Prudential 
disregards medical history beyond five years old. (Hardy Dep. pp. 
63, 48-49, 59-63, 65-66, 71-73;-see also Aff'ts of Jan Hardy and 
Mark Ith, Rec. pp. 1012-15, Add. pp. 30-33.) 
Part 2 of the application consisted of questions regarding 
medical history and a physical examination. Agent Rigby arranged 
for Part 2 to be completed by Launa Perry (now Noble), a paramedic, 
on August 7, 1981. In reliance upon Agent Rigby's assurance that 
the old heart attack need not be listed in the application, Lynn did 
'On January 5, 1974, Lynn suffered a sudden inferior wall 
myocardial infarction, (FDE-1 pp. 59-60, 68), which is an 
insufficiency of circulation to the inferior wall of the 
middle layer of the heart muscle. Stedman's Medical 
Dictionary pp. 630-31, 820 (3d Lawyers1 Ed. 1972). 
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not disclose the heart attack to Ms, Perry. However, Lynn did dis-
close that his father and two brothers had died prematurely from 
heart attacks, that he smoked cigarettes, and that he had received a 
Department of Transportation physical from Dr. G.W. Taylor in 
1979. Ms. Perry's physical examination consisted of little more 
than an electrocardiogram (ECG). She did not complete the sections 
of the exam pertaining to cardiovascular and circulatory condi-
tion. Lynn signed the Part 2, authorizing Prudential to obtain his 
medical records from any physician listed. (Hardy Dep., Ex. C, Add. 
pp. 8-9.) 
Prudential's underwriting department in California 
received Lynn's application on August 11 and was required to make a 
final determination by October 5, sixty days from the application. 
(FDE-1 pp. 207A, 225, 284.) As part of its routine underwriting 
review, Prudential requested a background and financial inspection 
by Equifax Services, an independent information service, and an 
attending physician's statement (APS) from Dr. Taylor, who was 
listed on the Part 2. (FDE-1 pp. 207, 214; see also Wiczek Dep. pp. 
6-7; Reed Dep. pp. 51-55 and Ex. 6.) The Equifax report confirmed 
Lynn's two-pack-per-day smoking habit; disclosed the name of another 
attending physician, Dr. Peterson; and revealed that another of 
Lynn's brothers, still living, also had "heart problems." (FDE-1 
pp. 208-10, Add. pp. 34-36.) The APS from Dr. Taylor revealed no 
cardiovascular information. (FDE-1 p. 215.) Meanwhile, the under-
writing department received the result of the ECG performed by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Ms. Perry, showing a first-degree atrioventricular (AV) heart 
block.2 (FDE-1 p. 211, Add. p. 37.) 
On August 14 the underwriting department discovered that 
Part 2 of Lynn's application had mistakenly been completed by a 
paramedic rather than by a physician, as required by the policy 
amount. (Rec. p. 82; Reed Dep. p. 56 and Ex. 7; FDE-1 p. 283.) As 
a result, a second Part 2 was completed by Dr. Joseph R. Evans on 
August 25. Reference to Lynn's prior heart problem was omitted in 
continuing reliance on Agent Rigby's prior instruction that it need 
not be listed. However, Lynn confirmed that he had smoked for 20 
years and disclosed the additional information that he had rheumatic 
fever as a child; that he received a Department of Transportation 
physical every two years, including a recent exam by Dr. Jay 
Capener; and that he had previotrsly been treated by Dr. Val Sundwall 
at Cottonwood Hospital, the same physician and hospital that treated 
Lynn for his 1974 heart attack. (See Rec. p. 1059, Add. p. 38.) 
Dr. Evans1 physical examination of Lynn reported no current cardio-
vascular disorder. Lynn also signed this Part 2, again authorizing 
Prudential to obtain his medical records from any of the named 
sources. (Hardy Dep., Ex. D, Add. pp. 10-11.) 
Based on Lynn's medical information, his heart block and 
family history of heart disorders in particular, underwriter Tom 
^Obstruction causing impairment or prolongation of normal 
conduction time (P-R interval) between atria and ventricles 
of the heart. Stedman's Medical Dictionary p. 162 (3d 
Lawyers' Ed. 1972). 
-5-
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i 
Shaw recommended issuing the policy with a special class 1 rating to 
account for the higher risk. (FDE-1 p. 217, Add. p. 39.) However, 
Prudential's medical department waived the rating, stating that Lynn 
was "standard physically." (Id.) Shaw's supervisor, Marilyn Reed, 
then discovered that another mistake had been made. According to 
underwriting rules governing applications with three known cases of 
early coronary death, Shaw should have requested Dr. Evans to obtain 
a chest X-ray at the time he completed the Part 2 on Lynn. (FDE-1 
p. 218, Add. p. 40; Reed Dep. p. 66 and Ex. 5, p. VII-1.) A chest 
X-ray was then ordered, but before the result was received on 
October 7, the deadline for final action had passed and no further 
underwriting investigation was undertaken. (FDE-1 pp. 285, 223, 
225, 290.) Notice that the policy had been approved standard was 
mailed the next day, but the policy was back-dated to take effect as 
of September 17, 1981. (FDE-1 p. 286, Add. p. 41; Id_. p. 229, Add. 
p. 12.) 
B. Review and Denial of Claim 
Lynn Hardy died suddenly and unexpectedly of a myocardial 
infarction on December 4, 1982, fourteen months after the policy was 
issued, and within the two-year contestability period. (FDE-1 p. 
JA policy may be issued "standard," if the insured has no 
ratable physical impairment, or "rated," according to the 
degree of physical impairments. A special class rating is 
determined by assigning "debits" for each impairment, 
totaling the debits, and then classifying the policy 
according to the corresponding debit total in the given 
table. A rated policy requires charging a correspondingly 
higher premium. (See Reed Dep., Ex. 5.) 
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204; Add. p. 17.) Lynn's widow and beneficiary, Cheryl, submitted 
her "Claim for Insurance Contract Benefits" on December 15. (FDE-1 
p. 200.) Prudential's claims department immediately sent Lynn's 
file to its home office investigator, Richard Stelzner, requesting 
him to conduct a "contestable investigation." (Id. pp. 188-89; 
Stelzner Dep. pp. 21-22.) Stelzner reviewed Lynn's application for 
medical leads and conducted his investigation on January 6, 1983. 
(FDE-1 p. 140, Add. p. 42.) He confirmed with Mrs. Hardy that Lynn's 
physician was Dr. Val Sundwall. Stelzner then visited Dr. 
Sundwall's office and obtained a lead to the University Medical 
Center.- At the University Medical Center, Mr. Stelzner obtained the 
records of Lynn's 1974 post-heart attack tests and a lead to the 
Cottonwood Hospital. At the Cottonwood Hospital, Stelzner obtained 
the records of Lynn's 1974 heartrattack. (Add. pp. 42-45.) 
Following Stelzner's report of Lynn's 1974 heart attack, 
Prudential's claims department deliberated for the next month and a 
half over whether they could deny the claim despite their rule to 
disregard medical history beyond five years prior to the applica-
tion. (See Frankel Dep., Ex. 2, p. 9, Add. p. 46; FDE-1 p. 123-24, 
Add. pp. 47-48.) The question was finally referred to Prudential's 
corporate headquarters in New Jersey, and senior claim consultant 
Jan Drosendahl (LeRoux) ruled that an exception to the five-year 
rule should be made in this case. (FDE-1 pp. 117-18, Add. pp. 49-
50.) Ms. Drosendahl also acknowledged the rule of law that bars 
rescission for misrepresentation if the insurer was "on notice" to 
conduct an inquiry that would have revealed the truth. She conceded 
-7-
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that "the underwriters were concerned about Mr. Hardy's cardiovas-
cular status," but claimed that they "thoroughly investigated all 
given possible leads to information." Therefore, she concluded that 
the claim should be denied for nondisclosure of the 1974 heart 
attack. (Id.) The claim was formally denied for that reason, and 
Mrs. Hardy was informed of the denial on February 22, 1983, over two 
months after the claim was submitted. (FDE-1 pp. 116, 113-14; Rigby 
Dep. pp. 47-48; FDE-1 p. 102.) 
C. Facts Subsequent to Denial of Claim 
Following Prudential's denial of the claim, Mrs. Hardy 
filed a written complaint with the Utah Insurance Department. (FDE-
1 p. 76, Add. p. 51.) The Insurance Department reviewed the matter 
and concluded that Prudential should reconsider its decision for 
possible error: 
It appears an error may have occurred in the underwriting 
department . . . . If [the application] questions had been 
reviewed more thoroughly the policy may not have been issued; 
but the policy was issued and the insured and beneficiary 
believed they would be protected if a loss did occur. 
(FDE-1 p. 75, Add. p. 52, emphasis added.) The Insurance Department 
requested that Prudential perform an "independent review" of the 
claim, but Prudential's Vice President and Counsel, Ernest A. Long, 
responded by sending a copy of his "informal analysis," previously 
sent to plaintiff's counsel. (Long Dep., Ex. 2.) The Insurance 
Department took no further action. 
Mrs. Hardy subsequently filed this action against 
Prudential and Agent Rigby alleging (1) breach of the insurance 
contract, resulting in denial of the policy proceeds and loss of the 
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Hardy trucking business; (2) bad faith denial of the insurance 
claim, justifying an award of consequential damages for emotional 
suffering, punitive damages and attorney fees; and (3) intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. (Rec. pp. 613-17.) Defendants 
answered, (Rec. pp. 627-32), and Prudential counterclaimed for res-
cission of the policy, alleging fraudulent concealment of Lynn's 
prior heart problem, (Rec. pp. 44-46). Mrs. Hardy filed a Reply 
denying misrepresentation and alleging (1) that Lynn's prior heart 
problem was disclosed to Agent Rigby and omitted from the applica-
tion at his suggestion; and (2) that Prudential is equitably 
estopped from asserting the misrepresentation defense because it was 
on notice to conduct an inquiry that reasonably would have revealed 
the omitted history and it failed to conduct such an inquiry. (Rec. 
pp. 619-21.) 
Defendants moved for summary judgment. (Rec. pp. 472, 
664.) Plaintiff opposed the motion, detailing and documenting 
several material factual issues, including whether Prudential's 
agent was informed of the prior heart problem. (Rec. pp. 992-
1015.) Plaintiff also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on 
the counterclaim for rescission on the alternative ground that even 
if there were a misrepresentation, it was not sufficiently material 
to justify rescission of the contract because Prudential conceded it 
still would have issued the policy, but at a higher premium. (Rec. 
pp. 975-87.) 
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary 
judgment and rescinded the policy. The court found that Lynn and 
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Cheryl failed to disclose the prior heart attack and supposed medi-
cation and treatment for heart disease. (Rec. pp. 1041-43, Add pp. 
1-3.) Plaintiff moved for reconsideration under Rule 60(b), 
U.R.C.P., on the grounds that defendants' counsel misrepresented, 
and the court mistakenly relied on, the supposed facts of follow-up 
medication and treatment. (Rec. pp. 1046-88.) Plaintiff obtained 
the affidavit of Dr. Joseph L. Thorne to prove that Lynn's condition 
was in remission and asymptomatic in the years following the heart 
attack and that Lynn was not taking heart medication or being 
treated for heart disease. (Rec. pp. 1068-70, Add. pp. 53-55.) The 
court reexamined the matter but reaffirmed its prior decision of 
summary judgment. (Rec. p. 1146.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In reviewing this summary judgment, this Court must view 
all evidence in a light favorable to the plaintiff, resolve all 
doubts in favor of the plaintiff, and reverse the judgment if there 
is any evidence from which a jury could possibly find the issues in 
favor of the plaintiff or against the defendants. 
In this case, there are several issues of material fact 
precluding judgment as a matter of law. In essence, the plaintiff 
argues that: (1) the medical history omitted from the application 
was disclosed to the agent and imputed to Prudential; (2) the agent 
directed the insured to omit that information from the application 
and the insured was justified in relying on that direction; (3) the 
agent's explanation for omitting the information was that Prudential 
disregards medical history beyond five years old; moreover, 
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Prudential does have and apply such a rule; (4) the insured did not 
intend to deceive Prudential, as evidenced by what he disclosed to 
the agent and on the application, and by his sincere belief that he 
was in good health; (5) the omissions were not material to 
Prudential's risk, as evidenced by the five-year rule, Prudential's 
waiver of a rating on the information it did have, and the fact that 
the policy still would have been issued; (6) Prudential is estopped 
to rely on the claimed omissions and to assert the defense of mis-
representation because it was "on notice" to conduct a further 
inquiry by checking available medical records and it failed to do 
so; (7) Prudential may not void the policy on the basis of state-
ments made outside the application; and (8) Prudential is precluded 
from obtaining rescission by its discriminatory and bad faith hand-
ling of the claim and by the inequitable result that rescission 
would produce. 
On each of these arguments there is evidence from which a 
jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff and against the defen-
dants. Therefore, it was reversible error for the trial court to 
weigh the evidence, judge credibility, and decide these issues with-
out a trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I; THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
THE FACE OF MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT ON EACH ELEMENT OF THE 
MISREPRESENTATION DEFENSE. 
Summary judgment may be granted only if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits and other documents show clearly that there 
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is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P.4 
In order to avoid liability under an insurance policy on 
the grounds of misrepresentation, the insurer must prove that (1) 
there was a misrepresentation of fact; (2) the misrepresentation was 
made with intent to deceive; (3) the fact misrepresented was 
material; and (4) the insurer reasonably relied upon the misrepre-
sentation in issuing the policy. Utah Code Ann. §31-19-8(1)(1953); 
Moore v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 26 Utah 2d 430, 491 
P.2d 227, 230 (1971). Each of these elements of Prudential's 
defense constitutes a separate question of material fact for the 
jury. See, e.g., Major Oil Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance 
In reviewing a summary judgment, this Court must 
evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences • 
fairly drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
losing party. E.g., Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 
(Utah 1982). All doubts or uncertainty as to the 
correctness of summary judgment must be resolved in favor of 
permitting the issues to go to trial. E.g., Butler v. 
Sports Haven International, 563 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1977). 
Summary judgment may be affirmed only if it appears to a 
certainty that the plaintiff in this case would not be 
entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be 
proved in support of her claims. See, e.g., Securities 
Credit Corp. v. Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P.2d 422 
(1953). If reasonable men could differ on the evidence in 
this case and could reasonably find for the plaintiff, 
summary judgment must be reversed. E.g., Jackson v. Dabney, 
645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982); Cardwell v. United States, 186 
F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1951). It is not for the trial 
judge on motion for summary judgment to weigh evidence, 
judge credibility, and resolve factual disputes. The sole 
inquiry is whether a material factual issue exists, and if 
the trial judge went beyond that inquiry the summary 
judgment cannot stand. E.g., W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio 
Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981). 
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Society, 457 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1972) (applying Utah law); Burnham 
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co,, 24 Utah 2d 277, 470 P.2d 261 (1970); 
Lester v. Sparks, 583 P.2d 1097, 1100-01 (Okla. 1978); 12A Appleman, 
Insurance Law and Practice §7297 (1981). When any one of these 
issues is disputed, summary judgment is inappropriate. Moreover, 
Prudential must establish each element of its defense not by a mere 
preponderance of the evidence, but by "clear and convincing" evi-
dence. See Utah State Dept. of Social Services v. Pierren, 619 P.2d 
1380, 1381-82 (Utah 1980); Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 
273, 274 (1952); Ostrov v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 379 F.2d 
829, 838 (3rd Cir. 1967). Therefore, if a jury examining these 
issues could possibly find for the plaintiff, or find that the evi-
dence of fraud is anything less than clear and convincing, the sum-
mary judgment must be reversed. 
Applying the principles of appellate review to the ele-
ments of claimed misrepresentation in this case, it is evident that 
summary judgment was erroneous and must be reversed. 
A. Misrepresentation 
Prudential initially denied Mrs. Hardy's insurance claim 
for the stated reason that Lynn failed to disclose his 1974 heart 
attack on Part 2 of the application. (FDE-1 pp. 117-18, Add. pp. 
49-50; FDE-1 pp. 116, 125, 187, 140-43, Add. pp. 42-45; FDE-1 pp. 
113-14; Rigby Dep. pp. 47-48; FDE-1 pp. 102-03.) When it became 
apparent, after commencement of the litigation, that the plaintiff 
was prepared to dispute that claim, Prudential came up with the 
additional allegation that Lynn also failed to disclose follow-up 
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medication and treatment for his heart problem. While this belated 
claim will be demonstrated to be immaterial and inaccurate, both 
claimed misrepresentations are addressed together. 
While Lynn did not disclose his 1974 heart problem on the 
application, he and Cheryl did disclose it to Agent Rigby at the 
time of the application. Cheryl Hardy testified: 
Q. Okay. At some point you and Mr. Rigby discussed Lynn's 
prior medical history? 
A. Yes. There were a couple of different days involved. I 
can't remember which one it was, but it was why [sic] part 
of the application was being filled out. 
Q. Where was this discussion held? 
A. In the kitchen at my house. 
Q. Mr. Rigby was there? Who else was there? 
A. Mr. Rigby, Lynn and I and I keep thinking somebody else 
was there. I can't put my finger on who it was. 
Q. Tell me about that discussion. 
A. I know that Lynn told him that he had a heart attack in 
1974. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I told Mr. Rigby that he had some kind of clogged valve or 
something just below the heart. 
(Hardy Dep. pp. 47-48, emphasis added; see also pp. 60, 62, 73, 
128.) 
Agent Rigby's response was that this medical history would 
be no problem and need not be disclosed in the application because 
Prudential disregards medical history more than five years old. 
Mrs. Hardy testified: 
Q. What did Mr. Rigby tell you about the application about 
how far back it went? 
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A. In essense, we only went back five years on the applica-
tion. [Hardy Dep. p. 49.] 
A. I do know that we discussed going back five years . . . . 
[Id. p. 59.] 
Q. Do you remember him [Rigby] saying to Lynn in substance or 
effect that he did not have to report his heart attack on 
Exhibit C [Part 2]? 
A. I would have to basically say, yes. [Id. p. 63.] 
(See also id. pp. 65-66, 71-73.) The testimony of others present on 
that occasion corroborates these facts. Jan Hardy, a daughter-in-
law, and Mark Ith, Cheryl's son and Lynn's step son, both were pre-
sent in the Hardy home and heard Lynn tell Agent Rigby of his prior 
heart attack. Both also remember Rigby responding that it did not 
matter because medical history more than five years old was not 
required in the application. (Aff'ts of Jan Hardy and Mark Ith, 
Rec. pp. 1012-15, Add. pp. 30-33T) 
Agent Rigby's instruction not to record the old heart 
attack in the application is corroborated by the fact that 
Prudential does have such a five-year rule. Corporate Claim 
Memorandum 76-40 (June 3, 1976) states the rule as follows: 
Even though an insured omitted information from the applica-
tion, common knowledge or a review of the Underwriting Manual 
may disclose that the information would not have had under-
writing significance. The file should be noted to reflect this 
unless the information relates to treatment so old or a condi-
tion so minor that it would obviously be of no significance. 
Question 9 on our application . . . is limited to treatment, 
tests, etc. within five years of the application date. 
Although the other questions on the application do not have any 
time limitation, it has been our practice to disregard treat-
ment more than five years old. 
(Frankel Dep., Ex. 2, p. 9, Add. p. 46, emphasis added. See also 
FDE-1 pp. 123-24, 117-18, Add. pp. 47-50.) This rule was current 
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and applicable to the Lynn Hardy case, and the claims manual con-
tained no provision for qualifications or exceptions to the rule. 
Claim consultant Mary Burke testified: 
Q. . . . Do you know of the existence of any guideline which 
sets forth the proposition that you should make exceptions 
in certain areas with reference to this five-year 
practice? [Question restated.] 
A. Not that I'm aware of. The only memorandum I'm aware of 
is the Exhibit 2 [Claim Memorandum 76-40]. 
(Burke Dep. p. 18; see also Frankel Dep. pp. 10-12, 15-16; LeRoux 
Dep. pp. 119-21.) 
Thus, the record contains three sworn statements that Lynn 
Hardy did disclose his prior heart problem to Agent Rigby, and the 
law is clear that disclosure of information to an agent of the 
insurer constitutes disclosure to the insurer, whether the informa-
tion is actually communicated to the insurer or not. E.g., Major 
Oil Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 457 F.2d 596f 603 
(10th Cir. 1972) (Utah law); Wootton v. Combined Insurance Co. of 
America, 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724 (1964); Lumbermens Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Bowman, 313 F.2d 381, 388 (10th Cir. 1963); 
National Life Assurance Co. v. Neves, 370. S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1963) (agent's knowledge is imputed to his company); Johnson v. 
Life Insurance Co. of Georgia, 52 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1951). The 
underlying rationale for this rule is that the potential insured may 
"reasonably assume" that the agent will perform his duty to report 
all relevant information to the officers of the insurer responsible 
for approving the policy. See 16C Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice §§9101, 9104; 3 Couch on Insurance 2d §§26:132-133. 
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Prudential's own claims manual acknowledges that disclo-
sure to an agent is treated as disclosure to the insurer: 
[T]he courts ... generally impute any knowledge of the agent to 
the Company under the law of Agency, which holds that knowledge 
of an agent is knowledge of the principal. 
(Corp. Claim Memo. 76-40 p. 18, Frankel Dep., Ex. 2.) Moreover 
Prudential has followed this rule in other similar cases. In the 
Emma Harris case, Claim No. N0D815009, Prudential paid the claim 
despite material misrepresentation in the application because its 
agent was told of the omitted information: 
Based on the agent's knowledge of the insured's kidney disease, 
which legally can be imputed to the Company, would suggest 
making payment of death benefits to [beneficiary]. Agent's 
knowledge would seem to estop us from claiming reliance on a 
material misrepresentation. [Add, p. 77, emphasis added.] 
Likewise, in the Barbara Sullivan case, Claim No. N0D89484, Pruden-
tial's claim department concluded: 
Because it is apparent that Agent Painter ... was also cogni-
zant (and had been for some time) of the insured's poor health 
at the time he took the applications, we have dropped our mis-
representation action and are accepting full death claim lia-
bility of $47,000. [Add. p. 78, emphasis added.] 
Thus, the rule of imputing an agent's knowledge to the insurer is 
widely acknowledged and applied, even by Prudential. 
Having disclosed his prior heart problem to Agent Rigby, 
Lynn was justified in relying on Rigby's representation that Lynn 
need not disclose the problem again to the medical examiners who 
completed the Part 2's: 
An insured is usually justified in relying upon the advice 
and assistance of a soliciting agent in preparing his applica-
tion • • . • 
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17 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §9410. For example, in 
Central National Life Insurance Co. v. Peterson, 23 Ariz. App. 4, 
529 P.2d 1213 (1975), the insured told the insurance agent of a 
prior hospitalization, but, as in the present case, the agent told 
the insured that it need not be included in the application because 
it "was not necessary to go back any further than five years." Id., 
529 P.2d at 1215. The court held that the insurer was bound by its 
< 
agent's representation as to the scope of the application and was 
barred from rescinding the policy for omission of the undisclosed 
hospitalization. Id. at 1215-16. See also Lazar v. Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co., 290 F. Supp 179, 181 (D. Conn. 1968) (insurer 
bound by agent's explanation that certain medical history was not 
required by application); Howard v. Golden State Mutual Life 
Insurance Co., 60 Mich. App. 469, 231 N.W.2d 655 (1975). 
Thus, based on the foregoing facts and law, it is apparent 
that there was no misrepresentation regarding Lynn's prior heart 
problem. Based on the evidence in the record, a jury could reason-
ably find that Lynn did disclose the heart attack to Prudential, 
through Agent Rigby. Therefore, it was clear error for the trial 
court to conclude that Lynn never disclosed the heart attack to 
Prudential "nor anyone else acting on behalf of Prudential." (Add. 
p. 2, Finding #5.) Whether Lynn disclosed the heart problem is 
clearly a material factual issue, and the trial court erred by 
weighing the evidence, judging credibility, and resolving that issue 
without trial. 
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B« Intent to Deceive 
The law is clear that to support a misrepresentation 
defense the insurer must show that the omissions in the application 
were made with the "intent to deceive" the insurer. In Wootton v. 
Combined Insurance Co. of America, 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724 
(1964), this Court stated: 
Unless the misrepresentations in the negotiation for an 
insurance policy are made with the intent to deceive ... the 
insurance contract cannot be avoided by an insurance company. 
Mere falsity of answers to questions propounded are insuffi-
cient if not knowingly made with intent to deceive and defraud. 
Id., 395 P.2d at 725. See also Marks v. Continental Casualty Co., 
19 Utah 2d 119, 427 P.2d 387, 389 (1967); Cardwell v. United States, 
186 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1951); 22 Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice §§13028, 13030. Moreover, the question of an insured's 
intent is a factual issue for the jury. Burnham v. Bankers Life & 
Casualty Co., 24 Utah 2d 277, 470 P.2d 261, 263 (1970) (reversing 
summary judgment for insurer). 
In this case a jury could reasonably find that Lynn Hardy 
did not intend to deceive Prudential concerning the fact of his 
heart problem. To the contrary, the evidence shows that Lynn and 
Cheryl volunteered to Agent Rigby the information of the prior heart 
attack and occluded artery. Under similar facts in Wootton, supra, 
this Court held that omission of certain information from the appli-
cation did not evidence an intent to deceive because the omitted 
information was disclosed to the agent. 395 P.2d at 726. See also 
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Willsey, 214 F.2d 729, 732 
(10th Cir. 1954) (Utah law); Roy v. Trans-World Life Insurance Co., 
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199 So. 2d 416, 418 (La. App. 1967). Thus, a jury could reasonably 
make a similar finding in this case. Moreover, it was Agent Rigby 
who instructed Lynn not to include that information in the appli-
cation because it occurred more than five years previously. Lynn's 
good faith reliance upon that instruction cannot be viewed as 
"intent to deceive." See Central National Life Insurance Co. v. 
Peterson and Lazar v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra. 
The information Lynn did disclose on the application is 
also inconsistent with an intent to deceive. He freely disclosed 
information that would draw his health into question, such as his 
extensive family history of heart disease, his childhood rheumatic 
fever, and his heavy smoking habit, and also revealed the names of 
several doctors and a hospital where Prudential could go for further 
information. He also willingly submitted to two physical examina-
tions, an ECG, and a chest X-ray. If he had actually intended to 
deceive Prudential, he could have disclosed much less detail on the 
application and been less cooperative. 
Lynn's sincere belief that he was in good health at the 
time of the application is also consistent with his answers and 
belies an intent to deceive. Following his 1974 heart attack, 
Lynn's recovery was rapid and uneventful. He was discharged from 
the Cottonwood Hospital in "good condition" after only ten days, and 
within one month he was briskly walking one mile per day and driving 
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trucks again, all without any sign of chest pain or cardiac irregu-
larity. His condition was thereafter asymptomatic, and he returned 
to a normal active life. (PDE-1 pp. 57, 68, 160-61.) In 1979 Dr. 
Thorne referred Lynn to the Coronary Consultation Clinic at the 
University of Utah for tests as part of a study on the relationship 
between family lines and heart problems. (Thorne Aff't 1(6, Add. p. 
54.) The tests there showed that Lynn's blood pressure, lungs, heart 
sounds, and cardiovascular data were all normal. The only abnormal 
finding was high cholesterol, for which he was taking atromid. (Rec. 
pp. 819-24, Add. pp. 56-61.) Dr. Thome's final "Clinic Note," on 
January 2, 1980, confirmed those positive findings: 
Lynn is doing very well, he lives an active physical life, he 
has not had any symptoms to suggest coronary artery insuffi-
ciency and has not had anything to suggest angina pectoris. 
His physical capacity is good .... The heart is in a regular 
sinus rhythm, no cardiomegaly, no extrasystoles. The abdomen is 
not remarkable and the extremities are normal with no evidence 
of edema. [FDE-1 p. 155, Add. p. 62.] 
Other physical examinations of Lynn during this period of 
time also indicate that he had recovered from the 1974 heart attack 
and was in good physical condition. Lynn was required by the 
Department of Transportation to undergo a complete physical every 
two years, and none of those examinations revealed any cardiac dis-
order. For example, on January 7, 1977, Lynn was examined by Dr. 
Val Sundwall, the same physician who attended Lynn at the time of 
his 1974 heart attack. Dr. Sundwall found no residual or continuing 
cardiovascular problem. (Id. p. 176.) Lynn's last D.O.T. exam, 
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performed on August 7, 1981 by Dr. E.J. Capener, also reported nor-
mal cardiovascular findings. (Id. p. 144.) 
Lynn also appeared to those closest to him to be in good 
health. For example, when Lynn married Cheryl in 1977, he told her 
of the old heart attack, but she found it difficult to believe 
because of his heavy work schedule and physical capacity. Lynn was 
able to do heavy lifting associated with his job and never seemed 
limited in his activities or worried by the old heart problem. The 
matter was rarely if ever discussed with his new wife and both they 
and the doctors assumed that the problem had improved or corrected 
itself. (Hardy Dep. pp. 53-58.) 
Thus, when Lynn applied for life insurance from Prudential 
in August 1981, he reasonably believed himself to be in good health 
and fully recovered from the 1974 heart attack. Similarly, this 
Court held in Marks v. Continental Casualty Co., supra, that an 
omission in the insurance application was not made with intent to 
deceive because the question related to a condition from which the 
insured sincerely believed she had recovered years before. 427 P.2d 
at 389. See also National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Sumlar, 51 
S.W.2d 866 (Ark. 1932) (no fraudulent intent where insured denied 
prior heart problem in the belief he had recovered); National Life & 
Accident Ins. Co. v. Bonner, 200 S.E. 319 (Ga. App. 1938) (insured's 
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belief of good health is relevant to jury question of fraudulent 
intent.) 5 
Finally, Lynn's incomplete answers in the application may 
also be attributable to the negligence or inadequate explanations of 
the medical examiners. For example/ in Rutherford v. Prudential 
Insurance Co. of America/ 44 Cal. Rptr. 697 (Cal. App. 1965)/ the 
court held that Prudential was estopped to rely on omissions in the 
application because its own medical examiner did not adequately 
explain the questions, gave the impression that the partial answers 
were sufficient/ and conducted the exam in a cursory and careless 
manner. Id. at 702-04. While the examiners in this case have tes-
tified that they read every question and recorded the answers, (Rec. 
pp. 730-33/ 736-37)/ they have not yet been cross-examined on that 
testimony/ and their claims do not preclude the reasonable possibil-
ity of unrecorded discussion regarding the scope or intent of the 
questions. For example, on the question regarding medication/ Lynn 
may have been led to believef upon inquiry, that it pertained only 
DPrudential also considers the insured's own belief 
regarding his good health as relevant to the question of 
fraud. In the case of Josephine Oertel, Claim No. DOD085459, 
Prudential approved the claim despite nondisclosure of an 
old myocardial infarction: 
It does not appear fraud would be a good defense in 
this case. The applicant gave a partial admission and 
considering the date of her last MI (1967) and no 
specific ongoing treatment for this, she, in all 
likelihood, may have believed she was giving truthful 
answers. She probably did not recognize the ongoing 
nature of her heart disease. [Add. pp. 79-80, emphasis 
added.] 
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to medication for current serious illnesses. In responding to the 
question about recent examinations by a physician, he may have been 
led to believe that it pertained only to the most recent or most 
serious examinations and that it did not call for mere "checkups." 
i 
See id. at 703. See also Columbian National Life Insurance Co. v. 
Lanigan, 19 So. 2d 67, 68-69 (Fla. 1944). 
In sum, because of (1) the information that Lynn did dis-
i 
close; (2) his sincere belief that he was in good health; and (3) 
potential error or inattention by the examiners, a jury could rea-
sonably find that Lynn Hardy did not intend to deceive Prudential; 
i 
therefore, it was error to grant summary judgment on that issue. 
C. Materiality 
The materiality of a claimed misrepresentation is to be 
determined not by what the insurer may think about the importance of 
the omission with the advantage of hindsight, but by "an industry 
standard," that is, on the basis of what a reasonably prudent 
insurer would have done had it known the truth. Burnham v. Bankers 
Life & Casualty Co., 24 Utah 2d 277, 470 P.2d 261, 263 (1970); 
Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Mardanlou, 60 7 P.2d 2 91, 
293 (Utah 1980). Moreover, this Court held in Moore v. Prudential 
Insurance Co. of America, 26 Utah 2d 430, 491 P.2d 227 (1971), that 
the issue of materiality is exclusively a question of fact for the 
jury. In that case, Prudential argued that the issue of materiality 
should not have gone to the jury because Prudential presented unre-
futed evidence that it would not have issued the policy had it known 
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the undisclosed medical history. This Court rejected that argument 
because it 
relates to a matter of post-mortem conjecture concerning which 
it is easy enough to now declaim in its own favor, and diffi-
cult if not impossible for the plaintiff to directly refute. 
This testimony was suffused with self-interest; and it was not 
mandatory for the jury to find in accordance therewith. 
491 P.2d at 230, emphasis added. Thus, even where the evidence of 
materiality is unrefuted, the issue should still go to the jury to 
judge the credibility of the evidence. 
In this case, Prudential claims that nondisclosure of the 
heart attack was material, not because disclosure would have pre-
cluded issuance of the policy, but because Prudential would have 
rated the policy and charged a higher premium. (Response to 
Interrogatory No. 7, Rec. p. 75.) Prudential now estimates that had 
it known of the old heart attack, it would have rated Lynn's policy 
a special class 4 and charged a temporary extra premium totaling 
$3,318 more than what Lynn actually paid. (FDE-1 p. 125; Rec. p. 
942, 1(8; Rec. p. 948, 1f3.) However, this Court rejected a similar 
claim of materiality in Pritchett v. Equitable Life and Casualty 
Insurance Co., 18 Utah 2d 279, 421 P.2d 943 (1966), because the 
insurer still would have issued the policy and the revised policy 
°Estimated monthly premium of $398.65 multiplied by the 
fourteen months the policy was in force equals $5,581.10, 
minus the $2,263.10 in premiums actually paid ($161.65 x 14 
mos.) equals $3,318. 
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still would have covered the insured's ailment. Moreover, as the 
Court stated in Moore, supra, Prudential's claim of materiality is a 
matter of post-mortem conjecture ... suffused with self-interest" 
and the jury would not be required to believe it. 
One basis for a jury's disbelief concerning materiality is 
Prudential's admitted rule, communicated to Lynn by Agent Rigby, of 
disregarding medical history beyond five years old. (Add. p. 46.) 
Prudential has frequently applied the rule in other cases. For 
example, in the Ida G. Floyd case, Policy No. 70 785 063, the claim 
investigator stated: 
Dr. Lindell last saw Mrs. Floyd as a patient in October 1973. 
Since this is well beyond the five year limit, we did not con-
tact Dr. Lindell's office in person. [Add. p. 81.] 
Prudential has also applied the five-year rule to cases of prior 
myocardial infarctions, such as that suffered by Lynn Hardy. In the 
case of William V. Cupp, Policy No. 84 116 781, payment was recom-
mended with the following note: 
Even though it appears there was an old inferior myocardial 
infarction, there was no need to pursue it. [Add. p. 82.] 
Similarly, in the cases of Josephine Oertel, Claim No. NOD085459, 
and Marcelino Garza, Policy No. 70 720 480, Prudential paid the 
claims despite unadmitted old myocardial infarctions. (Add. pp. 78-
80, 83.) 
Another reason for a jury to disbelieve Prudential's claim 
of materiality is that Prudential refused to rate the policy on the 
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basis of the ratable information it did have. Underwriter Tom Shaw 
recommended rating Lynn's policy a special class 1 because of the 
family history and heart block: 
Please note, 42 year old male applying for 300f000. ECG indi-
cates 1st degree AV block. Strong family history of circulatory 
disorders. No credits available. Suggest we accept at a special 
class-1. Please advise. 
(FDE-1 p. 217, Add. p. 39, abbreviations extended; see also Shaw 
Dep. pp. 25-29.) The ECG test performed on Lynn by Prudential 
showed a PR interval of .22 seconds, which is classified as a first 
degree atrioventricular block. (FDE-1 p. 211, Add. p. 37.) 
Prudential's underwriting guidelines required an assignment of 30 
debits for that impairment. (Reed Dep. p. 30 and Ex. 5, p. 111-33.) 
Lynn's family history of three or more cases of cardiovascular 
disease required an additional 20 to 40 debits. (Reed Dep. p. 31 
and Ex. 5, p. VII-1.) When mulCTple impairments are present the 
debits are combined, and when the impairments are inter-related, 
particularly cardiovascular impairments, additional debits are added 
to the sum "because of the added significance of the combination." 
(Reed Dep., Ex. 5 p. B.) Other factors, such as Lynn's long smoking 
habit, his mother's stroke, his brother's suicide, and the early 
death of seven out of fifteen siblings, were also significant and 
"call[ed] for special consideration," or additional debits. (Id. p. 
VII-1; Shaw Dep. p. 45; Ketchum Dep. p. 19.) Thus, Lynn's under-
writing debits should have totaled at least 75, based solely on the 
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heart block and family history. A total of 75 debits would have 
required a rating of special class 2. (Reed Dep.f Ex. 5 p. B.) 
Thus, Underwriter Shaw was being "liberal" with a recommendation of 
special class 1. (See Ketchum Dep. p. 17.) 
However, other members of the underwriting department were 
even more liberal and rejected Shaw's recommendation in favor of 
issuing the policy standard. They figured that only 20 debits was 
appropriate for each of the heart block and family history impair-
ments, for a total of 40 debits. (Reed Dep. pp 31-32.) 40 debits 
would still require a class 1 rating, but rather than combine the 
debits and add the inter-related impairment factor, the impairments 
were considered separately, both classified as "minor," and then 
totally disregarded to obtain a standard rating. (Id_. pp. 34-36.) 
Dr. Robert Ketchum, the medical consultant to the underwriting 
department, acknowledged the indications for rating the policy, but 
concluded that "absent other ratable impairment feel he's standard 
physically." (FDE-1 p. 217, Add. p. 39.) 
Thus, Prudential intentionally waived the justified rating 
of Lynn's policy, and frequently waives ratings for "competitive or 
business reasons." (Rec. p. 942 1(9? Rec. p. 710 n.16.) The 
7 
Impairment Debits 
Heartblock 30 
Family history 30 
Subtotal 60 
Inter-related impairment factor 15 (25% of 60) 
Total 75 
See Reed Dep., Ex 5 p. B. 
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"competitive reason" is that an unrated policy has lower premiums 
and is therefore more marketable, especially to a middle-income 
buyer like Lynn Hardy. (See Reed Dep. pp. 67-69 on underwriting 
concern over Lynn's financial ability to buy $300,000 policy.) For 
example, in the case of Manfred Mandelbaum, Claim No. WOD082 820, 
the insured failed to disclose a history of heart disease in 
applying for a $300,000 policy. The same underwriter, Tom Shaw, 
recommended to the same medical consultant, Dr. Ketchum, that the 
policy be rated special class 2 on the basis of an abnormal ECG and 
a history of "vague chest pain." However, as in Lynn Hardy's case, 
the medical department down-played the significance of the known 
impairments and concluded to waive the rating: "Feel we may be 
liberal .... Feel we may accept standard." (Add. p. 84.) The 
policy was issued standard and the insured died of a myocardial 
infarction nine months later. The claims department then figured 
that if the insured's medical history had been fully disclosed, the 
policy would have been rated special class 3. However, claim 
consultant Susan Frankel recommended payment of the claim because 
underwriters had waived the rating on the basis of the information 
they did have: 
Given that we waived a recommendation for Special Class 2 on 
the information we did have, which included references to the 
cardiac abnormalities,... I feel that we would have no basis 
now for declaring a misrepresentation ... and that we should 
pay the claim. 
(Add. pp. 85-86, emphasis added.) Prudential admits that the rating 
in the Mandelbaum case was waived "for competitive reasons." (Rec. 
p. 710 n.16.) 
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Prudential's "business reason" for opting not to rate a 
ratable policy is that it strengthens their claim in a potential 
misrepresentation action that they were not "on notice" of the medi-
cal impairment justifying the rating. Prudential acknowledges the 
rule that if it was "on notice" of an impairment at underwriting 
time, it would be estopped to later claim misrepresentation on the 
basis of that impairment. (Frankel Dep., Ex. 2 pp. 16-17.) More-
over, Prudential recognizes that a prior rating is prima facie evi-
dence of prior notice. For example, in the case of Edward A. Klug , 
Policy No. D84 081 443, a prior rating showed that Prudential was on 
notice of the misrepresented condition; therefore, the claim was 
paid: T 
In view of the fact that we knew of insured's condition, policy 
was rated, and insured died of same condition, will approve 
claim and waive contestability. [Add. p. 89.] 
Prudential took the same action on rated policies in the Richard A. 
Colwell case, Policy No. 79 056 337, and the Katherin Opgaard case, 
Policy No. D44 866 890. (Add. pp. 90-91.) Therefore, to avoid this 
prima facie evidence of "notice," Prudential waives the rating when 
possible. 
To illustrate the legal effect of a waived rating, in 
Tsosie v. Foundation Reserve Insurance Co., 77 N.M. 671, 427 P.2d 29 
(1967), the auto insurer claimed that had it known of the insured's 
prior license revocation it would have still issued the policy, but 
with higher premiums. The court rejected that claim because of the 
insurer's failure to rate the policy and adjust the premium for the 
other negative information that was disclosed. The insurer's dis-
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regard of disclosed facts "could properly be considered by the court 
in determining" the materiality of omitted facts. Id., 427 P.2d at 
31. 
Thusf based on the facts that Prudential (1) still would 
have issued the policy; (2) disregards medical history beyond five 
years old; and (3) waived a rating on the basis of the adverse 
information it did have, a jury could reasonably reject Prudential's 
"post-mortem" claim that omission of the old heart problem was 
material. 
D. Reasonable Reliance 
The law in Utah is clear that an insurer may not rescind a 
policy for misrepresentation unless the insurer actually relies on 
the misrepresentation, and that reliance is reasonable. Reliance is 
not reasonable if the insurer had sufficient indications to put it 
"on notice" to conduct an inquiry which, if carried out with rea-
sonable thoroughness, would have revealed the truth. In short, an 
insurer may not close its eyes to a misrepresentation and later 
plead reliance upon it to void the policy. See, e.g., Wootton v. 
Combined Insurance Co., 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724 (1964); Major 
Oil Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 457 F.2d 596 (10th 
Cir. 1972) (Utah law). 
Since the question of reasonable reliance parallels the 
issue of equitable estoppel to raise the misrepresentation defense, 
the two are addressed simultaneously under Point II. Suffice it to 
say at this point that there is sufficient evidence in the record 
from which a jury could reasonably find that Prudential either did 
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not rely on the omissions in the application, or that its claimed . 
reliance was unreasonable. Therefore, it was error for the trial 
court to grant Prudential summary judgment on the issue. 
E. Claimed Misrepresentation of Follow-up Information 
£ C
 t 
The trial court based its decision in part on the omission 
of Lynn's supposed heart medicatiion and treatment within five years 
prior to the application. (Add. pp. 2-3.) That finding is both 
i 
false and immaterial. Dr. Joseph L. Thorne, the cardiologist who 
gave Lynn periodic check-ups following his 1974 heart attack, testi-
fied that Lynn's only medication within that period was atromid, 
taken to regulate his cholesterol level. He took no "heart medica-
tion," such as digitalis or nitroglycerine. (Rec. p. 1069, Add. p. 
54, 115; see also Rec. pp. 822, 824, Add. pp. 59, 61.) Nor was Lynn 
receiving any "treatment" for heart disease. His condition was 
"totally asymptomatic," and his life was "active and normal." (Add. 
p. 54, 1|4; see also Add, p. 62.) As explained above, Lynn's visit 
to the University Medical Center in 1979, referred to by the court 
at Add. p. 2, 115, was merely for tests in connection with the 
Center's family studies, not for treatment of heart disease. (Add. 
p. 54, 116.) 
More importantly, the atromid medication and the check-ups 
by Dr. Thorne are immaterial in the context of this case. If the 
heart attack itself were not disclosed, then this follow-up informa-
tion would be material as evidence leading to knowledge of the heart 
attack. However, the evidence shows that the heart attack was dis-
closed; therefore, omission of the follow-up evidence is immaterial. 
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The same would be true in the analogous case of a real estate sales 
contract under which the seller discloses that the basement floods 
during rainstorms. The buyer could not later rescind the contract 
for the seller's failure also to disclose that the basement wall was 
cracked. Disclosure of the ultimate fact renders immaterial the 
omission of minor evidences of that fact. In this case, disclosure 
of the heart attack put Prudential on notice of the entire problem, 
rendering immaterial the omission of minor details. Moreover, there 
is no evidence that the follow-up information would have increased 
the rating above what it would have been for the heart attack alone. 
Thus, a jury could reasonably find this information immaterial, and 
it was therefore error for the court to rely upon it. 
Point II; PRUDENTIAL IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THE 
DEFENSE OF MISREPRESENTATION BECAUSE IT WAS "ON NOTICE" TO 
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY THAT REASONABLY WOULD HAVE REVEALED THE 
OMITTED INFORMATION ANTJ IT FAILED TO CONDUCT SUCH AN 
INQUIRY. 
The leading case of this Court illustrating application of 
equitable estoppel in the present context is Wootton v. Combined 
Insurance Co. of America, 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724 (1964). In 
Wootton, the insurer refused payment on a life insurance policy 
because the applicant stated on the application that her husband was 
in good health and free from physical defect, when in fact he had 
previously retired from work and applied for social security on the 
claim that he was totally disabled by polio. The Court rejected the 
insurer's defense of misrepresentation because the applicant 
informed the insurance agent at the time of the application that her 
husband had polio and the agent saw that the husband walked with a 
limp. The Court ruled that the false answer on the application that 
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the husband was free from physical defect "must be taken in conjunc-
tion with the disclosure" to the agent that the husband had a polio 
defect. Id., 395 P.2d at 726. The Court concluded: 
Appellant had sufficient knowledge of the physical disability 
of respondent's husband to ascertain all the facts it needed as 
to its extent, if it had deemed it important, by either asking 
further questions or conducting an investigation; and it cannot 
blind itself from ascertaining the truth and then claim wilful 
misrepresentation of the truth on which it relied in order to 
avoid payment under a policy. [Id., emphasis added.] 
The case of Major Oil Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Society, 457 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1972), applying Utah law, is also 
similar factually to the present case and illustrates the rule of 
equitable estoppel. In Major Oil the insured had a history of hos-
pitalization and treatment for alcoholism and an impaired liver. On 
his life insurance application, the insured falsely denied any 
treatment for a liver disorder, denied any treatment by a physician 
within the previous five years, and made no mention of his hospi-
talization and treatment for alcoholism. However, agents of the 
insurer were informed orally that the insured had been hospitalized 
for alcoholism, and the insurer's underwriting department learned 
from an independent information service that the insured had a 
drinking problem. The underwriting department then conducted its 
own routine investigation, which failed to confirm the drinking 
problem. The insurer then decided to issue the policy, without 
following its leads to make a further inquiry into the seriousness 
of the drinking problem. The insured died shortly thereafter, and 
only after the beneficiary's claim did the insurer investigate its 
lead from the information service to learn from another insurer of 
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the insured's alcoholism and liver disorder. The insurer raised the 
defense of misrepresentation, and the beneficiary contended that the 
insurer was estopped to raise the defense because the insurer was 
"on notice" through disclosure to the agent and the lead from the 
information service. The court agreed with the beneficiary, stating 
the general rule in two parts, as follows: 
(l)if the insurer has actual knowledge of the true facts, or of 
the falsity of the statements, or at least has sufficient indi-
cations that would have put a prudent man on notice and would 
have caused him to start an inquiry which, if carried out with 
reasonable thoroughness would reveal the truth, he cannot blind 
himself to the true facts and choose to 'rely' on the misrepre-
sentation; (2) if the insurer chooses to make an independent 
inquiry and the subject matter and the circumstances are such 
that he is in a position to ascertain the facts by a reasonable 
search, then he cannot plead reliance even if his investigation 
is as a matter of fact cursory and did not reveal the true 
facts—and if in the course of such an investigation he finds 
clues indicating the falsehood of some representations he is 
also bound, by the first rule, by what a reasonable inquiry 
into those clues would show. [Id. at 602. Quoted by Prudential 
as the applicable rule in Corp. Claim Memo. 76-40, p. 16, 
Frankel Dep., Ex. 2.] 
Applying that rule to the facts of that case, the court 
first concluded that the information disclosed to the agent was 
imputed to the insurer. Id. at 603. Concerning the quantum and 
nature of the information necessary to put an insurer "on notice," 
the court ruled that the test is not whether the insurer had actual 
knowledge of the true facts or actual knowledge of the falsity of 
the insured's statements, "but whether it had sufficient informa-
tion" to put a prudent man "on notice" to start an inquiry that 
reasonably would have revealed the truth. _Id_. at 604. Nor is it 
necessary that one disclosure alone be sufficient to put the insurer 
on notice; rather, the test "is whether the cumulative effect of all 
-35-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
the evidence bearing on this issue was sufficient to put [the 
insurer] on notice." Id. If the insurer was on inquiry notice it 
"may be charged with knowledge of facts which it ought to have 
known." Id. at 603. The court concluded that the fact of the 
insured's "drinking problem," disclosed to the agent and reported by 
the information service, was sufficient to put the insurer on notice 
to investigate the seriousness of the drinking problem. Moreover, 
judging by the ease with which the insurer discovered the omitted 
history after the insured's death, it was apparent that a reasonable 
search would have revealed the same information before issuance of 
the policy. Therefore, the insurer was charged with knowledge of 
that information and was equitably estopped to raise the misrepre-
sentation defense. Id. See also State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. 
Co. v. Wood, 25 Utah 2d 427, 483 P.2d 892 (1971) (insurer lost right 
to rescind for misrepresentation by its failure to make reasonable 
investigation of insurability before issuing the policy); Taylor v. 
Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 P.2d 222, 228-29 (1935) (party with means of 
discovering truth cannot be inactive and afterwards allege fraud); 
16B Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §§9081-9082, 9088; 7 Couch 
on Insurance 2d §§ 35:252, 35:254; 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance §1018. 
A review of the information admittedly known to Prudential 
at the time of underwriting Lynn's policy demonstrates that Pruden-
tial was "on notice" to conduct a further inquiry and should be 
charged with knowledge of what that inquiry would have revealed. 
Prudential learned from the first Part 2, completed by Launa Perry, 
that Lynn's father and two brothers had died at young ages from 
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heart attacks; his mother died of a stroke; one brother died of 
suicide; three other brothers and a sister died at birth; he smoked 
cigarettes; and he had been examined by Dr. Taylor in 1979. (Add. p. 
8.) The Equifax report confirmed the smoking habit; disclosed that 
a third brother, still living, also had heart problems; and listed 
another physician, "Dr. Peterson." (Add. pp. 34-36.) Prudential 
then learned from the ECG performed by Ms. Perry that Lynn had a 
first-degree AV heart block. (Add. p. 37.) Prudential learned from 
the second Part 2, completed by Dr. Evans, that Lynn had smoked 
heavily for twenty years; he had rheumatic fever as a child; he 
received a recent I.C.C. exam from Dr. Capener; and he had been 
treated by Dr. Val Sundwall at Cottonwood Hospital. (Add. p. 10.) 
The "cumulative effect" of the above information was "suf-
ficient to excite attention and call for [further] inquiry" into 
Lynn's physical condition. See, Johnson v. Life Insurance Co. of 
Georgia, 52 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1951); Union Insurance Exchange, 
Inc. v. Gaul, 393 F.2d 151, 154-155 (7th Cir. 1968) (insurer had 
sufficient information "to awaken further inquiry"). Prudential 
admits the significance of Lynn's extensive family history of heart 
disease and his heart block. Prudential's underwriting manual 
states: 
A number of deaths from cardiovascular-renal disease in a 
family at ages under 60 is significant, especially if the 
applicant shows any indication of any cardiovascular-renal 
impairment. 
(Reed Dep., Ex. 5, p. VII-1, emphasis added.) It also states that 
where three or more cases of cardiovascular disease exist "[i]n 
combination with ... any evidence of cardiovascular-renal disease" 
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in the applicant, the debits for the two impairments should be com-
bined, id., and additional debits should be added because the 
impairments are "inter-related." (Id. at B.) 
In addition to the family history, Lynn's own childhood 
rheumatic fever could be indicative of future heart problems, 
Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, Ch. 257 pp. 1400-02 
(10th ed. 1983); 1 Anderson's Pathology, pp. 606-07 (8th ed. 1985) 
(Add. pp. 65-71), and a first-degree AV heart block may be indica-
tive of a prior inferior wall myocardial infarction, such as Lynn 
suffered in 1974, J. Hurst, The Heart, pp. 544-45 (5th ed. 1982); E. 
Goldberger, Textbook of Clinical Cardiology, p. 550 (1982) (Add. pp. 
72-76); see also FDE-1 p. 59; Ketchum Dep. p. 12; Reed Dep., Ex. 5 
p. 11-33. The underwriting manual also indicates "special consider-
ation" for a suicide in the family and "several early family deaths" 
where "the lack of longevity is very marked." (Reed Dep., Ex. 5 p. 
VII-1.) Smoking also has significance in conjunction with other 
impairments. (Shaw Dep. p. 45; Ketchum Dep. p. 19; Wiczek Dep. p. 
12; see also Thorne Aff't 118, Add. p. 55.) Thus, Lynn's application 
did show indications of cardiovascular impairment. 
Prudential's underwriters recognized the significance of 
the indicated impairments and the need for a further investigation, 
such as requesting medical records from the listed physicians and 
hospital. As shown previously, underwriter Shaw judged the impair-
ments significant enough to rate the policy and charge a higher 
premium. (Add. p. 39.) He recognized that the AV heart block indi-
cated "some sort of abnormality," and that the family history and 
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heart block together were "indicative of a potential heart problem." 
(Shaw Dep. pp. 26-28.) Underwriter John Wiczek, who ultimately 
approved the policy unrated, also testified concerning the indicated 
impairments: 
Q. ... Having in mind that information as an underwriter and 
based upon your experience and training, would that be a 
significant factor which in your opinion would warrant 
some further investigation and analysis? 
A. Yes, I believe it would. 
(Wiczek Dep. p. 12.) Jan Drosendahl LeRoux also testified: 
Q. Would you consider [the family history of heart disease] 
to be a red flag under those circumstances? 
A. Three more incidents of coronary artery disease under age 
60, yes, in a family history. 
Q. Would you also consider a red flag the fact that the EKG 
showed a Class 1 heart block? 
(LeRoux Dep. p. 19.) Dr. Ketchum agreed that a prudent underwriter 
would have requested and reviewed available medical records: 
Q. ... Were those two red flags, family history and the ECG, 
sufficient to warrant a request from attending physicians 
for their statements? 
A. ... Certainly using those two—using the term red flag— 
taken together, could well prompt a reasonable underwriter 
to get an attending physician's statement perhaps from at 
least the most proximate physician who is listed on the 
declarations as having been seen in attendance .... 
[Ketchum Dep. p. 49.] 
Prudential could have readily obtained or checked the 
medical records indicated in the application, and Lynn's signed 
release authorized it to do so. Underwriter Shaw testified that 
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requests for medical records were commonly made, directly by 
Prudential or through Equifax: 
Q. It was not unusual in the Underwriting Department in 
various cases to make a request for attending physician's 
statements and hospital records; isn't that true? 
£. That is correct. 
Q. And those documents could either be procured directly by a 
secretary or someone working for Prudential Insurance 
communicating with the doctor or the hospital or by 
sending it out to these independent investigators; isn't 
that true? 
A. That is correct. 
(Shaw Dep. p. 14; see also pp. 15, 38-39 and Wiczek Dep. pp. 9, 
15.) Underwriter Wiczek testified that a request for Lynn's medical 
records should have been made to Equifax: 
Q. . . . [Biased upon what you know of this case now and as a 
general rule, with reference to the practice that's 
followed in the Underwriting Department, wouldn't you 
normally expect that a form like Exhibit 8 [requesting 
medical records] would have been completed and sent to 
Equifax? 
A. Yes. [Id. at 23.] 
In fact, no such form or request for medical records was sent to 
Equifax. Stanley Vogen, of Equifax, testified: 
Q. Since you have printed forms in that regard, is it fair 
for me to assume that insurance companies do make requests 
on occasion for you to secure medical history from doctors 
and from hospitals? 
A. True. 
Q. They would return that [form] to you together, apparently, 
with an authorization for you to get the information? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There's nothing in your files or records in this case of 
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Lynn Hardy to indicate that such requests were made by 
Prudential? 
A. No. [Vogen Dep. pp. 27-28.] 
Thus, despite the indications of cardiovascular impairment 
in Lynn's application, and the leads to four doctors and a hospital 
known to have further medical information, Prudential made no 
further inquiry beyond requesting the APS from Dr. Taylor, who was 
listed on the first Part 2. Prudential made no request from the 
doctors or hospital listed on the second part 2, or from the doctor 
listed in the Equifax report. Therefore, Prudential's conclusion in 
the claims investigation, that "[u]nder-writing thoroughly 
investigated all given possible leads to information," (Add. p. 50), 
is false. Prudential did not follow the leads to Doctors Sundwall, 
Capener, and Peterson, or the lead to Cottonwood Hospital. If 
Prudential had inquired with Dr. Sundwall or Cottonwood Hospital 
before issuing the policy, it would have learned of Lynn's 1974 
heart attack, just as it did following his death. 
Relevant case law demonstrates that Prudential's failure 
to check with the hospital or doctors listed on Lynn's application 
estops it from asserting misrepresentation. For example, in 
Rutherford v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 44 Cal. Rptr. 697 
(Cal. App. 1965), the insured failed to disclose on Part 2 of the 
application a history of treatment for chest pain and the doctor who 
had been treating him. However, he did disclose the names of other 
doctors who had treated him for other ailments, and who were also 
aware of the insured's history of chest pain. The court found that 
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the answers in the application put Prudential on notice of a 
possible misrepresentation, imposing a duty on Prudential to conduct 
a further inquiry by contacting the two doctors in the applica-
tion. Had additional information been requested from those doctors, 
the insured's true condition would have been learned. Id. at 704, 
707. Prudential's failure to make that further inquiry barred it 
from claiming misrepresentation. 
On facts even closer to the present case, the court in 
Trawick v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co., 447 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 
1971), reached the same result. There, the insured denied a prior 
history of heart disease on the application. However, the insurer 
possessed at the time of issue an abnormal ECG reading and the 
insured's family history revealing that his father and two brothers 
had previously died of heart trouble. Id. at 1296. The court con-
cluded that while such evidence does not show "actual knowledge" of 
the insured's true condition, it is sufficient to put the insurer 
"on notice" to conduct a further inquiry. Since the insurer was on 
inquiry notice and was "in a position to ascertain the facts by a 
reasonable search, then the insurance company cannot avoid liability 
by pleading reliance on the insured's application." Id. 
Likewise, in First National Bank v. Modern Woodmen of 
America, 486 F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1973), the insured failed to dis-
close a history of hospitalization and treatment for potential heart 
disease and listed only one doctor and hospital that had treated 
him. However, he did disclose that his father had died of heart 
disease and also gave other answers indicating other hospitaliza-
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tions. The court held that the purpose of the medical examination 
is "to develop leads for future investigation." Id. at 13. Had the 
insurer inquired at the listed hospital or requested the medical 
records from the listed physician it would have learned the full 
history; instead/ the insurer made no such further inquiry. The 
court concluded: 
Appellant could have readily obtained all the relevant informa-
tion from [the physician listed on the application] but it 
failed to do so. Upon these facts we can only conclude that 
appellant was sufficiently put on notice as to Kellams1 condi-
tion and, therefore, is chargeable with knowledge of facts 
which a prudent inquiry would have revealed. 
Id. at 14. For other cases illustrating the estoppel rule in the 
insurance claim context see Columbian National Life Insurance Co. v. 
Rodgers, 116 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1940) (courts loathe forfeitures); 
Security Life & Trust Co. v. Jones, 202 So. 2d 906, 909 (Fla. App. 
1967) (estoppel based on failureTto consult available physician and 
hospital records); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Pollard, 19 
S.E.2d 557, 559 (Ga. App. 1942) (failure to make inquiry of listed 
physician); Wabash Life Insurance Co. v. Maguire, 461 S.W.2d 916 
(Ky. App. 1971), Washington National Insurance Co. v. Estate of 
Reginato, 272 F. Supp. 1016 (D. Cal. 1966); Northern National Life 
Ins. Co. v. Lacy J. Miller Machine Co., 305 S.E.2d 568 (N.C. App. 
1983); Johnson v. Life Insurance Co. of Georgia, 52 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 
1951); Pipes v. World Insurance Co., 150 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. La. 
1957) . 
Prudential has acknowledged and applied the rule of 
estoppel for its failure to check available medical records in other 
similar cases. For example, in the Manfred Mandelbaum case, Claim 
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No. WOD082820, the insured failed to disclose an extensive history 
of heart disease but did disclose the names of two Kaiser medical 
centers where he had been treated. Prudential obtained the medical 
records from the Kaiser-Sunset center and discovered a history of 
chest pain and an abnormal ECG. Prudential waived the recommended 
rating and issued the policy standard. After the insured died of a 
myocardial infarction within the contestable period, Prudential 
obtained the medical records from the Kaiser-Cadillac center and 
learned the full undisclosed history of heart disease, which would 
have required a special class 3 rating. Prudential paid the claim 
despite the misrepresentation because it was "on notice" to check 
available medical records and failed to do so: 
Because it was decided at issue to waive a Special Class 3 
rating based on the insured's cardiac abnormalities you are 
recommending that we pay the claim. I agree. As I see it, there 
is no basis for a misrepresentation defense. At underwriting 
time we were on notice. . . . Underwriting . . . did not pursue 
obtaining his medical records . . . .[Add. pp. 87-88, emphasis 
added.] 
Likewise, in the Josephine Oertel case, Claim No. NOD085449, 
Prudential paid the claim despite a misrepresentation because of its 
failure to obtain available medical records: 
Underwriter's comment on reverse of Part I indicates that there 
was a basis for requesting an APS [attending physician's state-
ment] , but he opted not to. Thus we waived the APS and accepted 
the risk with our eyes open. [Add. p. 80, emphasis added.] 
Prudential also paid the John Richardson claim, No. NOD 070413, 
despite a misrepresentation, for the same reason: 
The Company had an opportunity to obtain clarification of dx 
[diagnosis] and prognosis, etc. from the source (A.P.) and 
opted not to do so. These factors would substantially weaken a 
misrepresentation defense. . . .We would also be vulnerable to 
a contention that we were "reunderwriting"1 at time of claim and 
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thus be exposed to a damages action. On balance, I am reluctant 
to resist liability in this case. Pay death benefits. [Add. pp. 
92-93, emphasis added.] 
Thus, in the case of Lynn Hardy, Prudential was on inquiry 
notice, it was in a position to learn the truth, and failed to con-
duct a further inquiry. Therefore, Prudential is charged with know-
ledge of what a reasonable search would have disclosed and is now 
estopped by its own inaction from claiming reliance on a misrepre-
sentation. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON CLAIMED 
MISREPRESENTATIONS OUTSIDE THE APPLICATION. 
The insurance policy issued to Lynn Hardy prohibits Pru-
dential from relying on statements outside the application to void 
the policy: 
We will not use any statement, unless made in the application, 
to void the contract or to—deny a claim. 
(FDE-1 p. 233, Add. p. 16.) Prudential violated this provision by 
alleging, as grounds for rescission, that Mrs. Hardy intentionally 
withheld Lynn's medical history from Prudential. (Rec. p. 671 et 
seq.) The trial court seized upon this error and based its decision 
on claimed misrepresentations of Mrs. Hardy. The court's decision 
repeatedly refers to the "plaintiff" and to both Lynn and Cheryl. 
For example, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the court's decision cite omis-
sions of "Mrs." Hardy, and the court concludes that "the plaintiff" 
has withheld information justifying rescission. (Add. pp. 2-3.) 
The trial court's construction of the policy in relying on 
omissions of Mrs. Hardy, outside the application, constitutes rever-
sible error. By the clear terms of the policy, Prudential may rely 
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only on claimed misrepresentations made in the application. Since 
only Lynn Hardy made statements in the application, Prudential and 
the trial court were limited to reliance on those statements. To 
illustrate, in Wabash Life Insurance Co. v. Maguire, 461 S.W.2d 916 
(Ky. App. 1971), the insurer attempted to rely on omissions of the 
insured's widow and beneficiary to void the policy. The court 
rejected the attempt: 
The further claim that ... the insured's widow and benefi-
ciary under the policy, cannot recover because, in substance, 
she knew of the policies and knew her husband's condition is 
nothing short of ridiculous, and we shall not dignify it by 
further mention. 
Id. at 919. The same holding is justified in this case. 
POINT IV: PRUDENTIAL IS PRECLUDED FROM OBTAINING RESCISSION BY ITS 
OWN DISCRIMINATORY AND BAD FAITH HANDLING OF PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM AND BY THE INEQUITABLE RESULT THAT RESCISSION WOULD 
PRODUCE. 
The Utah Insurance Code, U.C.A. §31-27-22(1), prohibits 
unfair discrimination by insurers in the handling and payment of 
claims. (Add. p. 63.) In this case, Prudential has engaged in flag-
rant, unjustified discrimination in the handling and denial of Mrs. 
Hardy's claim. For example, as demonstrated in the preceding argu-
ments, Prudential failed to apply the rules commonly applied in its 
other similar cases, including (1) imputing the agent's knowledge to 
the company, supra p. 17; (2) accepting the insured's sincere belief 
of good health, supra p. 23; (3) disregarding medical history beyond 
five years prior to the application, including old myocardial 
infarctions, supra p. 26; (4) paying the claim where it was "on 
notice" of the condition and waived a rating, supra p. 29; and (5) 
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paying the claim where it should have consulted available medical 
records but failed to do so, supra p. 44. 
Prudential has also violated the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing inherent in every contractual relationship. See, e.g., 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 306 (Utah 
1982). In no other area of the law is this duty more applicable and 
better developed than in the area of insurance contracts. In the 
insurance context the insured occupies an inferior bargaining posi-
tion, and where the loss insured against does occur, the insured is 
placed in an economically vulnerable position at the mercy of the 
insurer. Thus, to better protect insureds from arbitrary and unfair 
insurance practices, the majority of courts now recognize a cause of 
action for an insurer's bad faith handling and denial of a claim. 
E.g., Noble v. National American Life Insurance Co., 128 Ariz. 188, 
624 P.2d 866, 867 (1981); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 
577 P.2d 899, 901 n.l (Okla. 1978); Ghiardi & Kircher, Punitive 
Damages: Law and Practice §8.11 n.14 (1984); Annot., Insurer's 
Liability for Consequential or Punitive Damages for Wrongful Delay 
or Refusal to Make Payment Due Under Contracts, 47 A.L.R.3d 314 
(1973). 
This Court has also recognized a cause of action for an 
insurer's bad faith. In Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 19 
Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576, 578 (1967), the Court stated: 
[T]he cause of action for bad faith, though arising because of 
the policy, is not, strictly speaking, an action on the policy. 
. . .[I]t is properly regarded as a separate cause of action 
for a wrong done to the insured by violating a fiduciary duty 
owed to him. 
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See also Auerback v. Key Security Police, 680 P.2d 740, 743 (Utah 
1984); Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co*, 25 Utah 2d 311, 
480 P.2d 739, 745 (1971); Espinoza v. Safeco Title Insurance Co., 
598 P.2d 346, 349 n.7 (Utah 1979); American States Insurance Co, v. 
Walker, 26 Utah 2d 161, 486 P.2d 1042, 1044 (1971). This duty is 
reinforced by the Utah Insurance Code, U.C.A. §§31-1-8, 31-27-1(1), 
and by the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations of the 
Utah Insurance Department, sections 2 and 5. (Add. pp. 63-64.) 
While space does not permit a discussion of all the bad 
faith practices of Prudential in this case, it is apparent from the 
"entire course of dealings between the parties" that Prudential has 
violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Timmons v. 
Royal Globe Insurance Co., 653 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1982); Pistorious v. 
Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 123 Cal. App. 3d 541, 176 Cal. 
Rptr. 660 (1981). For example, (1) Agent Rigby mislead Lynn to 
believe that disclosure of the 1974 heart attack in the application 
was not required; (2) Prudential had at least imputed and construc-
tive knowledge of Lynn's medical history, intentionally waived 
rating the policy, and now falsely denies that it was "on notice"; 
(3) Prudential failed to conduct the further inquiry indicated by 
the information it had; (4) Prudential falsely represented to Mrs. 
Hardy and the Utah Insurance Department that its underwriters 
"thoroughly investigated" all leads prior to issuing the policy and 
that it was not "on notice" of the omitted history; (5) Prudential 
knew that Mrs. Hardy would lose her trucking business if it denied 
her claim and yet acted with total disregard for those consequences; 
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(6) Prudential unfairly discriminated against Mrs. Hardy's claim, as 
shown above; and (7) Prudential sought rescission of the policy 
without attempting in good faith to settle the claim. This unfair 
and bad faith conduct of Prudential precludes it from now obtaining 
the "equitable" remedy of rescission. 
Rescission is also precluded by the inequity that results 
from restoring the parties to their precontract, or "no-contract," 
position. As shown above, even if Prudential had known the omitted 
history, it still would have issued the policy for the additional 
premiums totaling $3318. Since the policy would have been issued in 
any event, it is not reasonable or equitable to restore the parties 
to a no-contract position. Rather, they should be restored to the 
position they would have occupied absent the claimed misrepresenta-
tion. Under that remedy, often referred to as "reformation," Mrs. 
Hardy would receive the insurance proceeds, less the additional 
premiums of $3318. Such a remedy is more consistent with the 
approach of "common sense and flexibility" that characterize a court 
of equity. D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies §4.3 (1973); 
see also Restatement of the Law of Restitution §28, comment d. 
Moreover, in the context of life insurance contracts it is impos-
sible to restore the parties to their precontract positions: 
The need to protect the stability of transactions is especially 
important in the case of insurance policies, where the attempt 
to rescind is made by the insurer after the occurrence of the 
insured event. In these cases, of course, rescission does not 
return the parties to the status quo ante; after the loss it is 
too late to procure substitute insurance. 
James & Gray, Misrepresentation—Part II, 37 Md. L. Rev. 488, 500-01 
n.ll (1978) (emphasis added). Likewise, it is too late for Lynn 
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Hardy to obtain other life insurance. Thus, on the facts of this 
case, it would be inequitable to grant Prudential a windfall of 
$300,000 because of a disputed $3318. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mrs. Hardy respectfully requests 
that the order of summary judgment be reversed and that the case be 
remanded for trial. 
Dated this /5l^day of August, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
BV <&J#*L 7Z6^ 
Dan S. Bushnell 
Merri l l F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Plaint i f f /Appel lant 
_ c n . 
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r — - IN- THE DJ STRICT COURT G<" SALT L.-iKC COUU 
F STATE OF (J IAN l*?L£DU CLERKS Cv "•;<"£ 
fait Ukfe County U»«*» 
CHERYL HARDY, 
Plaintiff., 
vs. 
! ! IE PRUDENT I AL I M S U R H N C E 
•.AJliPAMY OF AMERICA a n d 
WAYNE L . R I G D Y , 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
rkH*0l985 
Dint Ccurt 
22&3S Oppgty Df.:fc 
MEMORANDUM DEC ISION 
vil No4*S3-719^ ,1  
'"'.laintiff has filed this lawsuit seeking homages and 
recoyer y o«i a "1 i f• e i nsLirance p o 1 :t ~y j. «su<.?r; by the defen<:!ant, 
Rr ud(•-• r-ij;" i a 1 .. DeI &nd&nt,, Pr uden t i a 1 ,, seek s r esc i si Dn of ':he 
r.• D 1 i c v on the g r c u n d B t h a t 11«•:••• p 1 a i n 13 f f a n d h •-•- r h u s i: • a n d 
MI i. srepresen Lod mat (?i• -i a 1 f acts :;..« c:cnnsc t i Dri w:i. th Ihe 
app I i cat i crj f or vhp pel i cy» Doth si d;2i:.; h a-, 
Motions for Bummanv Judgment... Man.- facts ,:ire no: 
a n^ • I"1 e c <j u t~ t f i n d s t h e f o 11 o w i n u f a c t s -•. \ c i.t r; c i • p u t e d ;: a c t s 
:J. r i t h c c a s c ;: 
1 « L y n n H 3 r d y w a s t h o h u s b a i * J o f t h •- p i. ~» I. < I:,. f f h e r J i n , 
2 „ 7 I . e p 1 a i r 11> Rf a n c! L y n n : i a r d y m -• d <•:: a;: .• n .1 :i •.::: c:i ••; i o n t c 
' 'r v.i d e n t i a 1 :*'• o r a t 3 0 0
 ? 0 J5'":« 00 1 i i" ? i. n s u i" ar"; •" tr- D O *' i c y u p nn 1. h -. 
Buoim. . v i e d 
n d i v n u t e 
i f G3- o f L y n n l i a i ' d v w i t h t h e p i a.i n ,.:i. f f t o b r t h - r 
«on c f i. c :i a. r / : .i n d.::/ J " 1.! s e p o 1 I.«..: y „ 
3., S a i d a n u l i c a t . i o n '--.as madt-:- i n A u g u s t 19T3.I. 
owner" a n d 
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1« LVTII, Hardy !'<;, J s ,.-. : : '•: :red •:,vrir.i.i.:r h ^ v t atT'ac1: i r, 
January 1.974., but this uas never- shown on the application t:r ' 
!i*' . and Mrs. Hardy., no'- was this i n form:-':. i on e-cr given to 
tne ex ami ni ng physician ., Dr. Evans, 
5« Neither Mr- or Mrs* Hardy ever revealed to the 
Eq u i f ax i n vest i g at or. act in g on Pruden t ia1 ?s behalf, nor 
anyone else acting on behalf of Prudential, the prior heart 
attack nor the fact that he was taking regular medication 
and h a ci b e e n m o n i t o r e d a n d t r e a t e d f o r a h e a r t d :i. s e a s e a t 
the University of Utah Medical Center and by Dr. Thorne, a 
cardiologist, as late as August 1., .1.979* 
6* Prudential issued the $300., 000.00 life insurance 
p o 1 i c y u p o n 11) e 1 i f e o f L y n n H a r r.i y w i t.h o u t a n y a d d i t i o n a 1 
premium rating.' 
7- Lynn Hardy died o( a heart attack on December A9 
1982., within the policy's contest-ability period. 
8„ Prudential denied the plaintiffs claim for money 
under the policy on the grounds cf -false &\>d fraudulent 
misrepresentation of material facts and seeks rescission of 
the insurance policy and tenders tack to the plaintiff all 
p r e m i u m s p a i. d ,. 
P1 a i n t i f f c o n t e n ci s L h a t s h e a n d h e r h u s fo a n d w e r e 
informed by the defendant., Way no I R:; gby., the insurance 
agent f o r t h e defends n t - P r LI d e n t i a 3. , t h ^  t t! •• e y n e e ci n c t 
disc 1 nse any med i c i a 1 i nf or mat i on t |-i at pre•:::edes t he;? per i oci 
of five years before the application,. The prior heart attack 
was m o r e t h a n f i v e y e a r s b e f o r e t h e a p p 1 :i c a t i o n . C e r t a i n 1 y „ 
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btfi* 
*? this would bb 'a sufficient issue :>f fact to den/ the 1* motion 
f or summary judgment i f it were not for the fact that the 
p 1 a i n 11 i \ a n d h er i •; u. s b a n d w :L t! i h e 1 d t h o i n f or mat :i. on a f t h e 
fact that Mr- i-!ai dy had seen Dr,. Thorne and the University 
of Utah Medical Center in 197? both within the H V B year 
period. Certainly, this was a fact well known to both Mr. 
and Mrs- Mardy and was deliberate 1 y wi thhe 1 d f rD.TI the 
Prudential. The court .finds this to be a material fact which 
was deliberate!y w i t hh e1d f r om t he defend a n t a n d t h at t he 
defendant;, Prudent i al « relied upon the representations made 
by t he Hardys.. Fur ther more, the evi denc:e i s uncon trovert ed 
that Mr. I lardy was on medication up to the time ef his 
d e a t h. T h i s m a t e r i a 1 f a c t w a s n o t d i s c: 1 o s e d a n d w o u 1 d h a v e 
materially effected the decision to issue the policy.. 
All of the foregoing facts clearly show that the 
plaintiff has purposely withheld material facts from the 
i ns urance app 1 i cati on and jus(:i f-y 1h e de f endant ,f Prudent i a 1 ;f 
to rescind its insur&nc:& policy. 
Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant,, 
Pruder t i al , i s granted . PI ai n t i f f ? s Ma-- i on for Summary 
Judgment is d^rn.E:d., 
Dated this ^_0 day of February, 1705. 
Dean is. vCo»<de ~ 
Di. st r i ct Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
,CI©rk 
&«f**yQt9fk 
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* l V R • % - . ' *7T> fiONDmONS OF APPUCMlffli A 
1R0 
»-o 
a* 
RM Tracer Sent Initials 
\ M J OOf 08 1981 v 
(49) UNDSRWIUTING DIV. 
g y s pac PRATE DREE 
laauaDatails 
PC 
Q Multiple Parts 2 IfjAppI* other than 
• Cons. Comm. Adj. Q 31 Day Delivery 
Rag ion Agency Coda 
SLCX 
Agency 
SAP" LAKE CITY AGENCY 
Letter Des. 
22_ 
Contract No. (Rep.lnit*] 
9993 VtZ 
Name (Print or>tmp) 
4>A><r j . fitter 
.% Credit to 
Agency Code 
Check Applicable Box 
^Individual 
n Two or more Uvea 
To Se Completed in Every Case 
j / y * ^*- Premium Quoted 
%/&C*6S(Ac 
.(According to interval of premium payment) 
Regular Ord. 
Prudential Parti Application to The Prudential Insurance Company of America \*>6 76£ 4%Z~* 
1a. Proposed Insured's name —first initial last (Print) 
4/<o*J j/**&f 
lb. Sex 
I^MDF 
2a. Date of birth 2b. Age 
3. D Single JJMarried • Widowed 
D Separated • Divorced 
5a. Occupation: 
"fane* f&ttf$& 
>. If spouse is proposed for 6, spouse 
a. Name 
b. Date of birth 
proposed for coverage, give 
5b. For how long? 
XT I** 
7W<rt\rA Or*« 
2c. Place of birth 
Address for mail 
No. /£.<Q Street JO < 
CitV-T C C State fSr KV1TV//9 
Mo. Day Yr. 
c. Age d. Place 
of birth 
Amt. of life 
ins. in force 
8a. Kind of policy I 8b. Initial amount 
9. Rating if not 
Standard 
10. Accidental death coverage 
a. Initial amt $. 
b. RatingD2 Q 3 • * Q 5 
7. For each child proposed for coverage give: 
First name & 
initial 
c . 
d.. 
e.. 
f.. 
Relation-
ship 
Date of birth 
Mo. Day! Yr. 
Amt. of life 
ins. in force 
Insurance for a child will not start until the 15th 
of life. 
11. To apply for any of these Supplementary Benefits, give details 
a Year Decreasing Term on Insured 
$ Initial Amount. 
Family Income to. 
Insured $ 
th Contract Anniversary on 
.per month. 
Year Decreasing Term on • Spouse 
• Insured & Spouse $ Initial Amount 
Decreasing Term to Age 65M/68F on Insured 
$ Initial Amount 
Decreasing Term to Age 62M/65F on Spouse 
$ Initial Amount 
Family Income to 20th Contract Anniversary on 
Q Spouse Q Insured & Spouse $ per month. 
Family Income to Age 65M/68F on insured 
$ per month. 
Family Income to Age 52M/55F on Spouse 
$ per month. 
.Year Level Term on Insured $. 
• Level Premium • Mod. Premium 
j . Level Term on Dependent Children $ 
k. Option to Purchase Additional Insurance $-
I 12. Beneficiarv: ^ //^ ^ _ - (Do not complete for a family or Insured 8t Spouse Policy.) 
-~- ^ *. 1 -^^^ar ^^a>/^ 
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13. State any special request. 14. List all life insurance, annuities and variable con-
tracts on proposed Insured. (If NONE, so state.) 
^Company, 
4fHti«H -¥ear 
M 'jga qgy 
Kind'Life, 
End't.Qfoup) Medics! Ye 
D 
D IL 
No 
D 
D 
D 
n 15. Will this insurance replace or change any existing insurance or annuity in any company on any 
person named in 1a, 6 or 7? If "Yes", give their names, name of company, plan, amount and policy Y e s N° 
numbers. E «fij 
16. Is anyone applying for, or trying to reinstate, life or health insurance on any person named in 1a, 6 or Yes No 
7 in this or any company? If "Yes", give amount details and company. • J3? 
17. Does any person named in 1a, 6 or 7 plan to live or travel outside the United States and Canada Yes No 
within the next 12 months? If "Yes", give details. • & > 
18. Does any person named in 1a, 6 or 7 plan to fly an aircraft, glider, balloon or like device or, within the 
last 2 years, has any such person flown as a student pilot, pilot or crew member or had any other Yes No 
duties aboard an aircraft, glider, balloon or like device while in flight (including flight for flight pay)?.. Q 
If "Yes", complete Aviation Questionnaire. 
19. Has any person named in 1a or 6, within the last 12 months: Yes No 
a been treated by a doctor for or had a known heart attack, stroke or cancer other than of the skin?— D "6£ 
b. had an electrocardiogram for chest pain or for any other physical complaint or taken medication 
for high blood pressure? D J B -
20. Premiums payable QAnn. • Semi-Ann. QQuar. J&Aon. QPay. Budg. QPru-Matic DGov't Allot 
21. Amount paid $ / f r f / . £ ^ D None (Must be "None" if either 19a or 19b is answered "Yes".) 
22. Is it understood that a medical examination will be made on any person named in 1a, 6 or 7? If "Yes", Yes No 
on whom? j^ f D 
23. If 22 is "Yes", is it agreed that no insurance will take effect on anyone until all medical examinations Yes No 
are made, even though 21 shows that an amount has been paid? . /&[ D 
24. Changes made by Home Office. 
The proposed Insured declares that, to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, the above statements are 
complete and true. When Prudential gives a receipt form, ORD 22385-79, of the same date as this Part 1, coverage 
will start as shown in that form. Otherwise, no coverage will start unless: (1) a contract is issued, (2) it is accepted, 
and (3) the full first premium is paid while all persons to be covered are living and their health remains as stated in 
Parts 1 and 2. If all these take place, coverage will start on the contract date. Any entry in 24 made at a Home Office 
will be approved by acceptance of the contract. But where the law requires written consent for any change in the 
application, such a change can be made only if those who sign This form approve the change in writing. No agent 
can make or change a contract or waive any of Prudential's rights or needs. 
OWNERSHIP: Unless otherwise asked for above, the owner of the contract will be (1) the applicant if other than the 
proposed Insured, otherwise (2) the proposed Insured. But this is subject to any automatic transfer of ownership 
stated in the contract 
Applications X?y ' S t a t e M - ISignatyfCof 
Date y , ,
 > >^T 7 ISianatufiw fL Witnessed b^Licansed Agent (Vtfgpnf 
Signature j ^ C ^ Q S y A < ^ 
ORD 34362-79 
er than proposed Insured) 
sentative) <*•«* 
By 
inaart nama of company) 
(Signature and ttta of officer signing for firm or corporation) 
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\ 
TO FIELD OFFICE 
SERVICE STAFF: 
County Code 
KR M? 
Appt. Checked and County Code entered by 
Initials 
TOWRmNGRB»RESENTATTVE 
1. If 19a or 19b of the application is answered "Yea": 
a. Any application which would normally have to be prepaid is to be written on a non-prepaid basis. 
b. If Government Allotment, Payroll Budget or Pro-Matfe, 13 of the application MUST state "Insurance to begin when policy issued". 
2. If the proposed Insured is a member of the Armed Forces, 13 of the application must state "Military Serial Number is. 
Also show in "REMARKS" the full name, relationship and permanent address of someone who will always know where the proposed 
Insured can be contacted during and after termination of military service. 
3. You must furnish the information asked for below, and complete and sign the Certification below. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ~ 
1. Give proposed Insured's HOME and BUSINESS addresses for last 3 yeaf»ifamoumatriskislessthan$100,0(X);for5year»if $1C»^ 
$249,999; for % of lifetime if $250,000 or more. (Print) 
City or Town 
Apt No. 
or 
From 
Mo. t Yr. 
To 
Mo. | Yr. 
No. 
Street 
(If R.D., state number.) 
SIT5322 
(If in country, give distance from 
and name of trading town and 
nearest post-office.) 
County State 
S1U TTZ7 o*-. 
From 
Mo. 
.r 
Yr. 
& 
To 
Mo. I Yr. 
Employer 
vm 
No. Street 
•S^p £*&**> 
City or Town 
S.ce. 
State 
OJL 
2. Does more than 50% of the proposed Insured's support come from someone else? Yes Q NoJ?^ 
If "Yes", give that person's: Full name Relationship 
Occupation Amount of life insurance in force $ 
13 . Did someone other than you suggest this insurance? rf "Yes", state in "REMARKS" who and what prompted the request. Yes • NorfS 
4. How well do you know the proposed Insured? (Check each applicable box.) 
D Met very recently ^gf-Known slightly for__^^Lyears at: Q Home ^Business Q Other (explain) 
Q Relative (state relationship) Q Known welt for. -.years at: • Home u Business • Other (explain) 
5. Do you have, from any source, facts which you have not stated any place else in the application which indicate that any person named in 
la, 6 or 7 of the application may: Yes No 
a. replace or change any current insurance or annuity in any company? • ^ & 
b. have in the last 3 years participated in hazardous sports (such as auto racing or parachuting), or been arrested for driving 
recklessly or while intoxicated? D mG 
c. have frequently drunk to excess, illegally used habit forming drugs or have a criminal record? D S i 
d. have volunteered or been ordered to report for active duty in the Armed Forces? D JST 
(Give details of "Yes" answers in "REMARKS".) \ J 
6. Does the amount applied for plus applications in the past 3 months in ALL companies equal $100,000 or more? Yes jjpAlo D 
If "Yes", complete the following 
Business 
Total Amount 
now in force 
in ail companies 
Total Amount 
being applied for 
in all companies 
b. Is total amount being applied for in ALL companies Yes No 
to be placed? If "No", explain in "REMARKS" 7 5 D 
c Will more insurance than shown in a. be applied for 
in any company in the next 3 months? D T ^ 
If "Yes" 
Amounts. 
• Personal 
—Company 
• Business 
7 V Hasthelastnameofanypeiaonnamedin1a,6or7oftheapplicationbeenc^^ ^** ^ S 
rf "Yes", who, and what was the previous last name? 1 ±3—25* 
8a. What is the proposed Insured's total yearly income from all sources (before deductions)? S _ J ^ ++* 
b. If married, wrujt is the spouse's total yearryiricc^^ 
9. Identify the group that beet covers the proposed Insured*s occupation: (Check owe) 
JO-
(A) O Professional, Executive, Scientific 
tm\ l—J I . M ^ L A , nm^4mmmlf%nmi J u n i f M T C»^<Mrf i lM 
OF) KSkiHed, Semi-SMIed, Foreman, Part-time Fermer 
(G) U Unskilled. Service Worker, Laborer 
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(D) • Full-time Farm Operator 
(E) G Clerical, Sales Clerk 
(I) O Student 
U) D Military 
110. Who is to pay the premium? (Check one) 
(A)JBClnsured 
(B) D Employer 
(C) • Policy Owner (not employer). 
(D) D Third Party (not policy owner). 
.(relationship) 
(name and relationship) 
11. if this application is for personal insurance, what is(are) the 
purposeje)? (Check appropriate boxes.) 
(E) • Family Income 
(F) • Retirement 
(J) Q , Estate Conservation 
(Ch&Mortgage Insurance 
* (Of D Education Fund ( V ) Q Other. 
12. Check appropriate Special Financing {or None): 
(A) Q Split Dollar 
(B) D Minimum Deposit/VOP 
(C) Q Initial Premium from Policy Loan 
(F) • Other 
(E)jZLNone 
114. What was the primary source of this sales lead? (Check one) 
(A) D Cold Call -
(B) Q Cold Call -
(C) • Referral 
(D) • Direct Mail 
Phone 
Visit 
(E) 0 Policyholder Service 
(F) Q Personal Acquaintance 
(G) D P & C Lead 
( H ) & £ t h e r 
15. What Sales Services did you use? (Check appropriate boxes.) 
(A) • CP1 — Computer Ledger Statement 
(B) D Employers Advisory Service 
(C) Q Variable Outlay Plan 
(D) Q Estate Conservation Proposal Service 
(E) • Business Valuation Proposal Service 
(F) • Capital Planning Guide 
(U D Business Security Analysis 
(I) Q Other compter services 
0 » . 
ura i None of the above used 
13. If this application is for business insurance, complete the following: 
(a) (G) D Buy-out 
(H) • Key Employee-Employer Indemnification 
(Y) • Key Employee-Deferred Compensation 
(W) D Non-Qualified Employee Benefits Ran 
(X) D Section 303 Plan 
(Z) • Other 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
Is firm a: (1) Q Sole Proprietorship? 
(2) • Partnership? (3) • Corporation? 
Is proposed Insured: Q Owner of firm? (state %) 
• Employee? 
Amount of business insurance in force and applied for in all com-
panies on each officer or member of the firm. 
Name Age Position In force Applied for 
16. Proposed insured's telephone number ftfpf )p)2r~g&7^ 
Complete if children are to be covered 
17. Are any of the children named in 7 of the application foster children or children whose legal adoption has not yet been made Yes No 
final? If "Yes", explain in "REMARKS" • Q 
18. Are there other children less than 18 years of age who have not been named in 7 of the application? Yes • No Q 
If "Yes", explain in "REMARKS". 
19. Are there any children named in 7 of the application who are: Yes No 
a. living in a household other than the proposed Insured's? Q • 
b. dependent on someone other than the proposed Insured for support or maintenance? D D 
If either is "Yes", explain in "REMARKS". 
CERTIFICATION Yes No 
Did you deliver the notice that an investigative consumer report may be necessary? j E ^ O 
I certify that (a) on this date I saw the proposed Insured and (b), except as stated in "REMARKS", I am not aware of any information that was not 
shown in the answers to the questions in any Part of this application, which would adversely affect the eligibility, acceptability or 
insurability of any person proposed for coverage. I recommend that Prudential accept the risks proposed for coverage. 
Y ,„f( 
•\ 
i 
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Pwdential Pert 2 of Application or — Wsquatt For Change of Policy 
1. Name of person examined — first initial, last (Print) 
» IvA/A* //A*.JI ' 
2. Family racord 
Father 
Living 
(give age) 
Dead 
Cause 
3ffiS * * • 
Year 
/&&! Mother 
Living 
(give age) 
Dead 
Cause 
J322&&£ 
Afle Year 
/?*-</ 
JLL* 
Brothare 
Hn/O piai_ Sisters N o _ 2 
V^gx, / / iatl 
3. a. Has your weight changed more than 10 pounds in the past year? YesQ NoQf 
b. If "Yes", Gain lbs. Loss lbs. Reason for change j ; 
c How long has the present weight been the same? iT ~C **€+0t,* 
4. Have you ever smoked? Yes^y NoD 
tf "Yes", give date(a) last smoked: Cigarettes Mo. ? Yr. ?J Cigars Mo. Yr. Pipe Mo. Yr. 
5. When did you last consult a doctor? Mo. ^ Yr. f^ (Give details in 12.) 
6. Are you now being treated or taking medicine far any condition or disease? Yes • N o g ' 
Have you ever; 
a. had any surgery or bean advised to have surgery and have not done so? 
b. regularly used or are you now using, barbiturates or amphetamines, marijuana or other hal-
lucinatory drugs, or heroin, opiates or other narcotics, except as prescribed by a doctor? Q 
c. been treated or counseled for alcoholism? Q 
d. had life or health insurance declined, postponed, changed, rated-up or withdrawn? • 
a. had life or health insurance canceled or its renewal or reinstatement refused? Q 
Yes No 
D 0 
M 
Have you ever been treated by a doctor for or had any known sign of: 
a. JiigfvbJood pressure? (tf "Yes", state date found, if drugs are used and if still being treated.) .. 
b. chest pain, pressure or discomfort? (If "Yes", state where located, number of attacks, their 
duration, date of last attack and treatment) Q 
c. heart murmur or rheumatic fever? (If rheumatic fever, state number of attacks, date of last attack 
and how long disabled for each.) G 
d. asthma, emphysema or tuberculosis? Q 
a. tumor, cancer, leukemia, diabetes or syphilis? G 
f. nervous trouble, convulsions, epilepsy or mental disorder? G 
Yes .No 
D % 
J2T 
Other than as shown above, have you ever been treated by a doctor for or had any known sign of a 
disease or disorder of the: Yes No 
a. heart arteries or veins? Q fit 
b. lungs, chest or throat? • £? 
c brain or nervous system? Q JQ 
d. liver, gallbladder, stomach, intes-
tinet or rectum? Q "gf 
Yes No 
kidneys, bladder, genital organs or urin-
ary tract? 
spine, joints, skull or other bones? 
Wood, glands or skin? 
K 
ears, eyes, nose or sinuses? Q Jjjff 
10. Other than as shown above, have you in the past 5 years: Yes No 
a. consulted or been attended or examined by any doctor or other practitioner? G M . 
b. been in a hospital, sanitarium or other institution for observation, rest diagnosis or treatment? G .83. 
c. had electrocardiograms, X-rays for diagnosis or treatment or blood, urine, or other medical 
tests? (If "Yes", state dates, why made and by whom.) G jBi 
d. made claim for or received benefits, compensation, or a pension because of sickness or injury? O j ^ 
11. Do you now have a known sign of any physical disorder, disease or defect not shown above? .. YesQ No[%[ 
12. Whet are the full details of the answer to 5 and to each part of 6 through 11 which is answered "Yes"? 
Illness or other reason. 
If operated, so state. Reason for Time lost Full PRINT full names 
any check-up, doctor's advice, Began from normal recovery and addresses of 
Question No. treatment and medication. Mo. Yr. activities Mo. Yr. doctors and hospitals 
«gr «A fruH+Mi rtt'cJ * i bfk*L 
4 qfcMVS *SJ*m*/ *y/*rJ*L. 7d7&Vfs«<i>'/i 
/SiJk/rr OfVrV ,W klriL 
/ r flrtrsrw7 &r*u Jit Aj&s * + 
,4^* LX^U Arut'^e i f *r*/ 
h0T fhitftff/'foT&etf'Tf 9*7? 
-^ J S : S I J E S S Z y*3<TJ. &e*fc£~J>KJL 
«s»ry^*fc;s t#< V 
I dedere that to tha beet of my knowledge and belief, the above 
(Be sure you have read ad the questions and 
statements mm complete and true, 
before signing.) 
Witness J / " " " ) 
&&-
Signature/Of person examined 
COMB 72 T-79 I CM Z - 7 - ^ . , 
TO OUkMmm*: Th« authorisation muat ba aignad and datod by tha propoaod Inaurad. 
MnHOffZftnoN 
For tna Raiaaaa of 
F - 7-J>/ 
.19 
To: Any 
•uraau or othar organization. inaUtuiion or paraon. 
hoapltai. cUnieor othar madicat)/ ratatad facility, inauranoa oompany, tha Madicat Information 
SothatallgibHttvfor 
and, throuQh it. to ta 
haaith inauranoa oovoraga can ba datarminad. t authi wte you to 
and tha Madicat Information Buraau, any data o -aeon* you 
giwTKoP a Company of Amartes 
• or my mantat or physical haatth. 
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ft. Timaofdayonminad 
- # D MyORtea 
A.M. 3 i ^ O P.M. 
c 
0. 
to thsporoonoxaminad your potior*? . . . . . . . . . . Y o a Q 
f "YMT and any kthrmmbon was not rtoxluaaU, gtva Oats* 
HEIGHT ^ fL / i n . 
Mdyoumaoaun 
Nojkj 
baton? 
•7 
No D 
ft, WEKSHTfln 
^ OW you wokjh? 
* / o ^ * * vwjef Nog 
IP. SLOOO PRESSURE 
lot Wooding 
2nd " 
3rd " 
Raoorvfinsf fwadtng fatal 
Mt or * osfWMBsn/ ovorw) 
OMSrVOKS. OlO// MO 0 MTWH 
loocaovorftL 
SYSTOLIC 
I9X 
DIASTOLIC 
Ossoppooranco of Sound 
•MP* 
n. 0tyttodie o) ovsr MP or dimtotk ovor 
tQtrt, locofu two fnoto laadinQt tattati of 
taaeiman 0 ayttoiie it ovar 140 or diat-
« . PULSE 
AtraaHaaotsd) 
(20 body bondings in 00 
ooconda of OQuivoionti 
jff 
Moil; Examim hmrt in tmrifht. mcumamt* md 
L HEART —ANY ML*MUR PRESENT? 
ff "Yos". eompioto 1, 2. 3, 4 and 5 
. . . Yaa Q No Q 
(If mora than ona 
1. Murmur datosa — 
A. D Apical 
ft. D Syotolic 
C D * o « 0 * 
D 0 BoraiyHoord-
Gr.1 
• Palnt-Gr. 2 
E. Q Tranamittod 
lEffoctofbody 
poaMon? 
D Soaai 
O Praaystoiic 
Q Slowing 
• « / 
D Diastolic 
Q'Othar 
D Mod.-GrJ Aj Vary Lood-Gr. 5 
D Loud-Gr. 4 / Q Loudost Possibla-
/ Gr.6 
• LocahW . 
o. Any otrtor abnormal caafliac findings? 
(ff ofthor is "Yaa", daaerlM) boiow.) 
4. What is your diognoi 
or opinion? J 
7 
V o a Q 
Yaa D 
N o G 
No Q 
E THERE ANY AatftORMAUTftft Of: (Rooord oil ofctoiN boiow) 
\LOOD VESSELS 
Mlor)? Y a o Q No Q 
2.RESPWA' 
(including 
itoRYORGANS~"~ 
i  noaa>tqroat and . Yoa Q No Q 
J, ANALYSIS Of URINE 
Albumin -r wya< ^ 
Yos Q No J K Y « D No & r 
If oUnor it "Vol", moH us a portion of tho urina axaminad. 
1 ASOOMIrW O W G A d S s ^ 
(including tandamaaa. honnaJ7 
4. NERVOUS SYSTEM? (Examino 
and. whan tndicotad, othor rofkwosl 
5, EYES? 
Y a s D No p 
BaKoaX^. Yaa D No 
(If morkod rsfractiva arror or hiatohsof 
• a.- injary, racavd vision by Snoilan ^ ^ 
m m oach aya) Y o T Q No Q 
* , 
ros p No g . 
K. Ara you mailing us a urina apacimon? Yaa B£-*No D 
Mali a apadman: 
(1) ff roquirad by instructions on ravaraa of vouchor. 
(2) If Ufa tnauranca application for — 
$30,000 or mora, and aga SO or over, or 
360,000 or mora, at any aga. 
ft EARS? (Daacriba any diaehargo praaant or 
fl) Y< 
L Hova you any information about this parson not 
racordod aiaowhara on this form rotating to 
physical or montal impairmant? Yas Q N o | 
« V S COMPLETE OETAftJ OP ALL -YES* ANSWERS TO OJJtlTIONS Q<2J. K13a-b. and L 
m 
w 
CfiTjCTCP 
AUG - t T98I 
I oortrfy that on tho data shown I axaminad tha parson nomad on tho ravaraa whoaa anawars to tha quastions on tha ravorsa wars raviowad 
by mo, and that ha or aha aignad thia form in my prooonco. 
* - ~ > n * / 
£--> •it rf7 
(^A**~ruM.<d*rrl6> 
*Sr- Zip 
COMS72TJ7S Bffmwammmm 
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Prudential fart2of Apfifcatlunor l For Chenpe of PeJssy No. 
1. Name of personejua^med — fWst, initial, last (Print) 
L\j)J/j UAg^v/ 
6-
2. Family racord Living 
(give age) 
Brothari 
No 
Cause l Afle l Yaar { 
^Ktto^ril 
Living Daad 
Cauaa 
M 
Ape 
in frrpnr/vn 
Year 
imfinfiiUiri No_ LAnKn^UiL 
3. a. Haa your weight < 
b. If "Yea". Gain. 
c. How long haa the \ 
I mora than 10 pounds in the peat yaar? YaeQ NoH) 
Loae_^tbe. Reason for change
 mmmm 
t waight baan the aama? 
4. Have you aver smoked?. 
if "Yet", give date<s) iaat 
...lfa..*~7rM..*4.y«+^.T:A.^S./!^ Ya»& NoD 
—• Cigarattaa Mo. Yr. Cigars Mo. Yr. Pipe Mo. Yr. 
S. Whan did you teat contort a doctor? Mo. f Yr. ? J (Give detail* in 12.) 
6. Are you now being treated or taking medicine for any condition or dtteeee?. • YatDNoJS. 
7. Have you even 
a. had any aurgaty or baan adviaad to have aurgary and have not dona ao? 
b. bun in a hospital, aanitarium or other institution for observation, rest, diagnosis or treatment? 
c. regularly used or are you now using, barbiturates or amphetamines, marijuana or other hal-
lucinatory drugs, or heroin, opiates or other narcotics, except as prescribed by a doctor? 
d. baan treated or counseled for alcoholism? 
a. had life or health insurance declined, postponed, changed, rated-up or withdrawn? 
t had life or health insurance canceled or its renewal or reinstatement refueed? 
Yes No 
D S 
B D 
B 
B-
Have you ever baan treated by a doctor for or had any known sign of: 
a. high blood pressure? (If "Yes", state data found. If drugs are used and if still being treated.) .. 
b. cheat pain, pressure or discomfort? (if "Yea", state where located, number of attacks, their 
duration, data of Iaat attack and treatment) 
c. heat murmur or rheumatic fever? (If rheumatic fever, state number of attacks, date of last attack 
and how long disabled for each.) B 
d. asthma, emphysema or tuberculosis? D 
a. tumor, cancer, leukemia, diabetes or syphilis? D 
f. nervous trouble, convulsions, epilepsy or mental disorder? D 
Yes No 
D B 
D B 
D 
D 
Q 
Q 
9. Other than aa shown above, have you ever been treated by a doctor for or had any known sign of a 
i or disorder of the: 
a. heart, arteries or veins? 
b. lungs, chest or throat? 
c brain or nervous system? 
d. liver, gallbladder, stomach, intes-
tines or rectum? 
Yes No 
a. kidneys, bladder, genital organs or urin-
ary tract? 
1 spine, joints, skull or other bones? 
g. blood, glands or skin? 
h. ears, eyas, nose or sinuses? 
6 
ES 
O 
B 
10. Other than aa shown above, have you in the past 5 years: Yes No 
a. consulted or been attended or examined by eny doctor or other practitioner? S D 
b. had electrocardiograms. X-rays for diagnosis or treatment or blood, urine, or other medical 
testa? (If "Yes", state dates, why made end by whom.) S D 
c mada claim for or received benefits, compensation, or e pension because of sickness or injury? D 09 
11. Do you now have a known sign of any physical disorder, disease or defect not shown above? .. YesQ No^ 
12. What are the full details of the answer to 5 end to each part of 6 through 11 which ia anawered''Yes''? 
Illness or other reaeon. 
If operated, ao state. Reason for Time tost Full PRINT full names 
any check-up, doctor's advice, Began from normal recovery end addresses of 
Question No. treatment and medication. Mo. Yr. activities Mo. Yr. doctors end hospital 
<-» • JZS'M.^' s *• £*w£_ f *( -aSw- .^rY^fiitf^ 
&***!&? \ f^*£t~>-JJL- /O . ftp* <-
B^V^JbuJIt*'** 
T T 6+ '* ..*.-U>/ ~*J*J~ 
TEL ~m 
•ir** 
-jETZZ £>~t*z ? fc+te %esf 6< C*~S<r -7*** ***** 
I dadara that, to the beet of my knowledge and belief, the above statements are complete and 1 
(Be aura you have read all the questions and answers before eigning.) 
I SJgnatureyef parson examined 
K £Z**u, U^> \t fi^,,- stCz 
• g - 3 5 " .is ? ) 
TO IXMSJNPU Thts authonttion must t » mqrwd and d w d by tht ptopo—d insumd. 
AUTHOfVZATKW 
fmnmn oft Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was mads at Q Homo y^yo*-
& ffmaofdoyo 
VJSrfS) 
C. to tho parson axaminad your p 
w isa"* and any anbrmabon w 
0. HEIGHT ip n. 2 - in. 
P»*»"tf Va»D Nofcbl , i i — , , - - , - ^ ^ 
I W M — ^ y i — • w w r . A, D ApiQl • t — I Q 
DM your Y
-fl J* 0 
I . WEIGHT (in dothaa) / ? 7 AjN- Yaa |fe No { 
P. BLOOD PRESSURE SYSTOUC DIASTOLIC 
/ ? • ^ 
n>if imdmg ojaan. tftyttoHe m o*r 140 or 
90* OfaOtmtnttthf OV9fW9tQnt, fWCOft/tWO 191099 fOOdtofft CSSOn Mt 
MmtvuH Mail ta » urint Mpmammt If wymoiic i$ ovmf 140 or dim-
toUc m oyfr 90. 
0. PULSE Piamatuia Contractions 
NaparMmuta 
1 lfMYar'.daaer1taabalow. * * 
IN. ARE THERE ANY ABNORMAUTES OF: (Racord all datsUs baiow) 
1. HOOD VESSELS 
(artarioaeiarosis. paripharal vascular)? Yat Q * • £ l 
2. RESPWATORY ORGANS | (including noas. throat and mouth)? Yaa Q 
». ABDOMINAL ORGANS 
4. NERVOUS SYSTEM? (Examinaaya. paiaNar 
[ fc EYES? (if marsad ratrscttva arror or hiatory of 
dtaaaaa or in|ury, racord viaion by Snailan 
Notation in aach aya) Yaa O 
1 C EARS? (Daacriba any diacharga praaant or 
No)gj 
N o ^ 
NofeB 
Note 
NoQ. 
L HEART—AMY MURMUR PRESENT?.... _ 
IT n a T , aompiata 1. 2, S. 4 and 5 baiow: (K mora than 
in opan spacs baiow.) 
Yaa Q No j & 
A. D Apical D Basal 
B. D Syatoiic D Praaystoiic 
C Q Rough Q Blowing 
0. Q BaratyHaard* Q Mod.-Gr.3 
Gr. 1 Q Loud-Gr. 4 
D Faint-Gr. 2 
E. Q Tranamlttad Q Loeafasd 
Z» Eflsct ofbody 
poatton? 
3a. fc haart anlargad? 
b> Any othar abnormal cardiac findings? 
(If aMhar is "Yaa". daacriba baiow.} 
4 What is your diagnoais 
or opinion? 
DOthar 
0 Diastolic 
D Othar 
0 Vary Loud-Gr. 5 
0 Loudaat Po»6(e-
Gr.6 
Yas Q N o H 
Yas D No@ 
S. Mart poairjon of apax; location of murmurta) and transmission 
w jrs u A > 4 «.Ck 
Position of apax bast... ^% 
Anw of ojstribtfbon ^^ 
pomt of najKNaunt atasn- ^ ^^ 
atoy of murmur O 
J. ANALYSIS OF URINE 
*•» D • ^ L Yaa Q " NO Sj£( 
IT althar is npjs^ mail us s portion of ths unna axaminad. 
K. Ara you moMng us a urina spaciman? Yaa Q No Q 
MaN a apaeiman: 
(1) If raqutrad by Jnatructiona on ravaras of wjuchar. 
(2) If Ufa inauranco application for — 
$30,090 or mors, end sga 55 or ova.-, or 
L Havayouany ii 
lacordad anawhara on this form raiatmg to 
physical or marital JmpaJrmant? Yas Q No & . 
tfVEOOMPiCTEOETAsUOFALL-YCS0 TO OAJESTIONB OftL I t I Ja-b. and L 
JSBSJSEL 
iu •-* ? iggft-
5* 
I cartffy that on tha data shown I axaminad tha parson nomad on 
by ma. and that ha or aha sigjnad this form in my tothaquastioraontfwrsvarsawararaviawad 
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Prudential The Prudential Insurance Company of America a mutual life insurance company 
Corporate Office, Newark, New Jersey 
Insured 
Fece Amount 
Term Period 
Premium Period 
Agency 
LYNN HARDY 
$3D3tDDD— 
S YEARS, BUT SEE PAGE M 
S YEARS, BUT SEE PAGE H 
G-SLCX 
70 ?bfc H t 3 t ^©•teY Number 
SEP 1 7 , l ^ f i l i Contract Dete 
We will pey the beneficiary the proceeds of this contract promptly if we receive due proof 
that the Insured died in the term period. We make this promise subject to all the provisions 
of the contract. The term period starts on the contract date. The term period and the 
contract date are shown in the window of this page. 
Please read this contract with care. A guide to its contents is on the last page. A summary 
is on page 2. If there is ever a question about it, or if there is a claim, just see a Prudential 
egent or get in touch with one of our offices. 
Right to Cancel Contract.—Not later than ten days after you get this contract, you may 
return it to us. All you heve to do is take it or mail it to one of our offices or to the agent 
who sold it to you. We will cancel the contract from the start and give beck your money 
promptly. 
Signed for Prudential. P 00229 
*\m + l*t& JC.T'fcXcJL***** 
Secretary President 
irm Life Policy. Insurance payeble only upon deeth within stated term period. Premiums peyeble during Insured's 
etime for stated premium period. Convertible and renewable es limited. Supplementary Benefits, if any, as listed on 
ontract Data page(s). Eligible for ennual dividenda as stated in Dividends provision. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONTRACT SUMMARY 
We offer this summary to help you understand this 
contract. We do not intend that it change any of the 
provisions of the contract. 
This is a contract of term life insurance. It is payable only 
if the Insured dies in the term period shown in the 
window of the first page or any later renewal term period 
which we describe under Renewal on page 15. We show 
the amount(s) of renewal premiums in the Table of 
Renewal Premiums on page 4. The amount of the 
premiums will change as we show in the Schedule of 
Premiums. Premiums are to be paid during the premium 
period. If a premium is not paid before its days of grace 
are over, the contract may %nd and have no value except 
as we state under Dividends on page 8. If this occurs, 
you may be able to reinstate its full benefits. 
Proceeds is a word we use to mean the amount we would 
pay if we were to settle the contract in one sum. To 
compute the proceeds which may arise from the Insured's 
death, we start with a basic amount. We may adjust that 
amount if there are dividend credits, premium in default, 
or a premium paid (but not waived under a waiver of 
premium benefit, if any) past the date of death. The table 
on page 15 tells what the basic amount is. The table will 
refer you to the parts of the contract which tell you how 
we adjust the basic amount. 
Proceeds which arise from the Insured's death often are 
not taken in one sum. For instance, for all or part of those 
proceeds, you may be able to choose a manner of 
payment to fit the beneficiary's expected needs. If the 
Insured dies, and one has not been chosen, the benefi-
ciary may be able to do so. We will pay interest under 
Option 3 from the date of death on any proceeds to 
which no other manner of payment applies. This will be 
automatic as we state on page 14. There is no r\—d to 
ask for it. 
You and we may agree on a change in the ownership of 
this contract Also, unless we endorse it to say otherwise, 
the contract gives you these rights, among others: 
• You may change the beneficiary under it. 
• You may obtain any dividend credits undar it. 
• You may be able to renew it for further term period(s). 
• You may be able to exchange it for a new contract of 
life insurance. 
The contract, as issued, may or may not have extra 
benefits which we call Supplementary Benefits. If it does, 
we list them under Supplementary Benefits on the Contract 
Data page(s) and describe them after page 14. The 
contract may or may not have other extra benefits. If it 
does, we add them by rider. Any extra benefit ends es 
soon as any premium is in default past its days of grace, 
unless the form which describes it states otherwise. 
(Contract Summary Continued on Page IS) 
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p** ? /RT—791 
CONTRACT DATA 
INSURED'S SEX AND ISSUE AGE M-H2 
RATING CLASS STANOARD 
INSURED LYNN HARDY 70 7fcb Hh3 POLICY NUMBER 
SEP 17, HB1 CONTRACT DATE 
FACE AMOUNT $300,000— 
TERM PERIOD S YEARS, BUT SEE PAGE M 
PREMIUM PERIOD S YEARS, BUT SEE PAGE M 
AGENCY G-SLCX 
BENEFICIARY CHERYL HA?DY, WIFE, IF LIVING, OTHERWISE 
THE ESTATE OF SAID CHERYL HARDY 
LIST OF SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFITS 
(EACH BENEFIT IS DESCRIBED IN THE FORM 
WHICH BEARS THE NUMBER SHOWN FOR IT) 
E3100R INSUREDS WAIVER OF PREMIUM BENEFIT. 
***** END OF LIST ***** 
SCHEDULE OF PREMIUMS 
DJE DATES OF CONTRACT PREMIUMS OCCUR ON THE CONTRACT DATE AND AT INTERVALS 
OF 1 MONTH AFTER THAT DATE. 
CONTRACT PREMIJMS ARE $lbl.b5 EACH* 
CONTRACT PREMIUMS INCLUDE THE PREMIUMS FOR BENEFIT EG100R. 
•**•• END OF SCHEDULE ***** 
• SEE PAGE H FQ* TABLE OF RENEWAL PREMIUMS 
P C0231 
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5 RC TR 75-MM2 POLICY NO. 70 7fet Mfc.3 
TABLE OF RENEWAL PREMIUMS 
ATTAINED MONTHLY 
AGE PREMIUM 
M7 $230.bS 
52 3b2.feS 
S7 557.bS 
(.2 621.bS* 
t7# Ii3.a7.b5 
70 l,b?b.b5 
# THIS RENEWAL TERi PERIOD IS FOR LESS THAN S YEARS. 
* CHANGING ON FIRST ANNIVERSARY AFTER I N S U R E D S bSTH BIRTHDAY 
TO $73S.bS. 
P 00232 
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ENDORSEMENTS 
(Only we can endorse this contract.) 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Definitions.—We define here some of the words and 
phrases used all through this contract. We explain others, 
not defined here, in other parts of the text. 
We. Our and Us.—Prudential. 
You and Your.—The owner of the contract. 
Insured.—The person whose name is in the window of 
the first page. He or she need not be the owner. 
Example: Suppose we issue a contract on the lift of your 
spouse. You applied for it and named no one else as 
owner. Your spouao is the Insured and you are the owner. 
Issue Date.^The contract date. 
Anniversary or Contract Anniversary.—The same day and 
month as the contract date in each later veer. 
Example: If the contract date is March 9. 1980. the first 
anniversary is March 9, 1981. The second is March 9. 
1982. and so on. 
Contract Year.—A year which starts on the contract date 
or on an anniversary. 
Example: If the contract date is March 9. 1980. the first 
contract year starts then and ends on March 8. 1981. 
The second starts on March 9. 1981 and ends on March 
8. 1982. and so on. 
Attained Age.—The Insured's attained age at any time is 
the issue age plus the length of time since the contract 
date. You wilt find the issue age near the top of pege 3. 
The Contract.—-This policy and the application, a copy 
of which is attached, form the whole contract. We assume 
that all statements in the application were made to the 
best of the knowledge and belief of the person(s) who 
made them; in the absence of fraud they are deemed to 
be representations and not warranties. We relied on those 
statements when we issued the contract. We will not use 
any statement, unless made in the application, to void the 
contract or to deny a claim. 
Contract Modifications.—Only a Prudential officer may 
agree to modify this contract, and then only in writing. 
Ownership and Control.—Unless we endorse this 
contract to say otherwise: (1) the owner of the contract is 
the Insured; and (2) while the Insured is living the owner 
alone is entitled to (a) any contract benefit and value, and 
(b) the exercise of any right and privilege granted by the 
contract or by us. 
Suicide Exclusion.—Jf the Insured, whether sene or 
insane, dies by suicide within two years from the issue 
date, we will pay no more than the sum of the premiums 
paid. 
Currency.—Any money we pay. or which is paid to us. 
must be in United States currency. Any amount we owe 
will be payable et our Corporate Office. 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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Misstatement of Age or Sox.—If the Insured's stated 
age or sex or both are not correct, we will change each 
benefit and any amount to be paid to that which the 
premium would have bought for the correct age and aex. 
The Sched* K of *r*reiums may chow that premiums 
change or stop on a certain date. We may have used that 
date because the Insured would attain a certain age on 
that date. If we find that the issue age was wrong, we will 
correct that date. 
Incontestability.—Except for non-payment of premium, 
we will not contest this contract after it has been in force 
during the Insured's lifetime for two years from the issue 
date. 
Assignment.—We will not be deemed to know of an 
assignment unless we receive it. or a copy of it. at our 
Home Office. We are not obliged to see that an assign-
ment is valid or sufficient. 
You may designate or change a beneficiary. Your request 
must be in writing and in a form which meets our needs. 
H will take effect only when we file it at our Home Office; 
this will be after you send the contract to us to be 
endorsed, if we ask you to do so. Then any previous 
beneficiary's interest will end as of the date of the 
request. It will end then even if the Insured is not living 
when we file the request. Any beneficiary's interest is 
subject to the rights of any assignee of whom we know. 
When a beneficiary is designated, any relationship shown 
la to the Insured, unless otherwise stated. To show 
priority, we may use numbered classes, so that the class 
with first priority is called class 1. the class with next 
priority is called class 2. and so on. When we use 
numbered classes, these statements apply to beneficiaries 
unless the form states otherwise: 
1 . One who survives the Insured will have the right to be 
paid only if no one in a prior class survives the Insured 
2. One who has the right to be peid will be the only one 
paid if no one else in the same class survives the Insured 
BENEFICIARY 
3. Two or more in the same class who have the right to 
be paid will be paid in equal shares. 
4. M none survives the Insured, we will pay in one sum to 
the Insured's estate. 
Example: Suppose the dees 1 beneficiary is Jane and the 
class 2 beneficiaries are Paul and John. We owe Jane the 
proceeds if she is living at the Insured's death. We owe 
Paul and John the proceeds if they are living then but 
Jane is not But if only one of them is living, we owe him 
the proceeds. If none of them is living we owe the 
Insured's estate. 
Beneficiaries who do not have a right to be paid under 
these terms may still have a right to be paid under the 
Automatic Mode of Settlement. 
Before we make a payment, we have the right to decide 
what proof we need of the identity, age or any other facts 
about any persons designated as beneficiaries. If benefici-
aries are not designated by name and we make payment(s) 
based on that proof, we will not have to make the 
payment(s) again. 
moot POFTV f O ^ 2 2 ^ 4 T T A C H S D 
Prudential The Prudential Insurance Company 
of America 
Insured 
Lvnn Hardv 
Policy No. 
7Q 7$s 463 
Ownership and Control 
This contract is amended at issue to provide that, except as we may state below, all rights of ownership and control will 
belong to the owner(s) shown here: 
Cheryl Hardy, wife of the Insured, the estate of said wife. P 00234 
While the Insured is living, the owner(s). with no one else's consent, is entitled to any benefit and value, and to the 
exercise of any right and privilege granted by the contract or by us. But if we are settling with an owner or someone else 
who is not the Insured, then: (1) our consent is needed for a settlement option to be chosen for any proceeds which may 
arise other than from the Insured's death; and (2) if this is a contract which calls for monthly payments upon its maturity 
as an endowment, we will have the right at that time to pay its cash value in one sum instead. 
Endorsed by attachment on Contract Date 
The Prudential Insurance Company of America, 
By
 >ff,„rf./A #f,7£%«*•«•«> 
Secretary 
Printed in U.S.A. 
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PREMIUM PAYMENT AND REINSTATEMENT 
Payment of Pramiuma.—Tha Schedule of Premiums 
shows tha amounts of tha premiums and how often they 
must be paid. Wa tall you below how you may be able to 
have them fall due either more or less often. Due dates 
fall on the same day of tha month as tha contract data. 
They occur only while the Insured is living and only in tha 
premium period. The premium period, shown in the 
window of the first page, starts on tha contract date. Each 
premium is to be paid by its due date. It may be paid at 
our Home Office or to any of our authorized agents. If we 
are asked to do so. we will give a signed receipt. A 
premium is in default if it is not paid whan it is due. 
Change of Frequency.—You may ask us in writing to 
have premiums fall due either more or less often. If we 
agree, we will make the change and tall you what tha 
new premiums are and whan they are due. The more 
often premiums are due. the larger the total amount that 
will have to be paid for a contract year. 
Grace Period.—We grant 31 days of grace for paying 
each premium except the first one. If a premium has not 
been paid by its due data, tha contract will stay in force 
during its days of grace. If a premium has not been paid 
when its days of grace are over, the contract will and and 
have no value, except as wa state under Dividends. 
Pramium Adjustment.—The Insured might die in the 
premium period while no premium is in default. If so, wa 
will make an adjustment so that the proceeds will include 
that part of tha last pramium paid which is mora than that 
which was needed to pay premiums through the date of 
death. Or the Insured might die in the days of grace of a 
pramium in default. If so. the amount needed to pay 
premiums through the date of death is due us. We will 
make an adjustment so that the proceeds will not include 
that amount. 
Example: Suppose the contract date is in 1980. An 
annual pramium of $400 due in 1982 is paid. The 
Insurad diss nine months later. The proceeds will include 
about $100 from the premium, since $300 was enough 
to pay premiums through the date of death. The proceeds 
could include slightly more or less than $ 100, since some 
months have more days than others. 
If a claim arises while the Insured is living, we will 
subtract any pramium in default when we settle the claim. 
Reinstatement.—You may reinstate this contract after 
the days of grace of a premium in default. All these 
conditions must be met: 
1 . The final term period for which the contract may be 
renewed must not have ended. 
2. Premium paymant must not be in default more than 
three years. 
3. You must give us any facts wa need to satisfy us that 
the Insurad is insurable for the contract. 
4. We must be paid all premiums in arrears with 
compound interest at 6% a year. We may set a lower rate 
for any period in which there are arrears. 
Example: Suppose a premium due May 1st is not paid on 
time. The contract will stay in force until June 1st 
whether the premium is paid or not. If the premium is not 
paid by June 1st, you must meet all the above conditions 
if you want to reinstate the contract. 
Paga 7 (RT—60) P 00235 
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-Vv-IDENDS 
Participation.—-We will decide each year what part of 
our surplus, if any, to credit to this contract as a dividend. 
The contract will be eligible for such a dividend if (1) the 
Insured is living; and (2) all premiums due before the 
anniversary have been paid. 
We will credit any such dividend on the anniversary. But 
we do not expect to credit one before the second anniver-
sary. 
Dividend Options.—If you ask us in writing at our Home 
Office and in a form which meets our needs, you may 
choose any of these uses for any such dividend: 
1 . Cash.—We will pay it to you in cash. 
2. Premium Reduction.—We will use it to reduce any 
premium then due. 
3. Addition.—We will use it at the net single premium 
rate at the Insured's attained age to provide an addition, 
which is paid-up endowment insurance on the Insured's 
life to mature on the contract anniversary when his or her 
attained age is 75. 
Example: Suppose we credit a dividend of $10 to the 
contract on en anniversary Suppose it will provide en 
addition in the emount of $ 1 7. The amount of this 
addition will not change. Its net velue is thet which we 
will pey if the addition is surrendered The net velue, 
which starts at $10, will increese with time end grow to 
$17 by the Insured's attained ege 75 when that amount 
will be paid as an endowment 
4. Accumulation.—We will hold it at interest. The rate 
will be at least 3% a year. We may use a higher rate. 
If you have not made another choice by 31 days after the 
anniversary, we will use the dividend as we state in 3 
above. 
Dividend Credits Described.—The phrase dividend 
credits means the total of (1) any dividends and interest 
we hold under 4 above; (2) either the amount or value, as 
we explain below, of any additions under 3 above; and 
(3) any other dividends we have credited to the contract 
but have not yet paid. It includes the amount of any of 
those additions when we refer to the proceeds which arise 
from the Insured's death. It includes the net value of any 
of those additions when we use it under Surrender of 
Dividends and Automatic Cash Payment. The surrender 
value of those additions will never be less than the 
dividends we used to provide them. 
Surrender of Dividends.—You may surrender any 
dividend credits for their net value. But we must heve 
your request in writing at our Home Office and in a form 
which meets our needs. 
Automatic Cash Payment.—We will pey promptly in 
cash any dividend credits which exist (1) at the end of the 
last day of grace of a premium in default; or (2) on the 
date this contract is exchanged for a new contract of life 
insurance on the Insured's life; or (3) at the end of any 
term period if the contract is not renewed for a further 
term period; or (4) on the contract anniversary when the 
Insured's attained age is 75. 
Settlement.—If any dividend credits exist at the 
Insured's death, we will include them in the proceeds 
when we settle the contract. 
ENDORSEMENTS 
(Only we can endorse this contract.) 
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Paoe 8 (RT—80) 
CONVERSION TO ANOT 
Right to Convert.—You may be able to exchange this 
contract for a new contract of life insurance on the 
Insured's life. You will not have to prove to us that the 
Insured is insurable. When we use the phrase new 
contract we mean the contract for which this contract may 
be exchanged. 
Conditions.—Your right to make this exchange is subject 
to all these conditions: (1) You must ask for the exchange 
in writing and in a form which meets our needs. (2) You 
must surrender this contract to us. (3) We must have your 
request and the contract at our Home Office while this 
contract is in force and not later than its contract 
anniversary when the Insured's attained age is 70. 
The new contract will not take effect unless the premium 
for it or the charge we describe under Charge for 
Exchange is paid while the Insured is living. This must be 
done within 31 days after the first to occur of (1) the dste 
of your request; and (2) the date to which premiums for 
this contract are paid. 
There will be no charge for the exchange if the contract 
date of the new contract is the same as the date of your 
request. We will return that part, if any, of the last 
premium paid for this contract which is more than that 
which was needed to pay premiums to the contract date 
of the new contract. 
Contract Data.—The date of the new contract will be 
the date you ask for in your request. But it may not be 
after the date of your request or after the date to which 
premiums are paid for this contract. It may not be before 
the date of this contract or after the contract anniverssry 
when the Insured's attained age is 70. And it may not be 
before the date when we first offered the form of the new 
contract. 
Contract Specifications.—The new contract will be in 
the same rating class as this contract. We will set the 
issue sge end the premiums for the new contract in 
accord with our regular rules in use on the contract date 
of the new contract. 
The new contract may call for annual premiums. If we 
agree, you will be able to have premiums fall due more 
often. 
The new contract may be on any life or endowment plan 
we would regularly issue on its contract date for the same 
rating class, amount, issue age and sex. But it cannot be 
any of these: (1) a single premium contract; or (2) one 
which insures snyone other then the Insured; or (3) one 
which includes or provides for term insurance other than 
extended insurance; or (4) one with premiums which 
increase after a stated time, if its first premium is less 
than 8 0 % of any later premium; or (5) one which 
(Continued 
R PLAN OF INSURANCE 
provides an income if the Insured becomes disabled; or 
(6) one with Supplementary Benefits other than the 
benefits to which we refer later in these paragraphs. 
Its face amount will be the amount you ask for in your 
request. But except as we state below, that amount must 
be an amount we would regularly issue for the plan 
chosen. And it cannot be less than 15,000 or more than 
the face amount of this contract. If the face amount you 
want is less than the smallest amount we would regularly 
issue on the plan you wish, we will issue a new contract 
for as low as $5,000 on the Life Paid Up at Age 85 plan 
if you aak us to do so. 
tf (1) the new contract is either on the Life Paid Up at 
Age 85 plan or has a premium period at least as long as 
for that plan; (2) this contract has a benefit for waiving 
premiums in the event of disability; and (3) we would
 % 
include that kind of benefit in other contracts like the new 
contract, we will put that kind of benefit in the new 
contract, as we state in General below. 
We will not deny a benefit for waiving premiums which 
we would have allowed under this contract, and which we 
would otherwise allow under the new contract, just 
because disability started before the contract date of the 
new contract. But any premium to be waived for that 
disability under the new contract must be at the 
frequency which was in effect for this contract when the 
disability started. 
We will not waive any premium which would have been 
due for the new contract before the date of the exchange. 
And we will not waive any premium under the new 
contract unless it has s benefit for waiving premiums in 
the event of disability. This will be so even if we have 
waived premiums under this contract. 
If this contract has an accidental death benefit and we 
would regularly issue contracts like the new contract with 
that benefit, we will put that kind of benefit in the new 
contract, as we state in General below. But (1) you must 
ask for it in your request for the exchange; (2) the face 
amounts of this contract and the new contract must be 
the same; and (3) the amount of accidental deeth benefit 
in the new contract will be the smaller of the face amount 
of the new contract and the amount of the accidental 
death benefit in this contract. 
General.—Any benefit for waiving premiums and any 
accidental death benefit in the new contract will be the 
same one, with the same provisions, that we put in other 
contracts like it on its contract date. But if either benefit 
was added to this contract by rider and the contract date 
of the new contract is earlier than the date of that rider, 
the benefit, if any, in the new contract will be the same as 
that provided by the rider. In any of these paragraphs. 
Next Page) 
Page 9 (RT—80) 
P 00237 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONVERSION TO ANOTHER PLAN OF INSURANCE (Continued) 
when we use the phrases other contracts like it and other 
contracts like the new contract, we mean contracts which 
we would regularly issue on the same plan and for the 
tame rating class, amount, issue age and sex. 
Charge for Exchange.—If the contract date for the new 
contract is before the date of your request, there may be a 
charge to make the exchange. We will compute the 
amount of any charge in two ways as we show below. 
When we use the word interest, we mean compound 
interest at 6% a year from each premium due date to the 
date to which premiums have been paid. 
1. We will compute the sum of the premiums, with 
interest, which would have been due for the new contract 
from its contract date to the date to which premiums have 
been paid on this contract. Then we will subtract the sum 
of the premiums, with interest, which were due for this 
contract from the contract date of the new contract to the 
date to which premiums have been peid on this contract. 
But we will not subtract (a) any premiums, with interest, 
due on this contract for any portion of its face amount 
which is more than the face amount of the new contract; 
or (b) any premiums, with interest, for any extra benefits 
not included in the new contract. 
2. We will compute the cash value of the new contract as 
of the date to which premiums have been paid on this 
contract. We will increase this amount by not more than 
14%. We will add to this the sum of the premiums, with 
interest, which would have been due for any extra 
benefits under the new contract from the date the benefit 
took effect to the date to which premiums have been paid 
on this contract. Then we will subtract the sum of the 
premiums, with interest, which were due for the same 
extra benefits under this contract for the same length of 
time. 
We will compare the amounts we compute in 1 and 2 
above. The charge to be paid will never be more than the 
larger of the two. It may be less. 
Changes in Plan.—- You may be ebie to have this 
contract changed to another plan of life insurance other 
than in accord with the requirements for exchange which 
we state above. But any change may be made only if we 
consent, and will be subject to conditions and charges 
which we then determine. 
ENDORSEMENTS 
(Only we can endorse this contract.) 
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SETTLEMENT OPTIONS 
Payee Defined.—In thase provisions and under tha Auto-
matic Mods of Settlement, tha word Payaa means a 
parson who has a right to receive a settlement under the 
contract. Such a person may be the Insured, the owner, a 
beneficiary or a contingent payee. 
Choosing an Option.—While the Insured is living you 
may choose, or change the choice of, an option for all or 
part of the proceeds which may arise from the Insured's 
death. The requirements are the same as those to 
designate or change a beneficiary. We describe them 
under Beneficiary. 
A Payee may choose an option for all or part of any 
proceeds or residue which becomes payable to him or her 
in one sum. We explain residua under Residue Described. 
In some cases, you or another Payee will need our 
consent to choose an option. Wa describe these cases 
under Conditions. 
Options Described.—Here are the options we offer. We 
may also consent to other arrangements. As we use it in 
Options 2 and 5, tha phrase regularly issued does not 
include contracts which are used to qualify for special 
Federal income tax treatment as a retirement plan. 
Option 1 (Instalments for a Fixed Period).—Wa will 
make equal payments for up to 25 years based on the 
Option 1 Table. The payments will include interest at an 
affective rata of 316% a year. Wa may credit more 
interest. If and while we do so, the payments will be larger. 
Option 2 (Ufa Income).-—We will make equal monthly 
payments for as long as the person on whose life the 
settlement is based lives, with payments certain for the 
period chosen. The choices are either ten years 
(10-Year Certain) or until the sum of the payments equals 
the amount put under this option (Instalment Refund). 
The amount of each payment will be based on the Option 
2 Table and the age and sax, on the due data of tha first 
payment, of the person on whose life the settlement is 
based. But if a choice is made more than two years after 
the contract proceeds first become payable, we may use 
the Option 2 rates in Ordinary policies we regularly issue, 
based on United States currency, on the due date of the 
first payment. On request, we will quote the payment 
rates in policies we then issue. We must hava proof of the 
data of birth of the person on whose life the settlement is 
based. The settlement will share in our surplus to the 
extent and in the way we decide. 
Option 3 (Interest Payment).—We will hold an amount 
at interest. We will pay interest at an affective rata of at 
least 3% a year ($30.00 annually, 114.89 semi-annually, 
$7.42 quarterly or $2.47 monthly per $1,000). We may 
pay more interest. 
Option 4 (Instalments of a Fixed Amount).—We will 
make equal annual, semi-annual, quarterly or monthly 
peyments if they total at least $90 a year for each 
$1,000 put under this option. We will credit the unpaid 
balance with interest at an effective rate of at least 3tt% 
a year. We may credit more interest. If we do so, the 
balance will be larger. The final payment will be any 
balance equal to or less than one payment. 
Option 5 (Non-Participating Life Income).—We will 
make payments like those of any life annuity wa than 
regularty issue which (1) is based on United States 
currency; (2) is bought by a single sum; (3) is not eligible 
for dividends; and (4) does not normally provide for 
deferral of tha first payment. For the first $250,000 or 
less placed under this option on any data, tha payment 
will be 103% of what we would pay under that kind of 
annuity with its first payment dua on its contract date. For 
any excess placed under this option on that data, tha part 
of tha payment provided by the excess will be 101.5% of 
the part of the payment the excess would buy under that 
kind of annuity. In any case, we will compute the present 
value of any unpaid payments certain at the same interest 
rata we would use for that kind of annuity with the same 
provisions as to withdrawal. At least one of the persons 
on whose life the Option 5 is based must be a Payee. We 
must hava proof of the date of birth of any parson on 
whose life the option is based. Option 5 cannot be chosen 
more than 30 days before the due data of the first 
payment. On request, we will quote the payment which 
would apply for any amount placed under the option at 
that time. 
First Payment Due Date.—Unless a different data is 
stated when the option is chosen: (1) the first payment for 
Option 3 will be due at the end of the chosen payment 
interval; and (2) the first payment for any of the other 
options will be due on the data the option takes effect. 
Residue Described.—For Options 1 and 2, residue on 
any data means the then present value of any unpaid 
payments certain. Wa will compute it at an effective 
interest rata of 316% a year. But we will use the rate we 
used to compute the actual Option 2 payments if they 
were not based on the table in this contract. 
For Options 3 and 4, residue on any date means any 
unpaid balance with interest to that date. For Option 5, it 
means the then present value of any unpaid payments 
certain. We will compute it at the interest rata to which 
we refer in Option 5. 
For Options 2 and 5. residua does not include tha value 
of any payments which may become due after the certain 
period. 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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SETTLEMENT OPTIONS (Continued) 
OPTION 1 TABLE OPTION 2 TABLE 
| MINIMUM AMOUNT OF MONTHLY PAYMENT FOR EACH $1,000, 
AGE 
I LAST 
BIRTHDAY 
10 
and under 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 4 1 
42 
43 
44 
PAYABLE IMMEDIATELY 
KIND OF LIFE INCOME 
10-Year I 
Certain 
Male l 
$3.23 
3.24 
3.26 
3.27 
3.29 
3.30 
3.32 
3.34 
3.36 
3.37 
3.39 
3.41 
3.44 
3 46 
3.48 
3.51 
3.53 
3.56 
3.59 
3.62 
3.65 
3 68 
3.71 
3.75 
3.78 
3.82 
3.86 
3.91 
3.95 
4.00 
4.05 
4.10 
4.15 
4.21 
4.27 
Female 
$3.16 
3.17 
3.18 
3.19 
3.20 
3.21 
3.23 
3.24 
3.26 
3.27 
3.29 
3.30 
3.32 
3.34 
3.36 
3.37 
3.39 
3 42 
3.44 
3.46 
3.48 
3.51 
3.54 
3.56 
3.59 
3 6 2 
3.65 
3 6 9 
3.72 
3.76 
3.79 
3.83 
3.87 
3.92 
3.96 
Instalment 
Refund 
Male 
$3.22 
3.23 
3.25 
3.26 
3.28 
3.29 
3.31 
3.33 
3.34 
3.36 
3.38 
3.40 
3 42 
3.44 
3.46 
3 49 
3.51 
3.54 
3.56 
3.59 
3.62 
3 65 
3.68 
3.71 
3.74 
3.78 
3.81 
3.85 
3.89 
3.93 
3.97 
4.02 
4.06 
4.11 
4.16 
Female 
$3.15 
3.16 
3.17 
3.18 
3.19 
3.20 
3.22 
3.23 
3.25 
3.26 
3.28 
3.29 
3.31 
3.33 
3 34 
3.36 
3.38 
3.40 
3.42 
3.44 
3.47 
3.49 
3.52 
3.54 
3.57 
3.60 
3.63 
3.66 
3.69 
3.72 
3.76 
3.79 
3.83 
3.87 
3.91 
AGE 
LAST 
BIRTHDAY 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
and over 
THE FIRST 
KIND OF LIFE INCOME J 
10-Year T 
Certain 
Male 
$4.33 
4.39 
4.46 
4.53 
4.60 
4.67 
4.75 
4.83 
4.92 
5.00 
5.10 
5.19 
5.29 
5.40 
5.51 
5.62 
5.74 
5.87 
6.00 
6.13 
6.28 
6.43 
6.58 
6.74 
6.91 
7.08 
7.26 
7.43 
7.61 
7.80 
7.98 
8.16 
8.33 
8.52 
8.68 
8.85 
Female 
$4.01 
4.06 
4.12 
4.17 
4.23 
4.30 
4.36 
4.43 
4.50 
4.58 
4.66 
4.74 
4.83 
4.92 
5.02 
5.12 
5.23 
5.34 
5.46 
5.59 
5.73 
5.87 
6.02 
6.19 
6.36 
6.53 
6.72 
6.92 
7.12 
7.32 
7.53 
7.74 
7.95 
8.15 
8.35 
8.54 
Instalment 
Refund | 
Male l 
$4.21 
4.27 
4.32 
4.38 
4.44 
4.51 
4.58 
4.65 
4.72 
4.79 
4.87 
4.96 
5.05 
5.14 
5.24 
5.34 
5.45 
5.56 
5.68 
5.81 
5.94 
6.08 
6.23 
6.39 
6.56 
6.74 
6.93 
7.13 
7.34 
7.57 
7.81 
8.06 
8.34 
8.63 
8.95 
9.29 
Female] 
$3.96 
4.00 
4.05 
4.10 
4.15 
4.21 
4.26 
4.33 
4.39 
4.46 
4.53 
4.60 
4.68 
4.76 
4.85 
4.94 
5.04 
5.14 
5.25! 
5.37 
5.49 j 
5.62 | 
5.76 
5.91 
6.07 I 
6.23! 
6.41 | 
6.61 j 
6.81 ! 
7.03 
7.26 
7.51 
7.77 
8.06 
8.36 
8.68 
(Continued on Next Ptge) 
\ MINIMUM AMOUNT OF 
MONTHLY PAYMENT FOR 
EACH $1,000. THE FIRST 
PAYABLE IMMEDIATELY 
Number 
of Years 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
I 25 
Monthly 
Payment 
$84.65 
43.05 
29.19 l 
22.27 j 
18.12 | 
15.35 
13.38 
11.90 
10.75 
9.83 
9.09 
8.46 
7.94 ; 
7.49 
7.10 
6.76 
6.47 
6.20 j 
5.97 
5.75 
5.56 
5.39 j 
5.24 
5.09 I 
4.96 ] 
Multiply the monthly amount 
by 2.989 for quarterly. 
5.952 for semi-annual or : 
11.804 for annual. 
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SETTLEMENT OPTIONS (Continued) 
Withdrawal of Residue.—Unless otherwise stated when 
the option is chosen: (1) under Options 1, 2 and 5 the 
residue may be withdrawn; and (2) under Options 3 and 
4 all, or any part not lest than • 100, of the residue may 
be withdrawn. If an Option 3 residue is reduced to less 
than $ 1,000, we have the right to pay it in one sum. 
Under Options 2 and 5. withdrawal of the residue will not 
affect any payments that may become due after the 
certain period; the value of those payments cannot be 
withdrawn. Instead, the payments will start again if they 
were based on the life of a person who lives past the 
certain period. 
Designating Contingent Payees).—A Payee under an 
option has the right unless otherwise stated, to name or 
change a contingent payee to receive any residue at that 
Payee's death. This may be done only if (1) the Payee has 
the full right to withdraw the residue; or (2) the residue 
would otherwise have been payable to that Payee's estate 
at death. 
A Payee who hat this right may choose, or change the 
choice of, an option for all or part of the residue. In 
tome cases, the Payee will need our content to choose 
or Change an option. We describe these cases under 
Conditions. 
Any request to exercise any of these rights mutt be in 
writing and in a form which meets our needs. It will take 
effect only when we file it at our Home Office. Then the 
interest of anyone who is being removed will end as of 
the date of the request, even if the Payee who made the 
request is not living when we file it. 
Changing Options.—A Payee under Option 1, 3 or 4 
may choose another option for any sum which the Payee 
could withdraw on the date the chosen option is to start. 
That date may be before the date the Payee makes the 
choice only if we content. In some cases, the Payee will 
need our content to choose or change an option. We 
describe these cases next. 
Conditions.—Our content it needed for an option to* be 
used for any person under any of these conditions: 
1. The person is not a natural person who will be paid in 
his or her own right. 
2. The person will be paid as assignee. 
3. The amount to be held for the person under Option 3 
is lest than $ 1,000. But we will hold any amount for at 
least one year under the Automatic Mode of Settlement. 
4. Each payment to the person under the option would 
be less than $20. 
5. The option is for residue arising other than at (a) the 
Insured's death, or (b) the death of the beneficiary who 
was entitled to be paid as of the date of the Insured's 
death. 
6. The option is for proceeds which arise other than from 
the Insured's death, and we are settling with an owner or 
any other person who it not the Insured. 
Death of Payee.—If a Payee under an option diet and if 
no other distribution is shown, we will pay any residue 
under that option in one sum to the Payee's estate. 
ENDORSEMENTS 
(Only we can endorse this contract.) 
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AUTOMATIC MODE OF SETTLEMENT 
Applicability.—Thasa provisions apply to proceeds 
arising from the Insured's death and payable in one sum 
to a Payee who is a beneficiary. They do not apply to any 
periodic payment. 
Interest on Proceeds.—We will hold the proceeds at 
interest under Option 3. The Payee may withdraw the 
residue. We will pay it promptly on request. We will pay 
interest annually unless we agree to pay it more often. 
We have the right to pay the residue in one sum after one 
year if (1) the Payee is not a natural person who will be 
paid in his or her own right; (2) the Payee will be paid as 
assignee; or (3) the original amount we hold under 
Option 3 for the Payee is lass than $ 1,000. 
Settlement at Payee's Death.—If the Payee dies and 
leaves an Option 3 residue, we will honor any contingent 
payee provision then in effect. If there is none, here is 
what wa will do. We will look to the beneficiary desig-
nation of the contract; we will see what other benefici-
ary(ies}, if any, would have been entitled to the portion of 
the proceeds which produced the Option 3 residue if 
the Insured had not died until immediately after the Payee 
died. Then we will pay the residue in one sum to such 
other benefici8ry(ies), according to that designation. But 
if, as stated in that designation, payment would be due 
the estate of someone else, we will instead pay the estate 
of the Payee. 
Example: Suppose the class 1 beneficiary is Jane and the 
dees 2 beneficiaries are Paul and John. Jane was living 
when the Insured died. Jane later died without having 
chosen an option or naming someone other than Paul and 
John as a contingent payee. If Paul and John are living at 
Janes death we owe them the residue. If only one of 
them is living then, and if the contract called for payment 
to the survivor of them, we owe him the residue. If 
neither of them is living then, we owe Jane's estate. 
Spendthrift and Creditor.—A beneficiary or contingent 
payee may not, at or aftar the Insured's death, assign, 
transfer or encumber any benefit payable. To the extent 
allowed by law, the benefits will not be subject to the 
claims of any creditor of any beneficiary or contingent 
ENDORSEMENTS 
(Only we can endorse this contract.) 
Voting Rights.—We are a mutual life insurance company. Our principal offica is in Newark, Naw Jersey, and we are 
incorporated in that Stata. By law, we have 24 directors. This includes 16 elected by our policyholders (four each year for four 
year terms), two of our officers, and six public directors named by New Jersey's Chief Justice. 
The election is held on the first Tuesday in April from 10:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M. in our office at the Secretary's address shown 
here. After this contract has been in force for one year, you may vote either in person or by mail. We will send you a ballot if you 
ask for one. Just write to our Secretary at Prudential Plaza, Newark, New Jersey 0 7 1 0 1 , at least 6 0 days before the election date. 
By law, your request must show your name, address, policy number and date of birth. If you ara an individual, you must be at 
least 18 years old to vote. 
Home Office Locations.—When we use the phrase Home Office we mean any of these Prudential offices: 
Corporate Office, Newark, N.J. 
Central Atlantic Home Office, Fort Washington, Pa. 
Eastern Home Office, South Pis infield, N.J. 
Head Office, Canadian Operations. Toronto, Ont. 
Mid-America Home Office, Chicago, III. 
North Central Home Office, Minneapolis. Minn. 
Northeastern Home Office, Boston, Mass. 
South-Central Home Office, Jacksonville, Fla. 
Southwestern Home Office, Houston, Tex. 
Western Home Office, Los Angeles, Calif. 
COMB 34693—79 
The Prudential Insurance Company of America, 
y
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RIDER FOR 
INSURED'S WAIVER OF PREMIUM BENEFIT 
This Benefit is a part of this contract only if it is listed on the Contract Data page(s) 
Total Disability Benefit.—We will waive contract 
premiums which fall due while the Insured is totally 
disabled. But this is subject to all the provisions of this 
Benefit and of the rest of this contract. 
Disability Defined.—When we use the words disability 
and disabled in this Benefit we mean total disability and 
totally disabled. Here is how we define them: (1) until the 
Insured has stayed disabled for two years, we mean that 
he or s!ie cannot, due to sickness or injury, do any of the 
duties of his or her regular occupation; but (2) after the 
Insured has stayed disabled for two years, we mean that 
he or she cannot, due to sickness or injury, do any gainful 
work for which he or she is reasonably fitted by education, 
training, or experience. 
Except for what we state in the next sentence, we will at 
no time regard an Insured as disabled who is doing 
gainful work for which he or she is reasonably fitted by 
education, training, or experience. We will regard an 
Insured as disabled, even if working or able to work, if he 
or she incurs, during a period in which premiums are 
eligible to be waived as we describe below, one of these 
conditions: (1) permanent and complete blindness of both 
eyes; or (2) severance of both hands at or above the 
wrists or both feet at or above the ankles; or (3) severance 
of one hand at or above the wrist and one foot at or 
above the ankle. 
Premiums Eligible To Be Waived.—If the Insured 
becomes disabled before the first contract anniversary 
after his or her 60th birthday and that disability begins 
(1) on or after the first contract anniversary after his or 
her 5th birthday, if the contract date was before that 
birthday; or (2) on or after the contract date, if that date 
was on or after his or her 5th birthday, we will waive all 
premiums which fall due while he or she stays disabled. 
If the Insured becomes disabled on or after the first 
contract anniversary after his or her 60th birthday, we will 
waive only those premiums which fall due before the first 
contract anniversary after his or her 65th birthday and 
while he or she stays disabled. 
If the Insured becomes disabled on or after the first 
anniversary after his or her 65th birthday, we will not 
waive any premium which falls due in that period of 
disability. 
Conditions.—Both of these conditions must be met: 
(1) The Insured must become disabled while this contract 
is in force with no premium in default past its days of 
grace. (2) The Insured must have stayed disabled for a 
period of at least six months while living. 
Exceptions.—We will not waive any premium if the 
Insured becomes disabled from: (1) an injury he causes to 
himself, or she causes to herself, on purpose; or (2) 
sickness or injury due to service on or after the contract 
date in the armed forces of any country(ies) at war. The 
word war means declared or undeclared war and includes 
resistance to armed aggression. 
Successive Disabilities.-—Here is what happens if the 
Insured has at least one premium waived while disabled, 
then gets well so that premium payment resumes, and 
then becomes disabled again. In this case, we will ignore 
the six-month period which would otherwise be required 
by Condition (2) and consider the second period of 
disability to be part of the first period unless (1) the 
Insured has done gainful work, for which he or she is 
reasonably fitted, for at least six months between the 
periods; or (2) the insured became disabled the second 
time from an entirely different cause. 
If we ignore the six-month period required by Condition 
(2), we also will not count the days when there was no 
disability as part of the two year period when disability 
means the Insured cannot work at his or her regular 
occupation. 
Notice and Proof of Claim.—Notice and proof of any 
claim must be given to us while the insured is living and 
disabled, or as soon as reasonably possible. If notice or 
proof is not given as soon as reasonably possible, we 
will not weive any premium due more than one year 
before the date that notice or proof is given to us. We 
may require proof at reasonable times that the Insured is 
still disabled. After he or she has been disabled for two 
years, we will not ask for proof more than once a year. As 
a part of any proof, we may require that the Insured be 
examined at our expense by doctors of our choice. 
Recovery from Disability.—We will stop waiving 
premiums if (1) disability ends; or (2) we ask for proof 
that the Insured is disabled and we do not receive it; or 
(Continued on Next PBQ9) 
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(Continued from Preceding Page) 
(3) we require that the Insured be examined and he or 
she fails to do so. 
Miacellaneous.~-Any premiums which fall due are 
payable until we approve a claim. We will refund any 
premium paid which is later waived. There might be 
unpaid premiums which fall due (1) after disability starts; 
but (2) more than one year before we have notice of claim 
at our Home Office. Or disability might start in the days of 
grace of a premium which is unpaid. In either case, if we 
are otherwise able to approve a claim, those unpaid 
premiums which we do not waive will be due us with 
compound interest at 6% a year. If we do not receive 
them, we will deduct them with interest from any amount 
which we pay under the contract. 
Any premium we waive will be at the frequency in effect 
when the Insured becomes disabled. 
If we waive premiums, the effect on this contract will be 
the same as if the premiums had been paid in cash. But 
the Premium Adjustment provision in the contract will not 
apply to any premium we waive under this Benefit. 
If we owe the Insured a refund of premium but have not 
paid it before his or her death, we have the choice of 
paying the beneficiary for insurance payable upon the 
death of the Insured or the Insured's estate. 
Benefit Premiums.—The premiums for this Benefit are a 
part of the contract premiums due before the first contract 
anniversary after the Insured's 65th birthday. 
Termination.—This Benefit will end on the earliest of: 
1. the end of the last day of grace of a premium in 
default; it will not continue if a benefit takes effect under 
any contract value options provision which may be in the 
contract; 
2. the end of the day which is the last premium due date 
in the premium period; 
3. the date the contract is surrendered under its Cash 
Value Option, if it has one; 
4. the end of the day before the first contract anniversary 
after the Insured's 65th birthday, unless the Insured has 
stayed disabled since before the first contract anniversary 
after the 60th birthday; and 
5. the date the contract ends for any other reason. 
This Supplementary Benefit rider 
attached to this contract on the Contract Date 
The Prudential Insurance Company of America, 
By
 >ff,..<«//< J* TfLicJL***, 
Secretary 
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RENEWAL 
You may ranaw this contract at tha and of aithar its tarm 
pariod or a ranawal tarm pariod. You will not hava to 
prove to us that tha Inaurad is insurabla. All thasa 
conditions must ba mat: 
1. A ranawal tarm panod must start not latar than tha 
contract anniversary on which tha Insured's attained age 
is 70. 
2. Tha contract must ba in force with no premium in 
default past its days of grace. 
3. We must be paid the first premium for a ranawal tarm 
period as wa describe below. 
In any of these paragraphs when we use the phrase 
renewal term period we mean a tarm period for which the 
contract may ba renewed. Except as we state in the next 
sentence, a renewal tarm period will be the term period of 
this contract, as wa show on page 3. But if a renewal 
tarm period begins on the contract anniversary whan the 
Insured's attained age is 66, 67, 68 or 69, that renewal 
tarm pariod will be for the number of years between the 
Insured's attained age on that anniversary and age 70. 
Wa show the amount(s) of renewal premiums in the Tsble 
of Renewal Premiums on page 4. We base them on the 
Insured's attained age on the due date of the first 
premium for the renewal tarm period. The first of the 
premiums to be paid during a renewal term period will be 
due on the anniversary at tha end of the most recent of 
the term periods; the premium period for the renewal 
term period will start on that date. The Premium Payment 
and Reinstatement provisions of this contract will also 
apply to all premiums which become due during that 
pariod. 
The anniversary at the end of the final renewal term 
period is part of that tarm period. Unless we endorse it to 
say otherwise, any renewal of the contract will continue 
the interest of any beneficiary, owner or assignee. 
BASIS OF COMPUTATION 
Mortality Table and Interest Rata.—for dividend 
additions, we base net premiums end net values on the 
Insured's attained age and sax. We use the Commis-
sioners 1958 Standard Ordinary Mortality Table. If the 
Inaurad is female and at least age 15, we sat tha table 
back 3 years. If she is younger, we use the female 
extension of the table for eges less than 15. We use 
continuous functions based on age last birthday. We uaa 
an interest rate of 4% a year. 
CONTRACT S U M M A R Y (Continued from Pege 2) 
[ TABLE OP BASIC AMOUNTS 
If tha contract is in force and tha proceeds arise from the Insured's daath within the term period: 
Then The Basic Amount is: 
tha face amount (in window on page 1), plus the 
amount of any extra benefit arising from the 
Insured's death 
And Wa Adjust The Basic Amount For: 
dividend credits (see pege 8), end premium in 
default or paid (other than by a waiver benefit, if 
any) past tha date of death (see page 7). 
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Changing Options; Conditions; 
Death of Payee 
Page 
. .9 
.11 
. 3 * 6 
Pramiums 3 * 7 
Payment of Pramiums; Change of 
Frequency; Grace Period; Pramium 
Adjustment 
Reinstatement 7 
Automatic Mode of Settlement . . . 
Applicability; Interest on 
Proceeds; Settlement at Payee's 
Death; Spendthrift and Creditor 
Voting Rights 
Home Office Locations 
.14 
Dividends 
Participation; Dividend Options; 
Dividend Credits Described; Surrender of Dividends; 
Automatic Cash Payment; Settlement 
8 Renewal 
Basis of Computation . . . . . . . . . . 
Mortality Table and Interest Rata 
.14 
.14 
15 
.15 
Any Supplementary Benefits and a copy of the 
application follow page 14. 
Page 16 
Term Ufa Policy. Insurance payable only upon daath within atatad term period. Premiums payabia during Insured's 
lifetime for atatad pramium parted* Convartibia and ranawabia aa limitad. Supplamantary Banafits, if any, aa listed on 
'Contract Data page(s). Eiigibla for annual dividanda aa atatad in Dividanda proviaion. 
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Dan S. Bushnell #0522 
Merrill F. Nelson #3841 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL HARDY, 
VS. 
Plaintiff 
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF AMERICA; WAYNE L. 
RIGBY, Insurance Agent, 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAN HARDY 
Civil No. C83-7195 
STATE OF UTAH 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
JAN HARDY, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that: 
1. She is a former daughter-in-law of LYNN and CHERYL 
HARDY, and at the time of the events discussed here, she was 
married to Lynn and Cheryl's son, David Hardy. 
2. She makes this affidavit on the basis of her personal, 
first-hand knowledge. 
3. She was present in the home of Lynn Hardy when Agent 
Wayne L. Rigby was there discussing the matter of life insurance 
with Lynn Hardy. 
on, McConkto 
I Bushnell 
30 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
r 
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4. She heard Lynn Hardy tell Agent Rigby that he had a 
heart attack in 1974. * 
5. She heard Agent Rigby respond that Lynn need not worry 
about the heart attack because it occurred more than five years 
before and would therefore not be relevant to the application, 
6. She was present in the Hardy Trucking Co. office 
when Agent Rigby delivered the insurance policy to the Hardys. 
7. She heard Agent Rigby exclaim that there'was no prob-
lem with the policy, that it was issued without rating or waiver. 
DATED this /3L day of February, 1985. 
sy .TIH ninnv/i' ^ 7 J A N HARDYS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /gA-day of 
February, 1985. 
•3&^£: ^ ^ , 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My commission expires: 
on, MeConfcte 
I Busfmtll 
Immonat Corporator* 
f//S-/t7 
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Dan S. Bushnell #0522 
Merrill F. Nelson #3841 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL HARDY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff 
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF AMERICA; WAYNE L. 
RIGBY, Insurance Agent, 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK ITH 
Civil No. C83-7195 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
MARK ITH, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that: 
li He is the step-son of LYNN HARDY and the son of CHERYL 
HARDY. 
2. He makes this affidavit on the basis of his personal, 
first-hand knowledge. 
3. He was present in the home of Lynn Hardy when Agent 
Wayne Rigby was there going over the questions on a life insurance 
application. 
4. He heard Lynn Hardy tell Agent Rigby that he had had 
a heart attack seven years before. I Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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5. He heard Agent Rigby respond that the heart attack did 
not matter because the application was concerned with medical 
history for only the past five years. 
DATED this / 2. day of February, 1985. 
' M A R K I T H . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /£**~&ay of 
February, 1985. 
<%£w?^ 7Z£^ 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My commission expires: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
LIFE, REPOKT—ADVANCED 
Thi Jbrt contains information pertinent to Life Insurance 
Underwriting and was prepared for that purpose only. 
Date 
Name 
Address 
Occupation and 
Employer on Inq. 
Date of Birth 
Amt. Appl. 
17 DfruAgcy. 
8 / 1 3 / 8 1 - 6 - 5 
HARDY, LYNN. 
SLC, Utah, 1650 
Self-employed 
4 / 2 6 / 3 9 
or Br. 
Policy No. 
W. 
G S a l t 
ns 
Lake Office 
Date' 
Insurance History: 2 / 1 3 / 7 8 
Southgate 
c&a 
r*w*w 
: S a l t 
Acct. No. 
12486 
re* .V 7 
Lake Ci ty 
Amt or 
Type Coverage 
50M 
»• > - . , . -
Fam. 
or Indv 
Indv. 
300M (No) (Yes) (No) (Yes) 
AIUJJJBOL. Date(s) Inspection Made 
Identity 
interview (applicant, spouse, other adult family member): 
In person. 
>ther sources 
[Yrs. known to each) 
>rev. Rpts. 
By phone. 
In person. 
By phone. 
Wife 
~2j£....y.earjaf 4 years. 
7 years 
(no. reports—longest time known) 
Jow many days since you or sources have seen or -. < j a . . 
liked to applicant? (If not within 2 weeks, explain.) •*» q a X 
s date of birth on inquiry incorrect? 
Marital status? (M S Sep. Wid. Div.)-
dumber of children in household: 
( X 
-44-
)( ) 
leside with someone other than an immediate family 
nember? 
[s beneficiary someone other than an immediate family 
nember? (It yes, cover relationship & reason.) 
Occupation 
Occupation, job, or employer differ from that given 
MI inquiry? 
•art-time or off-season occupation? (Describe fully.) 
Change jobs frequently? 
Plan to work or travel in foreign countries? 
&vtatk>n—Sports—Avocations 
Flown as pilot or student pilot? 
(If yes, cover Handy Guide.) 
Hazardous sports or avocations (racing, skin or scuba 
diving, sky diving, snowmobiling, hang gliding, etc)? 
Driving Record 
004653871 
(X 
(X 
(X 
(X 
(X 
(X 
(X 
(X 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
Utah 
Driver's license number: 
and state or province: 
Moving traffic violations? (Cover at least past 3 yrs.) 
Traffic accidents? (Cover at least past 3 yrs.) 
Driver's license suspended or revoked? 
Own or drive motorcycle, motorbike, dune buggy, 
or high performance car? 
Appearance—Impairments 
Unusual build? (If yes, describe appearance.) 
If interview, give: ht—§JLA : wt.. 
Deformity, amputation, blindness, deafness or other 
impairments? 
Health (Amplify as necessary on reverse.) 
Personal Physician: Name J B H S _ E J B t e r S O n 
( 
(X 
(X 
(X 
< * 
185... 
)( x 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( ) 
(X ) ( ) 
Address. 
City & State or Province 
Date last seen: JQ& 
Why? 
SL^JLLtaix. 
3. Results: 
Ilmess, injury, operation, past or present, not 
covered in 6A? (If yes, see reverse.) 
Use medication regularly? 
Family member (parents, brothers and sisters) had 
diabetes, cardiovascular disorder, or cancer? 
? 00208 
(X 
(X 
( 
)( ) 
)( ) 
) ( X ) 
7. Smoking 
A. Smoke cigarettes? 
If yes, how long? J t e i 
B. Stopped smoking? 
If yes, when? 
pkgs. a day—]—sa. 2. 
) ( X ) 
c i g s 
(X ) ( ) 
Why? 
Interview Information (Alcohol-Drugs) 
Alcohol (Amplify as necessary on reverse.) 
1. Use alcohol? (If no, see "B.") ( 
2. How often? Q . £ £ . a S t i . Q n a 1 l y _ 
3. what? Mixed : 
)( x ) 
(Cover additional alcoholic beverages in narrative.) 
4. How many? 1—zz—2 
When? 
Where? 
Drive after drinking? 
E.Y.en±ags.. 
Home. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. Any noticeable effects from alcohol use? 
9. How long drinking? 
10. Drinking pattern changed? 
11. Received counseling or treatment for alcohol use? 
Used alcohol in past? 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
( X 
( X 
( X 
( X 
( X 
) ( 
) ( 
) ( 
) ( 
) ( 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
What? 
How many? 
How long? 
When stopped? 
Why stopped? 
(X ) 
(X ) 
A. 
Received counseling or treatment for alcohol use? 
Drugs (Amplify as necessary on reverse.) 
C. Use(d) or experiment(ed) with marijuana, LSD, or non-
Srescribed stimulants, depressants or narcotics? Rher Source Information (Alcohol-Drugs) 
(Amplify as necessary on reverse.) 
1. Does applicant use alcohol? (If no, see "B.") 
2. Any personal observation of noticeable effects 
from drinking? 
3. Drive after drinking? 
4. Any known financial, job or personal problems 
caused by drinking? 
5. Received counseling or treatment for alcohol use? 
B. Used alcohol in past? 
C. Use(d) or experiment (ed) with marijuana, LSD, or non-
prescribed stimulants, depressants or narcotics? 
10. Personal 
A. Except for traffic violations, ever been arrested? 
B. Any comments about reputation, life style, or 
home environment? 
11. Interview Information 
A. Ever rated or declined for insurance? 
B. Individual life insurance in force at this time? 
C. Group life insurance in force at this time? 
(If 11 B-C answered "Yes," give name of carrier and amount(s) in 
Insurance History paragraph.) 
12. Answer only if Family Polky: 
Illness, injury or operation of other family . . , v 
members? (Past or present) K ' K ' 
13. If Family Life requested, complete & attach Family Life Supplement, 
Form 18008. _ _ _ 
(X 
(X 
(X 
(X 
(X 
(X 
(X 
(X 
(X 
(X 
(X 
(X 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ilf ax Services Inc. 
. Iffav €«»v fa>M It A. 
(OVER) Report Transferred on.. -To-
(date) (branch office) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Finances* Worth Income 
Cash to banka 
Real estate 
Car(s) 
Stocks/bonds 
Business equity 
Personal! 
Total 
Accounts payable 
Mortgages 
Secured Loans 
Personal notes 
Total Liabilities 
2,000 
70,000 
10,000 
150,000 
20,000 
3f)?,Q0Q 
30,000 
50,000 
Salary 125,000 
Self-employed (Unincorporated) 
Gross Income $ 
Expenses $ 
Net income 
- ^ (adjusted gross) S 
Bonus $ 
Commission $ 
Total Earned $ £ g . Y . ( & Q -
Dividends 
Interest 
Net rentals 
8(J,Q0Q 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
Total Unearned $ 
Net Worth I JLZLU 
low was worth acquired? A c C U f f l u l a t e d . 
Vho gave worth/income figures?—# .1 f e 
Total Income (Earned and Unearned) $ 2 S y O 0 Q . . . — 
If 11 A-C answered "Yes," comment 
Show type of source, e.g., banker, business associate, neighbor. If applicant not interviewed, state why. 
business: Name of employer, line of business, approximate number of employees, how long employed. Describe business history for last 3 years. If fluctuations 
a business/profession, what are reasons? Describe business record for last 3 years when applicable. 
taties? Answer Handy Guide questions. 
'Inancets Amplify as needed. 
kViatfon—Sports—Avocations: Comment if question 3 A-B answered "Yes.** Cover Handy Guide questions. 
drivings If 4 B-E answered "Yes," give details. 
leaitfc: Give details of "Yes" answers to questions 6 B-D. 
Jcobol—Drugs: Give details of: noticeable effects of alcohol; any known related financial, job or personal problems; changes in usage; treatment Cover 
se of other alcoholic beverages. Describe in detail present or past usage of marijuana, narcotics, sedatives, depressants, stimulants or hallucinogens. 
'ersonal: Describe associates, home life, living conditions and neighborhood. Comment on social/club life if developed. 
SOURCES: Applicants wife, neighbor known for 272 years, neighboiS known for 4 
years, previous report for 7 years. 
BUSINESS: The applicant, Lynn Hardy, is present!^ self-employed as a trucker. 
H P K £X e«» <iK n A ^% 4> ,-...-» « C *. _ . . .« 1 . . J . .• n i i • ' ™ — ^ 
years and is stable. He will w^rk in the local area and will work bn"a 
contract basis with various companies. He will generally not do long-haul 
driving, however, will occasionally if necessary. The subject currently has 
a contract with the Clark Tank Lines to haul asphalt products.. 
DUTIES: The applicant's duties are* those of a truck driver. He will work 
primarily in the local area and will maintain his own trucks and will haul 
asphalt and lumber products. 
• * ' ••-." x 
"** fctBvttdtatfvfr—UM ContmuatloB of Re % p Form 5166, for additional remarks. P 00209 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fage 2 *"^ Account Na 1 / > m 
nnation * Lficitkm L i f e Report-Advanced 
Cport - . H A R D Y . LYNN : : 
# • 
DRIVING: • The applicant has received one speeding violation in 
the past 10 years. 
HEALTH: The applicant is in good health and is 6*1 and weighs 
185 pounds. We learned that his brother has some heart problems, 
however, is still living. 
PERSONAL: The subject is married and resides with his wife and 
three children in a middle-class surroundings. He is well regarded. 
042:cp 
V 00210 
( U i T t M i I n * . *\ f% 
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' MEDIC/ DEPARTMENT—X-ray and Electrocardi'09 .'Section 
• • * • REQUEST FOR EXAMINATION 
PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA, W.H.O. LOS ANGELES, CAL.' 
NAME 
SIGNATURE _ _ 
X RAY NO. 
Height.^ 
Lynn mra^ 
Weight_ 
f 
— D a t e . 
Age 
D R 
Pol. No. 
( ) X-RAY OF „ 
?) ECGNn 
( ) METABOLISM 
I ) Insurance 
( ) Disability 
f CI. No 
( ) Field 
( ) Other 
CASE HISTORY (Give briefly significant records): 
() H.O. Case 
() Borrowed 
(± Credit $13.00 
(T Photo-Copy * l * ' w 
M.D. 
Hi Amount 
x RAY 
REPORT OF EXAMINATION 
DATE FROM 
Date 8-17-ftl 
Exam. Mgmt. Services 
Salt Lake City, UT 
Code
 34Q 
{) X-ray returned 
( ) Film filed 
(il ECG to Underwriting 
( ) ECG copied and returned 
by X--ray 
ITW/vcm 
Comb 16600-A ED 5/81 (W) 
I 7 T . Wilson, CPT 
m 
AUG 1 8 7981 \ cc: 11 
CAT.#4005W5G Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
COTTCmoOD HOSPITALW soc sec. NO.. 
,.<• 5770'South 300 East. Murray. Utah 84107 
Wtm^"''\ EMERGENCY ROOM RECORD I NOTIFIED PARENTS [NOTIFIED OR. 
5§"5 o# TN( c*«u«cfl^usCHM.JT or kATTf *o*v t« t *^Hk ^ R a . ^^m U Y E S ^ ^ 1 J Y E S 
l l ^ | r Soc. Sec. N o — 
m* 68 7934 fwlf e ^ D NO _ J » 3 N O 
Drivers L ie . N o . . 
1-5-74 
. T i m e , 6:24 m .Pa t ient Log N u m b e r . _&2SL 
-m C L O T H I N G & V A L L W V L F T S Q W I T H PT . Q H O I \ { * - . Q C H E C K E D 
Witness: 
Signed for 
•f Patient . HARDY, LYNN F . 
s of P a t i e n t . 
Last' First 
3717 S. 3200 W. SLC 84119 
- A g e . 34 
Street C i ty — State — Z i p 
rer o f ft.ti.nt M c K i n l e y T r u c k i n g Occupat ion 
isible Party W a n d a R e t a t l o n s h i p _ H i f S Employer of R.P . 
_BirthOate 4-26-39 g™» 5 4 4 4 8 2 
ph^> 2 9 8 - 2 6 9 3 ^ M <: ft .Q w SeP. 
( N a m e of business — F i r m — Address) 
ice: Industr ia l : Yes No—Medicare : Yes N o O t h e r . 
an: V. Sundwa 11 REFERRED 
Travelers 
( N a m e of Insurance Carrier — Group No . ) 
_E.R. Doctor on Call: Taylor/Burton 
it in By: wife 
gating O f f i c e r : . 
>f 
nt 
.Charge N . T C * . S . R a g e r 
. D e p t : 
. M a n n e r Received: W a l k i n g 
. T i m e . 
. or Compla 
Orders 
po6S corpnary 
Murray , H ighway Patrol , S .L . County , Midvale 
. L o c a t i o n D a t e . 
7Gtn? . X - R a y N o . . 
rs (F ina l ) Diagnosis 
N U R S E ' S N O T E S 
i "M *T,V& CJttsJ /%£««- ^7 .<i&i&:ff< / ^ TTi/r^J-^S-
zf: &•{<. Jp*,. ' yLQ'fJts)*x^ r JASS 
T i m e V I T A L S I G N S 
BP 
?U4- Jd 'ZV^.-U f / • - • i. 
3 * 
?iyA 
* 
e**es _S7J^< y(Q4> ^it^o^^Ty 
<ZLJHi*rJ'„,*,s'Yjr < ^ <-' ' ^ 7 ^ 
^ £ /3*4U^O 
Z&C^/t.f &<* 
& "=T<+ 
4=-:—v—>t^—-y^V < j>rr f-f 'TZZ^t^crjf-r. e <x _ ~ ^ ^ .*=», 7 
E2S #f-
- • D I S P O S I T I O N E M R 
( C I R C L E O N E ) Out 
R E C Q 
" ^ Rm. 
R e p o r t : •&,, ^~rr? 
c's Orders 
A U T H O R I Z A T I O N A N D G U A R A N T E E O F P A Y M E N T : I heresy c^ffsent to any medical, 
surgical and anesthetic procedure which the physician may consider or advise in the treat-
ment of my case and guarantee payment of the charges incurred. In case this account is 
placed in the hands of an a t torney for col lect ion, the undersigned agrees to pay a reason-
able at torney's fee w i t h all costs and expenses incurred. I U N D E R S T A N D T H A T P A Y M E N T 
IS D U E A T T H E T I M E S E R V I C E IS R E N D E R E D . This off ice wil l not accept the responsi-
bi l i ty for f i l ing or collecting your insurance claim or for negotiating a sett lement w i th your 
insurance company . Should you have insurance benefits due you for this hospital service, 
we wi l l provide you w i t h a copy of your bill which you may forward to your insurance 
company for re- imbursement. Y o u are responsible for payment of your account w i t h i n the 
l imits of the above pol icy. I hereby agree to p a y a service charge at the rate of V/z% per 
m o n t h ( 1 8 % per year) on the unpaid balance. , . 
:ian's R e p o r t : . 
Signed \)0fo<vj>i*y 
Witness 
UMSLJL^> 
P] 5 & f r ^ ftf A^A/l dl<2St<7.<!. ' " ^ J L / z / T r < p - 7 ? > / r ^ l <$h<UsT~ 
/W 
CW ft <Q
 f 
KQjg (JAtf- OLsJ/u OAJ>^ ^ AJL*Z~ —* / /?/£ GA£?CS^ M- OW8. 
~ZTk Lh hi 1/ nv %^^np^. fe^l )pesHA**Jr MJV >*L 
4- JL 
l^j^D 
&hz irk - /a^i^y^ &ctc ~ iT.^& 
<E/<QC- 6^> j f g ) (k^ZT) STv^-~ ^ 2 VL ttt 'Ofn tfu. ^v ^ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DATE LAST JrAME/ FIRST NAMI MIDDLE INITIAL 
22L I y^^ 
DATS OP BIRTH 
.f&.&....<er&...2h<Jk. 
.^to. 34tej.x"-"" 
^.£\J?.....^i!~~U!U+«4^....jC.'^ 
'^f^^^Z. „fj. 'jSTf^y.^c 
.^T^L*?. <?f7ir^Ui^i f^rvr^rrCr^A^if.. 
nJSiu. 3toxL...$.tiiAiJ.J. : 
.T..SACX. 
..Jrf.L..tfi4sul...jy&:....*d. C.tf....Aji*$U&.....l&^.....&tt 
.A£...<..../rmc<&*te..^ md^...a^jm^^<^^Z..... 
.JLce£.. Lu...i £.2W<4t^.y*^.2^&<#^L, 
..?A. EZ^ZAZ 
.«??*y*&jJ»l.....f&/..<-f* 
P 00217 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~z<ui. e^sas^a ?£§Z /l3^.. 
1SV>cJ J? " 
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HARDY LY 
APPLICANT 
HARPY CHERYL 
te^ 
WRITING REPRESENJA 
R1GBY. W L 
JRJL' , 7sl ?gt?bt,k3lzli inbal IT.-SLC * 
THIS APPLICATION HAS BEEN APPROVED* STANOARD. 
POLICY SHOULD BE DELIVEREO BY 11 05 Al 
POLICY DATE 01 17 B l ISSUE DATE 10 OS A l 
REMIUH I t l . t S MODE H PRODUCTION CR 300000 
CONTRACT # TQ1113 COMH 71 ,13 (12 ) MHO 
lAOV PAY 111.US 
lib SO M SOUTHCATE SALT LAKE CTY UT BM111 
r AGE 1 OF 1 UNO-J C HICZEK 
COMB 81068A ED 1-79 PART II • REPRESENTATIVE'S COPY 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
COMB 9280 EO 6-81 (VV) 
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA RECEIVED 
LIFE & HEALTH CLAIM DIVISION, W.H.O. JA/Vl4l9ftQ 
& < U CONTROL DESK INSPECTION REPORT Richard S. Stelzner 
INSURED: Lynn Hardy 
RSS/jg JIU0.H. 
January 10, "83 
DIVISION 
LfcH CUid 
(Underwriting! 
CHIP/EBP 
CLAIM 
K3SP Claim 
Date of Death 
POLICY NOS. 
TO 766 463 
DATE OP APP8. TYPE OF INV. 
Broth 
Contest> 
SETTLEMENT OP CASE 
| R.P. 
Comp. 
L&fttuscJ 
Am mint Funds From*. 
Advance 
Draft 
Dist . Off. 
1 District Office Notmed? 
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT TO FOLLOW? Yes Q No Q 
This Report Requested By. Vicki Lavetts , Division L&H Clm. 
January 6, 1983 
Visited the Exam Center, 1735 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City. The 
Medical Secretary informed me that there were no copies of our Insured*s 
Medical Records kept by them. 
Visited our Beneficiary at her place of employment, Lynn Hardy Trucking 
Company, 2717 South Redwood Road. Our Beneficiary told me that our Insured 
became ill at about 3:00 a.m. with chest pains and pain in one of his arms. 
She drove him to St. Marks Hospital. His condition worsened and he died at 
approximately 5:00 a.m. that same morning, December 4, 1982. 
Our Beneficiary said that our Insured has never had any heart problems in the 
past. He and our Beneficiary had been married for 5 years and she is unaware 
of any medical history prior to their marriage. She said she could not 
recall any specific medical history, however, she said that he had seen Dr. 
Sundwall. 
I asked about our Insured's prior physical examinations for his driver's 
license. Our Beneficiary went to the file cabinet in her office and removed 
copies of a January 7, 1977 examination and an August 7, 1981 examination. 
She gave me copies of these reports. All of the categories were within 
normal limits. A signed Medical Authorization was obtained from our 
Beneficiary. 
Visited the office of Dr. Val Sundwall, 4815 Center Street, Murray. The only 
items in our Insured's medical folder was a visit on September 30, 1980 for 
ocass Nocheria. I asked the Medical Receptionist if there was other medical 
history perhaps in another folder. She stated that 4 or 5 years ago, all of 
the records for patients who had not been seen within 5 years were destroyed. 
P G0140 
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Lynn Hardy -2- January 10, 1983 
70 766 463 
The only records that they have for our Insured is the 1980 visit, which I 
had obtained from them. I learned that there is also a Dr. David Sundwall, 
who at one time, practiced at the Utah Medical Center. I was told that he is 
now in Washington, D.C., working with Senator Hatch. 
Visited the Utah Medical Center. Initially, I was not allowed to inspect nor 
obtain copies of our Insured's Medical Records, by the Medical Secretary. I 
asked to speak to the Director of Medical Records, Mr. Tohenaka. Vith much 
persistence, I was able to obtain copies of our Insured's only admission, 
which was on March 9, 1974. The final clinical impression for that visit 
was, organic heart disease. Etology, ASHD, secondary to hyerlipidemia. 
Anatomy high grade obstruction of the midcircumflex and right coronary 
arteries, inferior wall, myocardial infarction. 
Our Insured was referred to Dr. Thome, in the Cardiac Clinic. Our Insured 
had also been seen by Dr. Huckleberry, a Urologist, for prostatitis. 
Mr. Tohenaka would not allow me to inspect our Insured's Medical Records. 
Vith reluctance, he personally obtained copies of the records for me. He 
said the Records Department was undergoing an audit and they were being 
extremely cautious in releasing records. I asked about our Insured's Clinic 
Records. I learned that Dr. Thome had moved his practice to another 
location. After searching the files, Mr. Tohenaka informed me that there had 
been no Clinic Records in the files. He said that had there been Clinic 
Records, they would have been in the file. 
Visited the Cottonwood Hospital, Salt Lake City. Obtained copies of our 
Insured's Medical Records. Our Insured was seen on December 6, 1965 with 
left hip pain, Etology, unknown. On March 28, 1967 he was treated for 
recurrent genito urinary tract infection, probably recurrent prostatitis. On 
January 4, 1974, our Insured was admitted for pain in his chest and down both 
arms. A discharge diagnosis was (1) Arteriosclerotic heart disease with an 
apparent acute myocardial infarction. (2) Mild hypercholesteresolemia. (3) 
Strong family history for early coronary death. I obtained medical leads to 
Dr. Val and David Sundwall, Dr. C. A. Natoli and Dr. W. T. Black. 
A call is made to the office of Dr. V. T. Black, 870 East 94th South, Sandy. 
The Medical Secretary was unable to locate any Medical Records for our 
Insured. 
An attempt was made to locate Dr. C. A. Natoli, however I was unable to 
locate any evidence of this physician. 
Visited St. Marks Hospital, Salt Lake City. Obtained copies of our Insured's 
Autopsy and Medical Records. Our Insured was seen in the Emergency Room on 
December 4, 1982, complaining of chest pains. He expired that same day. 
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Lynn Hardy -3- January 10, 1983 
70 766 463 
The Autopsy Report states both severe arteriolsclerosis causing 70% to 80% 
luminal narrowing. I obtained leads to Dr. Adamson and Thorn*. 
I learned that Dr. Adamson is a staff physician at St. Marks Hospital and he 
does not have a private practice. 
-Visited the office of Dr. J. L. Thome, 1200 East 3900 South, Suite 3 F, 
Cardiovascular Disease. The Medical Receptionist would not permit me to 
review our Insuredfs medical records. She did however, make copies of the 
records for me. The records include a January 2, 1980 visit in the records 
of our Insured's March 9, 1974 visit at the University of Utah Medical Center 
for organic heart disease. I was told that there were no other visits to the 
doctor's office. There were no referring physicians. 
Visited the County Courthouse in Salt Lake City. Criminal and Civil Records 
were checked. There was no criminal record for our Insured. Civil Records 
revealed a law suit case #80-CV4934, A. J. Dean & Sons Ready Mix & Concrete 
versus Lynn & Cheryl Hardy, for the amount of $946.26. This case involved 
non-payment for services rendered. There were no medical leads. 
A call was made to Dr. Neel Huckleberry, M.D., a Urologist, at 1002 East 
South Temple Street. I learned that our Insured had been seen for urinary 
tract infections on June 6, 1967, July 1, 1967, July 8, 1967, September 27, 
1967, December, 1969 and May, 1972. There were no medical leads obtained. 
No Medical Reports obtained. 
A call was made to the SLCX Agency. I spoke with Wayne Rigby, the Writing 
Representative. Mr. Rigby first met our Insured approximately one month 
prior to the date of application. Rigby had been at a booth which had been 
set up at a local fair. He met our Insured's son and wife and they had a 
conversation about insurance. Our Insured's name and business had been 
obtained from the son as a possible lead. Mr. Rigby went to our Insured's 
place of business and attempted to interest our Insured in a Group Policy. 
Instead, our Insured applied for Life Insurance for himself. He requested 
$300,000 coverage for himself, because he had 3 or 4 semi-truck and trailers 
which he still owed money for. 
Mr. Rigby is unaware of any medical history pertaining to our Insured which 
is not on the application form. 
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Lynn Hardy -4- .January 10, 1983 
70 766 463 
CONCLUSIONS: 
All medical leads were followed. Medical evidence was obtained which shows 
that our Insured had a prior history of heart-related problems, which was not 
admitted to on the application. 
Please find all of the Medical Reports obtained, inside the jacket of this 
file. 
This concludes the handling of this file. 
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hospitalization to the application date? Who initiated the 4 
negotiations for insurance? What other insurance did our insured 
have? (These factors are not conclusive, but may help to 
evaluate good faith) 
•What factual information can ve prove? 
•What is the probable underwriting significance? 
Given information that an insured had incorrectly answered question 7 a. on 
the application because he had a physical two years ago at which time his 
blood pressure was found to be a "little high", we would have insufficient 
information to determine whether the insured had given us a "no" answer in 4 
good faith. Did he give us the date and name of the doctor in questions U, 
9> or 11? What were the actual Blood Pressure Readings? What was he told? 
Was medication prescribed? Were there sub sequent visits or treatment? The 
answers to these and other questions would have to be obtained before good 
faith could be evaluated and probable .underwriting significance Judged.^ " " 
< 
Even though an insured omitted information from the application, common 
knowledce or a review of the Underwriting Manual may disclose that the 
information would not have had underwriting significance. The file should 
be noted to reflect this unless the information relates to treatment so old 
or a condition so minor that it would obviously be of no significance. 
Question 9 on our application - the "Other than as disclosed in the answers 4 
to the preceding questions have you..." is limited to treatment, tests, etc. 
within five years of the application date. Although the other questions on 
the application do not have any time limitation} it has been our practice to 
-disregard treatment more than five years old,-
0. 
Occasionally the rnvnrit of the Part 2 Medical Application or our investigation < 
will disclose that our Examining Physician was also the insured1 s attending 
physician. In such cases the law will generally imply that any knowledge the 
physician has about his patient will be imputed to us under general rules of 
Agency. Therefore! given a misrepresentation which results from our own 
examiner's failure to record treatment he rendered to our insured there is 
generally little we can do other than pay the claim and refer the file to
 ( 
our Medical Department for appropriate action such as removing the examiner 
from our list. 
Partial admissions present particular difficulties for Claim because the 
question then becomes whether the insured in good faith told us what he 
believed to be true, or vhether deliberately tried to mislead us. For example,
 { 
if the insured admits hospitalisation for 10 days for "pneumonia" when in fact 
he was hospitalised three weeks for surgery to remove a tumor from his lung, 
this would have to be viewed as an admission deliberately designed to mislead 
us in the absence of conclusive proof that he was never told anything other 
than that he had pneumonia. 
The majority of questions on Part 2 of our application are objective ('Vhen 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DATE 
JL-
LAST MIOOLE INIT IAL flOATE O F BIRTH 
3 ^ TnZd ^/^rf^gjn 
~ZZ^lo^ <%2x&&^^i 
1 /9*?7€ALs&k 
^s^e^e* 6^J\M^^h^(^^^C 
7%U TTC,, 
fiClrfsSA ^ ^f < 
^^C^^^^z^<^^, *%%£ 
<&f6L [/U^^^r^C^t^^ 
7&U~ ~7?&^<*^-*3s ^t^C^L. ^^Z&Ly^ 
« ^ P t ^ m 
^e. iF^^^^^a^^ 
P 00124 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DATE O r BIRTH 
^L.^lA^M:..../^^^.. "•i>hZ 
Jhj. t^.....Jf^......£<£^jfc^^ 
MtL_..,.S>. Aiuiujf-
. . . ^ . ^ V . - . v - T . . ! . . , . . 
4^.y..A...^hM,: "x/t^r^^ 
'<•£ 2 'I-ft"JTx. u A ^ ' . 
JMJ^LI'M... 
A^X-M^-T^^ A 
kAL....S^....,...it± &*L 
. jfWUiK- / i ^ t u / 
0U£Jir. IUWM-. <i^....^^S^H 
.^....Ju^Sa..:. ".., ' 
/#£_ " iC*^-
AAL ,<1yi-£<-»~fLeC__ 
3^.^i^At_.iLLSK-i ./. 
i ;Z mtedk*.. Mdr^..A.....d?..^-;jT 4ttM4Jt*>. MdLi 
zm 'huf^lM M»%> ^-Llx B 242631 ED 8-81 (W) P 00123 057W81 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• .J • • 
MEMORANDUM FOR: MARY BURKE 
ASST. CLAIM CONSULTANT 
LIFE AND HEALTH CLAIM 
WHWH 
February 4, 1983 
You've referred this large amount contestable claim for review. For our 
files, these are the details. 
On 8-4-81, Lynn Hardy, age 42, applied for a 5 yr. term policy for $300,000, 
naming his wife, Cheryl, as beneficiary. 
Based upon his age and the amount applied for, the insured was required to 
take an exam and an EKG. Upon questionning on 8-17-81 by the paramedic, 
Mr. Hardy indicated that his father had died of a heart attack, his mother 
of a stroke and two brothers of a heart attack. The only other medical 
history furnished by the insured was an examination in 9-79 for his truck 
drivers license. The ECG was reported as normal "showinq a first dearee 
AV heart block". 
Because cardiovascular disease is heredity and because the insured's family 
demonstrated a high incidence of young age coronary deaths, the underwriters 
were concerned about Mr. Hardy's cardiovascular status. They requested an 
attending physician's statement from the only doctor the insured had admitted 
to seeing (the doctor who did his truck driver's physical) and ordered 
another examination - by a physician - and a chest x-ray. 
This time, Mr. Hardy indicated "unknown" to all questions regarding his 
family history. Additional medical history was furnished which included another 
truck drivers exam, a history of prostatitis ten years ago and rheumatic fever 
as a child. Questions 7a (Have you ever been in a hospital . . . for 
observation, rest diagnosis or treatment?), 8b (Have you ever been treated 
by a doctor for or had any known sign of chest pain, pressure or discomfort?) 
and 9b (. . .had any known sign of a disease or disorder of the heart, 
arteries or veins?) were all answered "No". The APS which was pursued verified 
the department of transportation exam. 
The file was submitted to the medical department because of the family history 
and the AV block in the current ECG. The doctor decided that the case could 
be issued standard "absent other ratable impairment". 
Mr. Hardy died on 12-4-82 of a myocardial infarction. A contestable investigation 
was conducted. The investigation revealed that the insured was hospitalized 
at Cottonwood Hospital on 1-5-74,*at the age of 34, with chest pain. He 
remained in the coronary care unit for ten days with a diagnosis of acute 
myocardial infarction, ASHD, and multiple episodes of ventricular tachycardia and 
/venticular extrasystoles. On 3-9-74; he was admitted to Utah Medical Center 
for cardiac catherization. The results showed the insured had a 92% occlusion 
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of the right coronary artery and moderate occlusion of the circumflex < 
coronary artery. He was discharged on digoxinfquinidine sufate and 
atromed arid was followed in a Dr. Thome's cardiac clinic. 
Unfortuantely Dr. Thome's clinic records have been either lost or destroyed. 
The only subsequent medical record we have obtained is a 1-2-80 visit 
to Dr. Thome which Dr. Thorne had in his possession as the visit was 4 
after Dr. Thome left the cardiac clinic 3 years ago. The clinic would 
not allow him to take his records on patients he saw there. 
On. 1-2-80 the insured was not suffering from any cardiac symptoms and was 
doing yery well. This v is i t , however, establishes that the insured was 
s t i l l being seen periodically by this cardiologist. I 
Generally medical history over five years old can be disregarded in a claim 
investigation because medically i t would have been of no significance at 
underwriting time. This is not always true,particularly in a case of 
myocardial infarctions and severe arteriosclerosis at a very young age. 
You referred the case to the underwriters who advised that had they had 
the 1974 information the case would have been a minimum Special Class 4 with 
a sizeable temporary extra. This information therefore clearly meets Utah's 
requirement that any misrepresented information be material to the hazard 
assumed by the insurer. 
I t also appears that there was a deliberate concealment of the facts by the 
Insyred. He furnished medical history of a genitourinary infection three years 
prior to his coronary as well as the childhood episode of rheumatic fever. 
I doubt he could have forgotten his myocaridal infarction and subsequent 
catherization. Each of the questions answered incorrectly was asked twice 
since the applicant had two exams. 
In addition Utah law stipulates that an insurer cannot void the policy on 
the grounds that i t relied on the misrepresentation of a material fact by 
applicant i f the insurer had "sufficient indications that would put a prudent 
man on notice and would have caused him to start an inquiry which i f carried 
out with reasonable thoroughness, "would reveal the truth . . . " 
In this instance the family history provided such indications. Uiderwriting 
thoroughly investigated all given possible leads to information but was prevented 
from discovering the history because the insured did not furnish * the names 
of any physicians who had knowledge of his history (namely, Dr. Thorne) or 
mention being confined to Utah Medical Center. 
I t is therefore my recommendation that l iabi l i ty be denied on the grounds of 
material misrepresentation. ^ — ) 
Jan Drosendahl 
Senior Claim Consultant 
General Actuarial and Claim Division 
9 Gib - CORP 
JD/qh 
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lephone 533-7900 10128 STATE OF UTAH INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
826 South 600 East Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
( INSURANCE REPORT FORM") 
This Insurance Report Form is sent in response to your recent request for assistance. 
Upon completion return both copies to the above address. t t^&AS 
Approximately 30 days is required to review and take appropriate action. $ZJU*//fo /Df"** 
PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT FIRMLY TO MAKE A CLEAR COPY 
fUlmjl H*trllj 
*etl&£& it), S^f-ka^te. tfi/e^ 
y. State. 
iAWr i/awy 0*7)/ 7.,-p w t n 
ur Telephone - Home 97^ &Z&Q-
Work SAM? 
iployer's Name
 ; 
I group policy) 
APPROXIMATE AMOUNT OF MONEY INVOLVED 
%9£>C.60O 
Insurance Company 'Prude.nTial (Against which complaint is directed) 
Agent's Name L)<!Lt{ ttfi. (&$hu 
Adjuster's Name. 
urName. 
Insured's Name 6 Addremt A-Un/f Md/-c/<f 
fff n<* vnnr nam) ' 7 (If ot your own) 
Type of Insurance LSTE' 
Policy* *7A~?CCVG 3 
Company Claim # 
. Policy Date_2 iZ£^7 
Dtte of LossJ^/^/p-c 
ase indicate which of the following is applicable: 
My complaint is against: fif Company D Agent D Adjuster 
Briefly and in your own words, describe your problem. If more space is needed, please add additional sheets in 
duplicate. Enclose copies of papers and other correspondence relative to this problem. (Do not send policy.) A copy of 
this form may be forwarded to the insurance company involved. 
T/ie. ihSUraxce <L£t*pa»Lf re c< side J fj^ policy - They 
JZSJLA tAaJL TArjj har/ntt fctieuln ^£ ny /^cA^Vc 
Ccrn pleft- tn-cdiCif re.(?crd, r4e.tr aa^uf- / ^ / ? ^ J hr _ 
UJL£. /?/</ t-AaT Lynn fa J been SAJ tk^ Itoxttpa./ bafiP 
/j?*/ 7A)/fI & (L/o^cJ MZrCHf + dftSp UtAzA. T^hS. po/'/CU 
MJ. 
-** 
A^ JJIAS. £d.7-jprtzr, /L til <kf / / fl/ei/er hurl. 
T^ tsJAtuer /HTtLtJgjJ /W /fc 
Tit ift^t/rAur*. Cetnpartu ' AACI /-yn*t r?Xia.jpj //is* 
ffin'r <4*rj-<>0f: - Th,i-4 he u>a.e aiVaa, au fJ£i" Ciecf y-rt & fl-K * l a-**- &pp*tsiA f>>mH., Thdi. <£c<CforS uf+re. O/- ZToSepl tfoa+u; 
XL GAMIS* I/fit Mr ntsmcts+L S/tee/a/s'sV
 0 
¥ 
tuT 
(Ashtnr ttltj. hucksHe/ a*,si IT tfrer- 77blc< 
pe/icu
 t—TL—GfrfceJ T^/P C ^ ^ V-f tii*. Ques7>ari 
ptrf&tn an/tf 7c tkr J6£? •Ty.r.f o*J TA.\< I*JMS 7#g 
(JM J*rf?&He/}*£ rfrA-'f' UJf A A a/. __ 
-L k?,H/>LO 
M* pp// 
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C0TT M. MATHESON 
Governor 
>3EP^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 5803 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-5803 
Phone:(801)530-6400 
ROGER C. OAV 
Commi&tion«r of Insurance 
July 5, 1983 
Mr. Ernest A. Long 
Vice President and Counsel 
Prudential Insurance Company of America 
P. 0. Box 9247 
Van Nuys, CA 91409 
^RECEiVED^ 
' UUU121983 
J.D° 
CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
RE: Policy No. 70766463 
Insd: (Deceased) Lynn F. Hardy 
Beneficiary: Cheryl Hardy 
Our File 13906 
Dear Mr. Long: 
Enclosed is a complaint concerning your company. We request that the 
problem described in this report form be subject to an independent review in 
your office to ascertain the validity of this complaint. 
We also request that you reconsider or review your decision to rescind 
the policy, paying particular attention to the evidence of insurability. It 
appears an error may have occurred in the underwriting department regarding 
questions 5, 8cf 10a and 10b of the application. If any of these questions 
had been reviewed more thorougnly the policy may not have been issued; but the 
policy was issued and the insured and beneficiary believed they would be 
protected if^a loss did occur. . 
appreciate receiving at your earliest convenience a report^jj 
Please attach to the report copies of any material that supports 
on. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
ROGER C. DAY 
Commissioner of Insurance 
//fe>^U^ )l "£^ <*o 
MarjorTe J. Pierce 
Consumer Service Division 
MJP:lm 
cc: Ms. Cheryl Hardy 
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Dan S. Bushnell - # 0522 
Merrill F. Nelson - # 3841 
KIRTON, McCONKIE S> BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL HARDY, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF AMERICA; WAYNE L. 
RIGBY, Insurance Agent, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
1 DR. JOSEPH L. THORNE 
• . / :•'•"• • . ' " • " :..•-• .:•;.;,,;.• •' ;•'" ..-. .. . ,i,~. , . -i ••*.--
) Civil No. C83-7195 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Dr. JOSEPH L. THORNE deposes and states that: 
1. He is a physician engaged in the exclusive practice of 
cardiology since 1965. 
2. He was an Associate Professor of Cardiology at the 
University of Utah College of Medicine from 1965 until 1980. 
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3. He is currently a member of the cardiology staff at St. 
Marks Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
4. He followed and monitored Lynn Hardy in his Cardiac 
Clinic through annual check-ups from 1974 until 1980. During 
that time, Lynn Hardy's physical condition steadily improved, his 
heart condition was totally asymptomatic, and he carried on a 
totally active and normal life. Between 1976 and 1980, Lynn 
Hardy received no special therapy for heart disease. 
5. Between 1974 and 1980, Dr. Thome prescribed no • 
medication for Lynn Hardy. The only medication that Lynn Hardy 
may have been taking at that time is atromid-S. Atromid-S is not* 
a medication for heart disease, but is prescribed only to 
regulate the cholesterol and triglyceride level. Atromid-S has* 
no direct physiological function or effect on the heart. 
6. Dr. Thorne referred Lynn Hardy to the Multidisciplinary 
High Risk Corornary Consultation Clinic at the University of 
Utah, not to receive special treatment for heart disease, but to 
participate in a study of the effect familial relationships have 
on cardiac disorders. 
7. The Electrocardiography Request Form, completed at Lynn 
Hardy's August 1, 1979, check-up, shows "angina with exertion.1" 
This notation is a reference to Lynn Hardy's medical history, and 
does not represent a current angina problem; 
-2-
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8. The facts that Lynn Hardy's father and two brothers had 
died prematurely of heart disease, that another living brother 
also had heart disease, that Lynn had smoked at least one package 
of cigarettes per day for over twenty years, and that a recent 
EKG exam revealed a first degree AV heart block, taken together* 
constitute significant external indications of potential cardiac 
abnormalities, ^ 
Dated t h i s • c C day of February, 1985, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o bifore/ae th i s j fr fAiay 
1985. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing: ^zJf/' Lake, £*s4*&v 
. ?A/r7 
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Kindred Number 2iL 
Individual ID Number 
Subjects Name 
_ f)20 
/(UAMA , n/~S. 
Last First • 
^ " T f ^ i . 
Visit : 
Time: 
V ,'sH i-_-i f 
I n i t i a l 
Year 
SKINFOLD MEASUREMENTS 
Triceps skinfold fS. CL cm. 
/(]. & cm. 
/5" / cm. 
Average cm. 
Subscapular skinfold /_5 • ~ZL cm. 
/C/. £. cm. 
ic^L 
Average^ 
cm* 
cm* 
Ulnar skinfold _£. ^  cm. 
*>. 3- cm. 
SL4. cm* 
Average^ cm* 
Suprailiac skinfold / 7, t-( cm* 
//S.V cm* 
-ZLi2 a*-
Average cm. 
Abdominal g i r t h £}/£> cm* 
Percent body fat 
2JZS5L 
Height 
Weight 
(cm to nearest .1 inch) 
(round kg to nearest *1 kg) 
/' V 5.0/ b S 
Is there a diagonal ear lobe crease? 
1) Yes. right ear only 
2) Yes, left ear only 
Yes. both ears 
4 $ o 
5) Can't tell 
Which of the following is the ear lobe? 
^Connected 
Vfe"-
ce-
BLOOD PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS 
Cufl&xt: 
/ ^p feg tHar AduR 
^ - t r t a r g a Arm 
3) Thigh 
4) Packatric 
5) Want 
Pub* fWouiaTt^Yev) 
<J No""" 
' 2 / 
. em* m x s«c_sL_I_ 
.J-IPMH] e..,,/***,,. 
Put*a.Ob*tarat»on Presawre 1/ JAM 
•so 
Paa* Inflation (aid) 
Mai Ztro (R-Z) 
Peak Infttaon (R-Z) 
1/ 
UL 
-Si 
y 
u 
q 2J 
j y 
STTTINO BLOOO PRESSURE 
1(1) Sttt 
R-ZUncon. 
Zero 
(2) R-ZBP 
Systole 
dM 
Diastole 
Muflte Disappear 
oFTfclFPy 
Q I <x 
\f / s] 
bk*i |g'7iy| 
El U £ 
o» M2i-
p) Automated (tf sk anacnad) 
BP (7FT7i f7T7i6ir^7ra 
R-Zuncorr. 
Zero 
\A) R-ZBP 
1/ 
\L 
1 
Q 
0 
~T] 
cA 
£d ? 
fq V 
2, 
i t 
ol 
< '^ 
^ 
BLOOO PRESSURE STANOING (2 MIN.) 
(S) R-Z BP IX-
-J 
3 
i_ 
f 
^ 
d 
[7 
C 
/ 
J 
El 
0 
« > 
zJ 
[7 
L 
CJ 
.1 
<" 
3 L/Loj 
Follow-up need for HBP? 
( ^ N o 
^ ) Yes.
 r .Referral made 1) No 2) Yes 
mo day y< 
o> bulated 
Screener Number 
1/16/78 
ZEE) 56 
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v.. "VENTILATORY FUNCTION 
Forced vrtal 
FEV 
• Fev. 
©^ 
25-75 
Hair c o l o r rtJuu>&*uJLs\r 
Male hair pat tern 2-
For how many hours have you been fasting 
How long ago did you have your last cigarette? //c. 
Have you taken any special dietary precautions in preparing for this visit? Ih. 
I f so , p l ease describe 
COMMENTS: 
J
 ^H2H 1980 
57 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ersity of Utah 
i State Division of Health 
•*rW 
Date 
Name 
.3/3^/79 
PHYSICIAN HISTORY 4 EXAMINATION 
Last 7 First 
Tamlly Number _ _ &\ & 
Pat ient Number 
CURRENT SYMPTOMS 
1 . ^JSy^ptom Summary 
None (Skip t 
Some (Check below) 
/ O v / N o n e ip ' o #9) 
2 * Chest Pain ( i f yes, l i s t onset mo/yr) 
g ) None 
2) Non-anginal pain 
3) Atypical angina 
A) Typical angina 
5) Unstable angina 
Dyspnea 
None 
Class I (vith marked exertion) 
3) Class II (vith ordinary exertion) 
4) Class III (vith minimal exertion) 
5) Class IV (at rest) 
or 
" < # 
jthopnea 
Absent 
Present 
• Coue] 
Absent 
Present 
Absent 
Present 
7. Fatigue or Decreased Exercise Tolerance 
^Tp~Absent 
1) Present 
8. Iptemittent Claudication 
Qy Absent 
2) Present 
Other 
CARDIOVASCULAR HISTORY 
9. C-V History Summary 
„ No abnormalities (Skip to 19) 
2)} Some findings (checked below) 
10. Coronary Artery Disease (clinical onsets 
Ho _ • 
Yes Onset: ^ ErtO ~")U 
' < & month year 
11, 
12, 
Myocardial Infarction (suspected) 
0 Yes Onset: 3*Pt^ 4 i W r2)) 5 j ^ L ^
month year 
First Myocardial Infarction (definite) 
JK" /'lY^Yes Onset: 1JL No
 :s vVJ^_^f 
month year 
Other Myocardial Infarctions 
Onset: _ 
Onset: 
month 
month 
year 
year 
13, Coronary Anfiiofiram Tfcf.TU. 
Q)) Tes Date: ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ^ U J ^ C 
month 
month 
month 
year 
year 
year 
1*. Coronary Artery Surgery 
Q > No ' 
2) Yes Date: _ 
15. 
month year 
Valvular Heart Disease 
Absent 
Present (circle) MS MR AS AR Other 
^yar 
16. ^ History of CHF 
£3,} Absent 
^ ) Present _ 
month year 
Other 
17. 
18. 
Heart Di 
J^ 
'D 
^ T 
i 
sea 
story of 
^ Absent 
Present 
story of 
7 Absent 
Present 
se: 
Cardiac Arrhythmias 
month 
Heart Block 
month 
year 
year 
CARDIOVASCULAR RISK FACTOR HISTORY 
19 . Risk Fac to r Summary 
(3 Q None (skip to 28) Some (checked belov) 
20. Hypercholesterolemia 
Absent 
Present 
Not known (never measured) " * : 
21. 
22. 
Hypertriglyceridemia (including history cloud 
serum) 
1) AJbRent 
JJ Present 
\2U Not knovn (never measured) 
Cigarette Smoking 
1) Never 
2) Past smoker: Quit 
After smoking: 
month year 
Average 
Q y e a r s n X Current smoker for: *-<~> pks a day 
years _ 
Average fr-
pks a day 
23. Knovn Hypertension 
1) No 
2) Yes (on treatment) 
3) Suspect (no therapy) 
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24. ramlly Historv of P r c T 7 4 tHD 
• JTto - — 
Q)Z Yes 
3) Suspect 
£> 
"•d$ betes Mellitus No 
2) Yes, non-insulin 
3) Yes, insulin 
4) Yes, dietary therapy 
D. ASSOCIATED CO-MORBID CONDITIONS 
26 ^ _ ^ 
r: 
Summary of Co-Morbid Conditions 
0 » /bsent (skip to #33) ' 
Present (check below) 
27. Peripheral Vascular Disease 
1) Absent 
2) Present 
28. Ceobral Vascular Disease 
1) Absent 
2) Present 
29. Kidney Disease 
1) Absent 
2) Present 
30. Chronic Pulmonary Disease 
1) Absent 
2) Present 
31. Peptic Ulcer Disease 
1) Absent 
2) Present 
32. Gout 
1) Absent 
2) Present 
Other: 
E. PRESENT THERAPY 
33. Therapy Summary 
IX No therapy (skip to 050) 
^J2J) On therapy (check below) 
34. nitroglycerine 
ML> No 
N2) Yes 
35. Long-Acting Nitrate 
c^£ . 
36. Propranolol 
Q P No 
^ 0 Yes 
37. .Bile 
CjP~tio 
2) Yes 
38. Atrooid 
Sequestrant 
& 
No 
2L. Yes 
"•<$n> No 
2) Yes 
rrhythmics 
40. 
& 
italis 
No 
2) Yes 
41 r^tJL-i 
} Yes 
42. Antihypertensive 
0£>No 
2) Yes 
43. ^Anticoagulants 
'd* No 2) Yes 
44. 
45. 
^ r t h Control Pills 
(ly No 
^ 0 Yes 
Aspirin 
fl)) Rat 
^T Occ 
In
arely (less than 2/month) 
ccasionally (3-8/month) 
3) Frequently (9-15/month) 
4) Regularly (at least one a day or one every 
other day) 
46. 
47, 
^insulin 
(Jr~No~ 
7) Yes 
Ora] 
Oral Diabetes Medication 
No 
Yes Name: 
48. Special Diet 
1) 
2) 
3) 
49. 
1L 
Low fat 
Low salt 
Low calorie 
Diabetic 
None 
rcise Program 
No 
Yes 
Other 
50. Summary 
^ i 4 ^ T o t a l l Y normal (skip to 86) 
C*?2)DSome findings (checked below) 
51. sX*y 
(f 
.nthoma 
Absent 
Present 
a) Planar 
Palmar 
Tuberous 
Tendenous 
Eruptive 
b) 
c) 
d) 
t ) 
52. Xjjithelpasma 
Absent 
Present 
EYES: 
53. Arcus Cornea 
1) Absent 
Q L Partial annulusJ^C^vL 
3) Complete annulus Pi 
FUNDUS: 
54. Fundus Summary 
U ) Not done 
C p ) Normal (skip to fib**) 
^ t ~ Abnormal (note below) 
55. Areriolar Narrowing 
1) Absent 
2) Present 
^ O 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
57. 
58. 
59. 
#• 
60* 
61. 
62. 
Silver-wire Changes 
) Absent 
) Present 
Round Hemorrhages 
) Absent 
) Present m 
) Absent 
) Present 
lame-Shaped Hemorrhages 
) Absent 
) Present 
Hard Exudates 
) Absent 
) Present 
ipemia Retinalis 
) Absent 
) Present 
Cotton-Wood Patches 
) Absent 
) Present 
63. Mlcroaneurisns 
) Absent 
) Present 
Other: 
LUNGS 
64.^-4*ung 
C2T* 
^ M Al 
, Summary 
Normal (skip to #68) 
Abnormal (note below) 
65. Basilar Rales 
1) No 
2) Yes 
66. Wheezes 
1) No 
2) Yes 
67. Dullness 
1) No 
2) Yes 
CARDIOVASCULAR 
68. y Summary 
l^.All findings normal (skip to #86) 
Some findings (checked below) 
69. Carotid Arteries: upstroke/volume 
1) Normal 
2) Decreased unilateral 
3) Decreased bilateral 
70. Carotid Bruits 
1) None 
2) . Unilateral (right or left) 
3) Bilateral 
71. LVH by Palpation 
1) No 
2) Yes 
72. RVH by Palpation 
1) No 
2) Yes 
7A, "He* 
1}J 
•2) 
75. 
76. 
1) AbsenJt. 
2) P r e / ^ 
rt Sounds 
Normal (skip 1 
Some abnormal: 
S3 Gallop 
1) Absent 
2) Present 
SACallop 
1) Absent 
2) Present 
77. Paradoxically Split S2 
1) Absent 
2) Present 
78. Mid-Systolic Click 
1) Absent 
2) Present 
Other 
"d •eart Murmur Summary Absent (Skip to #86) ) Present 
85. 
80. Systolic Ejection 
1) No 
2) Yes 
81. Holosystolic Ejection 
1) No 
2) Yes 
82. Late Systolic 
1) No 
2) Yes 
83. Early Diastolic Blow 
1) No 
2) Yes 
84. Diastolic Rumble 
1) No 
2) Yes 
ripheral Pulses 
Normal 
Abnormal (describe belov) 
1 R 
PL"" 
Brachial Radial Femoral DP Pt 
(Grade 0-4, 3+ being normal) 
Other Abnormalities and Comments (Bruits) 
86. Other Findings and Comments: 
C DEC 1 7 1979 
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.
 ; r ^ ; >• ^ j £ ^ ; \ ; ^ ^ ^ f ; ; i ; ; ^ ^«Av?:.:"i; ,1 \$ No /'->/<>: ?> \ ) 
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\2- -M4 
1 3-'" ::'W-
1 4- ^ 
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I 
CLINIC NOTE 
LYNN HARDY 
^January 2, 1980 , 
Lynn is doing very well, he lives an active physical 
life, he has not had any symptoms to suggest coronary 
artery insufficiency and has not had anything to suggest 
angina pectoris. His physical capacity is good, he has • 
not had orthopnea or PND and he is not aware of palpitation. 
Over the past several weeks he has had an upper respiratory 
tract infection with myalgia, malaise, sore throat, hoarsenes 
and a cough. 
Physical examination reveals abundant post nasal drainage, 
he has no evidence of lymphadenopathy. His neck is supple 
with no venous distension. The chest is symmetrical. There 
are no rales or rhonchi, and the breath sounds are normal. 
The heart is in a regular sinus rhythm, no cardiomegaly, 
no extrasystoles. The abdomen is not remarkable and the 
extremities are normal with no evidence of edema. 
We have given Lynn 1.2 mil units of Wycillin, he will 
take Turpin Hydrate 1 tsp Q4 hr. PRN for cough and Afrin 
nasal spray BID daily for four days and he will return 
in one day for follow up penicillin. 
J.L. Thome, M.D. 
%^^^Z^^^J>,^ L. M^^_ 
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31-27-22. Discrimination between risks of same class prohibited—Pre-
ference based on fictitious grouping prohibited—Revocation of certificate 
of authority.—(1) *Ko insurer shall make or permit any-unfair discrhnina* 
tion in favor of particular individual* or persons'between-insurants or> 
•subjects of insurance having substantially like insuring, Tisk and exposure 
factors or expense elements, in the terms or conditions - of an7* insurance* 
contract; w in the rater or amount of premiums cbwged lhereforr-or-in ~^ 
•the dividends or other benefits payable therenndcr.% 
, 31-1-8. Governmental regulation—Business affected with public inter-
est—Moral obligations of persons concerned.—Within th<5~intent of this" 
eode thn bnsinoss of insurance is-one affected with "the public^ntereal/fn* 
quiring that all persons be actuated by good faitfr, abstain from deception? J 
-and practice honesty and equity in all insurance matters! Upon the in* 
•urer, the insured, and their representatives rests-the duty of preserving 
inviolate the integrity of insurance. 
31-27-1. Unfair competition, or deceptive acts or practices prohibited— 
Commissioner to define unfair acts or practices—Effective date of regula-
tion—Penalties for violations.—(!) i \o person engaged in-the business of> 
insurance shall engage in unfair methods 'of competition or in unfair or J 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of such business as sucli methods, 
acts or practices are defined in this chapter. 
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Section 2. Purpose 
The business of insurance is a public trust assumed by persons accepting -^' 
licenses to operate in this State and inherently includes a duty to treat 
claimants equitably and in good faith. The breach of such duty is considered to 
be an unfair or deceptive business practice and, if generally engaged in, an 
unfair method of competition. Such a practice is detrimental to free competi-
tion and injurious to the insuring public. The purpose of this regulation is ton 
respond to the volume of complaints arising from claims settlement practices by 
affirmatively establishing standards of equity and good faith to guide licensees 
in the settlement of claims. This regulation defines and provides notice of 
such minimum standards which, if violated knowingly, or with such frequency as 
to indicate a general business practice, will be considered to constitute unfair 
claims settlement practices. The promulgation of this regulation is done in 
recognition of the limited jurisdiction of the Utah Small Claims Court, and the 
practical unavailability to the public of other legal remedies to handle common 
claims disputes.' It is intended that this regulation will help to establish 
parity between the public and professional insurance licensees and facilitate I 
the prompt and fair settlement of insurance claims. [ 
— — L 
Section 5. Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair or Deceptive Acts 
and Practices Defined 
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance: 
(a) misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance*policy'provisions: relating to 
coverages at issue; 
(b) failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with 
respect to claims arising under insurance policies; 
(c) failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt A 
investigation of claims arising under insurance policies; 
(d) refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation; 
(e) failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after 
proof of loss statements have been completed and communicated to the 
company or its representative; 
(f) not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable 
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear; 
(g) compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due-under an? 
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately 
recovered in actions brought by such insureds when claims or demands have 
' been made for amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately 
recovered; 
(h) attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable 
person would have believed he or she was entitled by reference to written 
or printed advertising material reasonably related to the insurance 
contract; 
(i) attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was 
altered without notice to, or knowledge or consent of the insured; 
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1400 
of the ASTZ test is in ruling out rheumatic fever when the titer 
is low in patients with isolated polyarthritis. To date, the spe-
cific antigens involved in the ASTZ test remain unidentified 
and therefore the test has not yet been adequately standard-
ized. A rise in titer of two dilution tubes or more can be dem-
onstrated for at least one of the streptococcal antibodies in 
almost all recurrent as well as primary attacks of rheumatic 
fever (Table 257-2). Increased streptococcal antibodies, how-
ever, do not reflect rheumatic activity per se, and their rate of 
decline is independent of the course of the rheumatic attack. 
Isolation of group A streptococci Some patients continue to 
harbor group A streptococci at the onset of acute rheumatic 
fever, but these organisms are usually present in small numbers 
and may be difficult to isolate by a single throat culture. The 
administration of penicillin or other antibodies may also result 
in failure to isolate the infecting organism. In addition, a sig-
nificant number of normal individuals, particularly children, 
may harbor group A streptococci in the upper respiratory 
tract. For these reasons, throat cultures are less satisfactory 
than antibody tests as supporting evidence of recent strepto-
coccal infection. 
Acute phase reactants These tests offer objective but nonspe-
cific confirmation of the presence of an inflammatory process. 
The erythrocyte sedimentation rate (ESR) and the test for C-
reactive protein (CRP) in serum are used most commonly. Un-
less the patient has received corticosteroids or salicylates, these 
reactions are almost always abnormal in patients presenting 
with polyarthritis or acute carditis, whereas they are often nor-
mal in patients with chorea. Other laboratory findings which 
reflect inflammation include reactions such as leukocytosis, 
and increases in serum complement, mucoproteins, and alpha2 
and gamma globulins. Prolongation of the PR interval of the 
electrocardiogram, although neither specific for rheumatic fe-
ver nor diagnostic of serious cardiac involvement, is frequent 
in acute rheumatic fever (about 25 percent of all cases), and 
other nonspecific electrocardiographic changes are also com-
mon. Anemia, due to the suppression of erythropoiesis charac-
teristic of chronic inflammatory diseases, is another feature of 
rheumatic activity. 
COURSE AND PROGNOSIS The course of rheumatic fever 
varies greatly and is impossible to predict at the onset of the 
disease. In general, however, approximately 75 percent of 
acute rheumatic attacks subside within 6 weeks, 90 percent 
within 12 weeks, and less than 5 percent persist more than 6 
months. The latter usually consist of severe, intractable forms 
of rheumatic carditis or stubborn, prolonged attacks of Syden-
ham's chorea, both of which may persist for as long as several 
years. Once acute rheumatic fever has subsided and more than 
TABLE 257-2 
Serologic results in patients with streptococcal disease 
Percent of patients whose serums were "positive" 
Patient group (no.) 
Acute rheumatic 
fever (20) 
Acute glomerulone-
phritis (22) 
Convalescent phar-
yngitis (11) 
Convalescent pyo-
derma (23) 
Total (76) 
ASO 
90 
50 
81 
35 
61 
AH 
65 
63 
54 
35 . 
54 
Anti-
DNaseB 
85 
72 
54 
91 
79 
At least 
lof3 
95 
91 
91 
96 
93 
ASTZ 
100 
95 
91 
91 
95 
SOURCE: AL Bisno. I Ofek, Am J Dis Child 127:676, 1974. 
2 months have elapsed after withdrawal of treatment with sa-
licylates or adrenal corticosteroids, rheumatic fever does not 
recur in the absence of new streptococcal infections. Recur-
rences are most common within the first 5 years of the initial 
attack and tend to decline with increasing duration of freedom 
from rheumatic activity. The frequency of recurrences is de-
pendent upon the frequency and severity of streptococcal in-
fection, the presence or absence of rheumatic heart disease fol-
lowing an attack, and the duration of freedom from the last 
attack. 
Approximately 70 percent of patients who develop carditis 
do so within the first week of the disease, 85 percent within the 
first 12 weeks of the disease, and almost all within 6 months 
from the onset of the acute attack. Thereafter, if significant 
murmurs have not appeared, the prognosis for a patient in 
whom recurrences are prevented is excellent. 
Chronic rheumatic carditis and the course of rheumatic heart 
disease The remarkable variability in the course of rheu-
matic carditis and rheumatic valvular disease stems from sev-
eral factors: (1) the variability in the duration and severity of 
the rheumatic inflammation: (2) the amount of scarring of the 
valves and myocardium following the abatement of the acute 
inflammation; (3) the location and severity of the hemody-
namic lesion due to valvular insufficiency or stenosis: (4) the 
frequency of recurrent bouts of carditis: and (5) the progres-
sion of valvular calcification and sclerosis, which occurs as a 
secondary phenomenon in a deformed or injured valve without 
recurrent or persistent rheumatic inflammation (as seen in con-
genital valvular disease or following healed acute bacterial en-
docarditis). These factors, and possibly others not yet appreci-
ated, produce striking variations in the clinical syndromes of 
rheumatic heart disease. 
Chronic rheumatic myocarditis In this syndrome, the present-
ing picture is one of chronic heart failure in a patient with a 
markedly dilated heart and with physical, roentgenographic, 
and electrocardiographic findings of mitral regurgitation. The 
differentiation of this syndrome from other forms of chronic 
myocarditis may be very difficult, if not impossible, when the 
associated extracardiac features of rheumatic fever (chorea, 
polyarthritis, and so forth) are not present (Chap. 263). Al-
though rheumatic fever does not produce isolated myocarditis, 
and is almost invariably a pancarditis, the pericardial inflam-
mation may not be clearly evident, and the mitral valvulitis 
may not be distinguishable from mitral regurgitation due to 
dilation of the mitral ring. In such cases one must search dili-
gently for an evanescent friction rub. evidence of pericardial 
effusion, appearance of a soft aortic regurgitation murmur, and 
extracardiac clues such as fever responding promptly to salicy-
lates, arthralgias, transient subcutaneous nodules, evanescent 
erythema marginatum, and subtle signs of chorea. 
The course of chronic rheumatic carditis may be intractable 
and end fatally after months or even several years. Often, how-
ever, the patient improves rather suddenly and even recovers 
cardiac reserve dramatically in association with the disappear-
ance of systemic manifestations of the inflammatory process. 
The heart may remain large, may decrease somewhat in size, or 
in occasional instances may return to normal size with varying 
degrees of residual valvular deformity. Such a course signals 
the termination of the "toxic" phase of the rheumatic process, 
and thereafter the course of rheumatic heart disease depends 
on the variables in healing cited above. 
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS Early cases of rheumatic fever 
may be confused with other diseases which begin with acute 
polyarthritis. It is wise to exclude bacteremia by blood cultures, 
particularly because such infections may be masked by penicil-
lin given for presumed acute rheumatic fever. Polyarthritis due Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to infective endocarditis in a patient with preexisting rheumatic 
heart disease may be mistaken for a recurrence of acute rheu-
matic fever. If streptococcal antibodies are not increased, poly-
arthritis should be attributed to some cause other than rheu-
matic fever. Gonococcal polyarthritis may be distinguished 
from rheumatic fever by the dramatic response of the former to 
a therapeutic trial of penicillin. In rheumatoid arthritis, joint 
involvement will persist and characteristic joint deformities 
may appear. The latter are not seen in rheumatic fever. The 
rheumatoid factor so characteristic of rheumatoid arthritis is 
not present in rheumatic fever. Antibodies against nuclear 
components and other autoantibodies are absent in rheumatic 
fever. Rheumatic pericarditis and myocarditis, associated with 
cardiac enlargement and heart failure, are both almost invari-
ably associated with valvular lesions which produce significant 
murmurs. 
Overdiagnosis of rheumatic fever should be avoided. Unless 
ill-defined febrile syndromes are clearly associated with a ma-
jor manifestation of rheumatic fever, the diagnosis of rheu-
matic fever should not be made. A common error is the prema-
ture, vigorous administration of corticosteroids or salicylates 
before the signs and symptoms of rheumatic fever are unmis-
takable. In the absence of a curative agent, one should not 
suppress the signs and symptoms of rheumatic fever until they 
are clearly expressed. 
Particularly confusing in the differential diagnosis of rheu-
matic fever is the drug sensitivity with fever and polyarthritis 
which may occur after administration of penicillin for a previ-
ous pharyngitis. Urticaria or angioneurotic edema, if present, 
helps differentiate penicillin sensitivity in such cases. The ab-
dominal pain of rheumatic fever may be mistaken for appendi-
citis, and the crisis of sickle-cell anemia may also be associated 
with joint pain, enlargement of the heart, and cardiac mur-
murs. The rapidity with which the arthritis symptoms of rheu-
matic fever are controlled with salicylates is characteristic of 
this disease. Dramatic response to salicylates does not in itself, 
however, establish a diagnosis of rheumatic fever. 
In order to help clarify the diagnosis of rheumatic fever, the 
American Heart Association has accepted and modified crite-
ria usually referred to as the Jones criteria (Table 257-1). They 
are not to be used as a substitute for good medical judgment 
but are recommended as a guide for careful study of question-
able cases. The finding of two major criteria, or of one major 
and two minor criteria, indicates a high probability of the pres-
ence of rheumatic fever if supported by evidence of a preced-
ing streptococcal infection. The absence of the latter should 
always make the diagnosis questionable, except in the situation 
in which rheumatic fever is first discovered after a long latent 
period from the antecedent infection (Sydenham's chorea or 
low-grade carditis). Because the prognosis may differ accord-
ing to the major manifestations, for recording purposes the 
diagnosis of rheumatic fever should be followed by a list of the 
major manifestations present, e.g., rheumatic fever manifested 
by polyarthritis and carditis. An indication of the severity of 
carditis in terms of presence or absence of congestive heart 
failure and cardiomegaly is also advisable. 
TREATMENT There is no specific cure for rheumatic fever, 
and no known measures change the course of the attack. Good 
supportive therapy, however, can reduce the mortality and 
morbidity of the disease. 
Chemotherapy After rheumatic fever is first diagnosed, a 
course of penicillin should be given to eliminate group A strep-
tococci. This is advisable even if bactenologic examination 
yields throat cultures negative for streptococci, since the orga-
nisms may be present in areas inaccessible to swabs. It is pref-
erable to administer penicillin parenterally. An effective course 
is a single injection of 1.2 million units of benzathine penicillin 
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intramuscularly or 600.000 units of procaine penicillin intra-
muscularly daily for 10 days. Attempts to reduce ultimate 
heart damage by administering penicillin early in the acute 
rheumatic attack in larger doses have not been successful. Af-
ter completion of the therapeutic course of penicillin, continu-
ous protection from reinfection with streptococci should be 
provided by instituting one of the prophylactic regimens de-
scribed below. 
Suppressive therapy For patients without carditis treatment 
with adrenal corticosteroids is unnecessary. Acute arthritis can 
be relieved with codeine or with salicylate, the latter being 
preferable to reduce fever and joint inflammation. When sali-
cylate is used in the therapy of rheumatic fever, the dosage 
should be increased until the drug produces either a clinical 
effect or systemic toxicity characterized by tinnitus, headache, 
or hyperpnea. A starting dose of 100 to 125 mg/kg per day in 
children and 6 to 8 g in adults given in four or five divided 
doses is recommended. Of the various salicylate preparations 
ordinary aspirin is cheapest and most effective. Gastric intoler-
ance can usually be diminished by administering aspirin after 
meals or by giving antacids 15 to 30 mi n after each dose of 
aspirin. 
Many physicians prefer corticosteroids to salicylates for the 
treatment of carditis, despite the lack of a demonstrated ad-
vantage of these adrenal hormones in controlled clinical trials. 
Corticosteroids are more potent anti-inflammatory agents but 
are more likely to be followed by posttherapeutic "rebounds," 
and they have the additional disadvantage of more frequent 
side effects, particularly acne, hirsutism, and cushingoid 
changes in facies and habitus. For this reason it is preferable to 
begin treatment of patients who have carditis with salicylates; 
if these drugs fail to reduce fever and to ameliorate heart fail-
ure, therapy with corticosteroids may be initiated promptly. 
Prednisone is administered in doses of 60 to 120 mg or higher 
when necessary in four divided doses daily. After the inflam-
mation has been brought under control by either salicylates or 
corticosteroids, treatment should be continued until the sedi-
mentation rate approaches near-normal values and should be 
maintained for several weeks thereafter. To prevent poststeroid 
rebounds, an "overlap" course of salicylate therapy may be 
added when steroids are tapered off over a 2-week period. A 
useful method for tapering steroids is outlined in Chap. 112. 
Salicylates may then be continued for an additional 2 to 3 
weeks. Rebounds of rheumatic activity are usually of short du-
ration and, when mild, are best managed without resuming 
anti-inflammatory treatment, because a second or even a third 
rebound may occur when suppressive therapy is discontinued. 
About 5 percent of rheumatic attacks persist for 6 months or 
longer, either in the form of spontaneous acute recrudescences 
or as posttherapeutic rebounds. These "chronic" attacks are 
most likely to occur in patients with cardiac damage and with 
previous rheumatic episodes. Weekly tests for C-reactive pro-
tein in blood and for erythrocyte sedimentation rate are useful 
in following the healing process, particularly while treatment 
with corticosteroids or salicylates is gradually withdrawn. 
Treatment of chorea The signs and symptoms of chorea usu-
ally do not respond well to treatment with antirheumatic 
agents. Because the patient with chorea is frequently emotion-
ally unstable and because the manifestations of chorea may be 
exaggerated by emotional trauma, complete mental and phys-
ical rest is essential. Patients with chorea should be kept in a 
quiet room and cared for by sympathetic attendants. Cortico-
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tives and tranquilizers, particularly diazepam and chlorproma-
zine, are useful. If the chorea is severe, large doses of 
phenobarbital rather than tranquilizers alone are usually nec-
essary to control purposeless movements. Padded sideboards 
for the bed may be necessary to avoid injury to the patient. In 
the absence of other evidence of acute rheumatic disease, it is 
advisable to allow gradual resumption of physical activity 
when improvement is apparent rather than waiting for all cho-
reiform movements to disappear, which may require many 
months. 
Because of the great variability in the course of chorea, 
evaluating the effectiveness of various therapeutic measures is 
difficult. It is well to remember that chorea is a self-limited 
disease which is usually not followed by significant neurologic 
sequelae and that good results are almost invariably obtained 
by patient, attentive nursing care and by conservative medical 
management. 
PREVENTION OF RECURRENCE The most efficient regimen 
for continuous prophylaxis against group A streptococci is a 
monthly intramuscular injection of 1.2 million units of benza-
thine penicillin. The disadvantages and discomfort of this regi-
men have to be weighed against the individual patients sus-
ceptibility to recurrences. Those with rheumatic heart disease, 
recent rheumatic fever, and exposure to an environment in 
which the incidence of streptococcal infection is frequent de-
serve the most effective protection. As a second choice, pro-
phylaxis may be administered orally with either I g sulfadia-
zine daily in a single dose or 200.000 units of penicillin given 
twice daily on an empty stomach. The duration of continuous 
prophylaxis cannot be fixed arbitrarily for all patients, al-
though the safest generalization is that it be continued indefi-
nitely. Certainly, those under the age of 18 years should receive 
a continuous prophylactic regimen. A minimum period of 5 
years is recommended for patients who develop rheumatic fe-
ver without carditis over the age of 18 years. The decision to 
continue prophylaxis beyond this period should take into ac-
count a number of variables. Patients with rheumatic heart 
disease are more susceptible to reactivation of rheumatic fever 
if they contract a streptococcal infection. Moreover, patients 
who have had carditis in a previous attack are much more 
likely to suffer carditis again in a subsequent attack. Climate, 
age, occupation, household situation, cardiac status, and 
length of time since the previous attack are all significant vari-
ables which influence the risk of recurrence. The decline in 
recurrence rates with increasing age is due to (1) decreased rate 
of streptococcal infection and (2) decrease in the rate of rheu-
matic reactivation following streptococcal infection in older 
rheumatic subjects. Despite this decreased rate, however, the 
risk of rheumatic recurrence in adults remains relatively high 
when the streptococcal disease encountered is severe or epi-
demic. 
PREVENTION OF INITIAL RHEUMATIC ATTACKS Early and 
adequate treatment of pharyngeal infection due to group A 
streptococci will prevent initial attacks of rheumatic fever. If 
clinical streptococcal disease were properly detected by throat 
cultures and adequately treated, the spread of infection in a 
given population would be prevented, the epidemiology of 
streptococcal disease would be modified markedly, and the in-
cidence of rheumatic fever in the community would be dimin-
ished. In communities where group A streptococcal disease has 
been diagnosed early and treated well and where socioeco-
nomic standards are high, the group A organisms cultured fre-
quently from schoolchildren's throats may be of relatively low 
virulence and may cause rheumatic fever less frequently than 
do more virulent strains prevalent in many epidemics. 
Streptococcal pharyngitis is adequately treated by a single 
intramuscular injection of 600.000 units of benzathine penicil-
lin in children less than 10 years of age or 1.2 million units in 
older children and adults. Any alternate plan of parenteral 
therapy or combined parenteral and oral therapy should pro-
vide for treatment over a period of 10 days. If oral penicillin is 
employed, at least 800.000 units per day in four divided doses 
must be given for no less than 10 days to achieve results com-
parable with a single injection of benzathine penicillin. Eryth-
romycin in daily doses of I g for 10 days may be substituted in 
penicillin-sensitive individuals. Tetracycline is not recom-
mended because some strains of group A streptococci have 
acquired resistance to it. All group A streptococci have so far 
remained extremely sensitive to penicillin. 
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The role of physical examination in the evaluation of patients 
with valvular disease is considered in Chap. 248: of echocardi-
ography, phonocardiography, and other indirect graphic tech-
niques in Chap. 250: and of cardiac catheterization and angi-
ography in Chap. 251. 
MITRAL STENOSIS 
PATHOPHYSIOLOGY In normal adults the mitral valve ori-
fice is 4 to 6 cm2. In the presence of significant obstruction, i.e.. 
when the orifice is less than one-half of normal, blood can flow 
from the left atrium to the left ventricle only if propelled by an 
abnormally elevated left atrioventricular pressure gradient, the 
hemodynamic hallmark of mitral stenosis. When the mitral 
valve opening is reduced to I cm2, a left atrial pressure of 
approximately 25 mmHg is required to maintain a normal car-
diac output. The elevated left atrial pressure in turn raises pul-
monary venous and capillary pressures, reducing pulmonary 
compliance and causing exertional dyspnea. The first bouts of 
dyspnea are usually precipitated by clinical events which in-
crease the rate of blood flow across the mitral orifice, which 
results in further elevation of the left atrial pressure. In order 
to assess the severity of obstruction, it is essential to measure 
both the transvalvular pressure gradient and the flow rate. The 
latter is dependent not only on the cardiac output but on the 
heart rate as well. An increase in heart rate shortens diastole 
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ment; and a surrounding zone of edematous connective 
tissue in which some degree of nonspecific, chronic 
inflammation may be seen (Fig. 16-34). Within the outer 
zone, there may be proliferation of blood vessels, but this 
is not a conspicuous feature.291 Foci similar to Aschoff 
bodies sometimes are noted. The subcutaneous nodules 
usually occur in association with evidence of rheumatic 
carditis.289 A lesion has been described in apparently 
nonrheumatic children that simulates the rheumatic 
nodule but is believed to represent an unusual reaction 
to trauma.285 
Arterial lesions 
Rheumatic arteritis is present in many instances of 
rheumatic fever. The lesions are not confined to the cor-
onary arteries but may be seen in arteries in various 
organs of the body. They are described in the discussion 
of coronary artery diseases earlier in this chapter (Fig. 
16-33). When the aorta is involved, the lesions are found 
predominantly in the proximal part of the vessel. 
Polyarthritis 
The rheumatic changes in the joints are not as well 
known as those in the heart. The synovial membrane and 
the periarticular connective tissues are the sites of hyper-
emia, edema, neutrophilic infiltration, fibrinoid change, 
and foci of necrosis of connective tissue, followed by pro-
liferative changes of a granulomatous character. Focal 
lesions similar to Aschoff bodies are observed. Serous or 
serosanguineous fluid may be present in the joint cavity. 
This usually subsides, without leaving a residuum.284 
Pleural and pulmonary lesions 
Pleuritis may develop in association with polyarthritis 
or carditis. Pleural effusion usually is present, and the 
pleural surfaces appear slightly opaque as a result of a 
fine film of fibrin. No definite Aschoff bodies are 
described in the pleura. Rheumatic pneumonia has been 
described, but there is a question about its specificity. 
There is no pathognomonic picture. Grossly,, the lungs 
are large, bluish or purplish, firm, and rubbery. Micro-
scopic changes include edema, capillary hemorrhages, 
and a patchy fibrinous exudate in the alveoli. The fibrin is 
in the form of globular masses or hyaline-like membranes 
and often is associated with monocytes.29° Organization 
of the fibrinous masses occurs with formation of so-called 
Masson bodies. Fibrinoid changes and angiitis may be 
seen, but Aschoff bodies are not evident. 
Lesions of central nervous system 
One of the major manifestations of rheumatic fever is 
chorea minor (Sydenham's chorea, St. Vitus' dance), 
although this entity has been reported in association with 
other clinical states. The word chorea (Greek choreia, 
"dance") refers to the disordered and involuntary move-
ments of the trunk and extremities that are characteristic 
of the disease. Chorea minor, often associated with or 
preceded by acute rheumatic fever, is seen in childhood 
and early adolescence, more commonly in girls. It has 
been shown to be associated most frequently with a 
benign form of rheumatic fever.295 
Chorea minor must be differentiated from Hunting-
ton's chorea, a chronic hereditary disorder occurring 
usually in adults. The cerebral lesions in chorea minor 
consist of a diffuse meningoencephalitis of mild degree 
that is not pathognomonic. Grossly, changes are not 
striking, but there may be evidence of edema, hyper-
emia, and petechiae. Microscopically, lesions have been 
described in the cerebral hemispheres, the brainstem, 
and, most frequently, the basal ganglia. Small hemor-
rhages, edema, and perivascular exudation of lympho-
cytes are commonly seen. The ganglion cells may show 
some changes, but these are not specific. 
Late sequelae of rheumatic heart disease in the brain 
include chronic obliterating endarteritis and embolism. 
Rheumatic obliterating endarteritis and other vascular 
changes, including thrombosis, involve particularly the 
meningeal and cortical vessels, with subsequent gross or 
microsopic softenings in the brain.286,287 Cerebral embo-
lism results especially from thrombi in the left atrium or 
its appendage, most frequently in patients with mitral 
stenosis and atrial fibrillation. Other sources of emboli 
may be the vegetations of nonspecific, nonbacterial 
thrombotic endocarditis and bacterial endocarditis, 
either of which may be superimposed on the deformed 
valves. 
Prognosis and causes of death 
The outlook today for patients with acute rheumatic 
fever is much better than it was several decades ago. In 
one study of children admitted to the hospital with pre-
sumably initial attacks, exclusive of chorea, a comparison 
was made of the number of fatalities among the first 100 
consecutive patients seen during the first year of each of 
four decades. The percentages of deaths were as follows: 
1920-1921, 24%; 1930-1931, 20%; 1940-1941, 8%; 1950-
1951, 3%.294 The 3% mortality represents an eightfold 
decrease since the beginning of the study. Other obser-
vations in this investigation were a modest decline in the 
incidence of cardiac involvement and a twofold improve-
ment in the severity of carditis. 
The decline in incidence and severity of rheumatic 
fever was noted even before the advent of antibiotics in 
the 1940s. Among the factors that contributed to the 
favorable state was improvement in standards of living 
for the poorer classes of urban areas after the extreme 
privation and crowded quarters of the depression years. 
There also was an awareness of the role of streptococcal 
infections in the first and succeeding attacks of the dis-
ease, so that the medical profession instituted measures 
to protect the patient and to isolate carriers. Natural 
mutation of the disease as a result of a new generation of 
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more resistant hosts and less vigorous organisms also 
may have been a factor.294 With the development of anti-
microbial prophylactic programs and the use of potent 
antirheumatic agents, there was acceleration of the 
decline in mortality and lessening severity of the dis-
ease.294 
Certain factors, such as the nature of the attack of 
rheumatic fever and the cardiac status at the time the 
patient is first seen by the physician, have been shown to 
influence the subsequent course of the disease. Many 
patients who initially had arthritis or chorea but no sig-
nificant murmurs remain free of rheumatic heart dis-
ease.296 The frequency, duration, and severity of recur-
rences (the last being most significant) affect the progno-
sis.295 The more frequent and more severe the recur-
rences, the greater are the disability and mortality. In 
patients who have evidence of rheumatic heart disease 
when first observed, there is a greater likelihood that the 
cardiac damage will disappear during subsequent years 
(1) in those who had no previous attacks of rheumatic 
heart disease than in those who had previous attacks, (2) 
in those without diastolic murmurs, and (3) in those with 
no cardiomegaly.296 Patients who have considerable car-
diomegaly or congestive heart failure at the onset of 
rheumatic fever do poorly, and it is unusual for the ones 
who survive adolescence to reach 30 years of age.29a 
Patients with little or no cardiac enlargement early in the 
disease are relatively free from serious recurrences and 
have a longer life.295 
The chief causes of death in patients with rheumatic 
heart disease 295-298 2 " are cardiac failure with or without 
associated rheumatic activity, bacterial endocarditis, and 
embolism. Death also may be attributed to other compli-
cations, such as bronchopneumonia. 
Cardiac failure is the most frequent cause of death 
from rheumatic heart disease, and it often coexists with 
and is caused by active rheumatic fever, particularly in 
early life. In young or middle-aged adults, heart failure is 
likely to be caused by various valvular deformities. In 
older patients, other types of lesions, such as coronary 
heart disease, often are superimposed on old rheumatic 
heart disease and may be the cause of death. Patients 
with heart failure are more susceptible to the develop-
ment of other lesions (pulmonary infarcts). 
Bacterial endocarditis, usually of the subacute type, 
shows a downward trend as a cause of death in rheumatic 
heart disease, probably because of the use of antibiotics 
and chemotherapeutic agents in the treatment of the dis-
ease and their use in prophylactic programs in the man-
agement of patients with rheumatic heart disease. The 
peak incidence of bacterial endocarditis in rheumatic 
patients occurs at about 20 to 39 years of age.298 Older 
patients are more likely to have the acute type of bacte-
rial endocarditis.298 
Embolism as a cause of death in rheumatic heart dis-
ease shows a substantial increase, in contrast to the 
downward trend of deaths caused by bacterial endocar-
ditis.298 The organ most frequently affected is the brain, 
followed by the kidneys, spleen, and lungs. The majority 
of emboli are bland, but occasionally they may be septic, 
the latter arising from superimposed bacterial endocardi-
tis. Most of the emboli originate in mural thrombi within 
the left atrium or its appendage, particularly in associa-
tion with mitral stenosis and atrial fibrillation. Another 
possible source of emboli is a concomitant, nonspecific 
nonbacterial thrombotic endocarditis on a valve.298 In 
contrast to emboli from the atrium or its appendage, 
emboli from nonbacterial thrombotic endocarditis are 
not dependent on atrial fibrillation, for they may occur 
whether the rhythm is regular or not. 298 2 " At times the 
source of the emboli cannot be identified in the heart at 
autopsy. In such instances it has been suggested that 
mural thrombi or vegetations of nonbacterial thrombotic 
endocarditis were washed away completely. If rough-
ened surfaces from which they were dislodged cannot be 
found, one may assume that the areas healed. Because of 
the high frequency of occurrence of thrombosis of the left 
atrial appendage, there is a danger of causing an arterial 
embolism during the course of mitral commissurotomy 
for mitral stenosis by inadvertently dislodging a fragment 
of a thrombus. 293 Occasional cases have been reported 
in which death was caused by emboli arising from calcific 
fragments of a greatly calcified mitral valve during valvu-
lotomy.292 Calcific emboli also have been reported to 
occur spontaneously, as well as in association with surgi-
cal procedures on the aortic valve, in patients with cal-
cific aortic stenosis.29' Another source of embolism, par-
ticularly pulmonary, is a thrombus in the veins of the 
lower extremities. 
Sudden death may occur as a result of obstruction of a 
stenotic mitral orifice by a ball thrombus in the left atri-
um or as a result of coronary insufficiency associated with 
aortic stenosis. 
Heart in rheumatoid arthritis 
The possible relationship of rheumatic fever to rheu-
matoid arthritis has long been a subject of discussion in 
the literature. Many pathologic investigations have 
shown that rheumatic heart disease and rheumatoid 
arthritis frequently coexist. The reported proportion of 
patients with rheumatoid arthritis who have postmortem 
evidence of associated rheumatic heart disease varies 
from 7% to 65.7%.)09 There is, of course, the possibility 
that use of less rigid criteria of what constitutes rheumat-
ic heart disease may account for the high incidence of this 
disease in some of the investigations. In a comparative 
study, one investigator observed that the incidence of 
rheumatic heart disease was somewhat higher (12.2%) in 
the group with rheumatoid arthritis than in the general 
population, in whom the incidence was 6 .1%.^ These 
data, together with those in the other published cases, 
suggest that coexistence of the two diseases is not merely 
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DISORDERS OF THE CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM 
IFAD aVn 
FIGURE 28-34 SA block. In each 
pause the entire P-QRS-T sequence is 
missing, and the long cycle is approxi-
mately equal to two of the sinus cycles. 
pause is equal to two sinus cycles (Fig. 28-,'M): if an 
existing sinus rate exactly halves, 2:1 SA block is 
diagnosed. 
It is important to recognize SA Wenckebach pe-
riods because they invariably indicate an abnormal-
ity of the sinus node, yet they are usually overlooked 
and (ailed sinus arrhythmia—a normal mechanism. 
Their recognition is discussed further on in this 
chapter. If P waves are entirely absent, complete SA 
block may be diagnosed, but it is well to keep in 
mind that there are four possible explanations for 
absent P waves: (1) failure of the sinus tiode to form 
impulses (generator failure): (2) failure of the im-
pulse to emerge from the node (exit block); (3) atrial 
paralysis, as in potassium intoxication: and (1) a 
sinus impulse that is too weak to activate normally 
responsive atria (inadequate stimulus). Block should 
be diagnosedonlv when a mathematical relationship 
can be demonstrated between the P waves, or when 
the c\ c le sequence of Wenckebach conduction is rec-
ognized. 
Am abrupt pause produced by failure of one or 
more sinus impulses to occur on time, and failure 
to satisfy the mathematic relations of recognizable 
block, may be called s-iitu.s pause and its duration 
specified. 
Atrioventricular (AV) Block' 
AV block is usually classified into three degrees 
(Table 28-7). In first-degree, AV conduction time isl 
prolonged, but all impulses are conducted to the ? 
ventricles?Second-degree means that more or less fre-
quent impulses are blocked and fail to reach the 
ventricles. This is usually subdivided into tvpe I. 
tvpe II, and high grade (or advanced). Third-dcgrct 
is complete block, in which no impulses can reach 
the ventricles. 
The current classification of AV block has serious 
shortcomings because its categories fail to correlate 
with prognosis or with indicated therapy. This is 
because two decades ago there was no consistentJ\ 
effective treatment for AV block, and consequenth 
it mattered little how blocks were graded. Pace-
makers then entered the picture and revolutionized 
the therapy of block, while nothing was done to ren-
ovate its taxonomv. It is regrettable that, in the da\ < 
before pacemakers muddied the prognostic waters, 
a careful assessment of the many and various pat-
terns of AV conduction disturbance was not at-
tempted. There is no doubt that, to correlate real 
isticallv with prognosis and the need for therapy, a 
classification expanded by several additions and sub-
categories is needed (Table 28-7. bottom). 
One of the manv factors that have helped to 
maintain the unsatisfactory status quo is the con-
sistent failure of almost all authors to define terms 
such as complete, high-grade (or advanced), and 
type II AV block. An extreme example of the un-
fortunate result of not defining these terms is that 
disturbances as different as spontaneous ventricular 
asystole and AV dissociation, at least partly due to 
block but in the company of an independent junc-
tional rhythm at a rate of 45 per minute or more— 
a combination which, for want of a bettei term, we 
have called blnckhttccleratimi di$sociatinn-~:\\'v often 
lumped under the heading of "complete AV block." 
Yet, in acute myocardial infarction transient spon-
taneous ventricular asystole (Fig. 28-35,\) is associ-
ated with a mortality (whether paced or not) of 
about 90 percent, while block/acceleration dissocia-
tion (Fig. 28-35/i) in our experience is associated 
with a mortality of less than 10 percent. 
Another factor is that "degrees" as thev are cur-
TABLE 28-7 Classification of AV Block 
Common Classification of AV Block 
First degree (prolonged PR interval) 
Second degree: 
Type I (Wenckebach periodicity) 
Type II 
High grade (advanced) 
Third degree (complete) 
Categories of AV Block Requiring Consideration 
Prolonged PR interval 
Block acceleration dissociation 
Occasional "dropped"' beats: 
Type I (Wenckebach periodicity) 
Type II 
2:1 AV block: 
Type I 
Type II 
High-grade block: 
Type I 
Type II 
Complete block: 
Junctional escape 
Ventricular escape 
Transient ventricular asystole: 
Spontaneous 
Phase 4 (?) 
Vagal 
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RECOGNITION OF ARRHYTHMIAS AND CONDUCTION ABNORMALITIES 
FIGURE 28-35 A. Spontaneous ventricular asystole lasting for over 7 s and due to the abrupt development of AV block at a time when 
no escaping pacemaker is active. From a patient with acute anteroseptal infarction. B. Complete AV dissociation due to a combination 
of some degree of AV block with an accelerated junctional rhythm (rate 68 per minute). From a patient with acute inferior infarction. 
rently defined do not necessarily correlate with the 
severity of the conduction disturbance—definitions 
are predicated mainly on conduction ratios to the 
neglect of atrial rate. Thus 2:1 block, which some 
classify as high grade, may represent anything from 
a disaster (2:1 block at an atrial rate of 60) to a 
blessing \2:\ block at an atrial rate of 140). Again, 
if the sinus rate is 70 and, despite a slow independ-
ent ventricular rate of 30, no impulses are con-
ducted to the ventricles, complete AV block can be 
diagnosed; but if the rate of an independent accel-
erated A V junctional pacemaker is 85, complete ab-
sence of AV conduction in these circumstances may 
represent only a minor degree of block. In fact, 
mere delayed AV conduction (prolonged PR inter-
val) associated with an accelerated subsidiary pace-
maker may be responsible for this form of complete 
AV dissociation. It is therefore obvious that in any 
meaningful consideration of AV block the respec-
tive rates of the involved pacemakers must be taken 
into account. 
In fact, with definitions and misconceptions as 
they presently exist, a patient with "first-degree 
block" may have a worse conduction disturbance 
than another erroneously labeled as having "high-
grade block." 
The recipe for confusion is complete if we add 
the following widespread misconceptions to the lack 
of precise definitions and the fact that "degrees" 
are not leally degrees: 2:1 AV block is necessarily 
high-grade;7 ' ' 2:1 AV block is necessarily type II 
block;8nMI the block is necessarily high-grade when 
most, but not all, atrial impulses are not conducted 
to the ventricles;82 and total absence of conduction, 
as in Fig. 28-35/*, is necessarily evidence for com-
plete-block.** In view of these deficiencies in current 
usage, it seems desirable that the following three 
remedial measures be implemented: (1) "degrees," 
as presently used, should be eliminated or at least 
decmphasi/.ed; (2) the inclusion of stated atrial and 
diagnoses of AV conduction disorders; and (3) the 
AV blocks should be reclassified into a realistic set 
of sufficient and defined categories, including at least 
those listed in Table 28-7. Only then will the current 
confusion be remedied and indications for therapy 
clearly limned. 
Since most reports concerned with AV block fail 
to define their terms, and since basic terms are var-
iably used, some of the following observations on 
etiology and incidence must be accepted with ap-
propriate reservation. 
Prolonged PR intervals are occasionally found im 
apparently normal subjects.40 In their survey of over 
67,000 asymptomatic Air Force personnel, Johnson 
et al.84 found 350 examples of first-degree block (5.2 
per 1000). Twenty percent of them had PR intervals 
that were over 0.24 s. Of 19,000 young aircrew ap-
plicants, 59 had PR intervals of 0.24 s or greater.h3 
In both normal and diseased hearts, atropine, 
s tanding, exercise, and isoproterenol tend to 
shorten the lengthened PR interval. There is a wide-
spread belief that the PR interval tends always to 
shorten with an increase in heart rate. Though this 
is true in normal hearts with natural acceleration, 
when the rate is increased with artificial atrial pac-
ing, the PR lengthens even in normal hearts; in dis-
eased hearts a natural increase in rate is frequently 
associated with lengthening of the PR interval. AV 
block with Wenckebach periods may occur in nor-
mal hearts10 and was found in 3 of the 67,0U() Air 
Force personnel screened by Johnson."1 
Prolonged AV conduction (PR interval) and* CZaMfeJ 
dropped beats can be caused by vagal stimulation* 
and by a variety of drugs, including digitalis, qtiin-
idine sulfate, procainamide, propranolol, and po-
tassium. Diseases that most commonly produce AV* 
block are rheumatic fever; chronic ischemic heart ? 
disease, and myocardial infarction, especially infe-
rior infarction. Any infectious disease that produces 
myocarditis may have this effect. Some patients with 
hvoertln roidism have prolonged PR intervals. 
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550 Clinical Cardiology 
disorder using pharmacologic means. In the usual event of 
this variety of ventricular tachycardia not being hemody-
namically tolerated, cardioversion is performed as an 
emergency procedure, and generally several hundred v\att 
seconds are required for conversion to sinus rh>thm. Oc-
casionally this rhythm disturbance will convert to sinus 
rhythm following a sharp blow on the chest, but the 
authors do not recommend this as the usual approach to 
correcting it. There are many different causes of cxtrasys-
lolic ventricular tachycardia, but acute myocardial isch-
emia and infarction, digitalis excess, severe hypoxia 
and/or acidosis, hypokalemia, hypercalcemia, hy-
perkalemia, systemic infection, viral myocarditis, ind 
hypotension need to be emphasized in particular. Occa-
sionally this rhythm disturbance occurs in apparently 
normal individuals; the reason for this is not known. 
Idioventricular Tachycardia 
The two major reasons for the development of this 
rhythm disturbance are digitalis excess and acute 
myocardial infarction. This rhythm is common in the set-
ting of acute myocardial infarction and is generally be-
nign. It may be present in as many as 30-40 percent o( 
patients with acute myocardial infarcts, and it is usually 
so benign that it goes unnoticed by patient, nurse, and 
physician. Even when discovered it generally requires no 
treatment as long as the patient is hcmodynamically ucll 
compensated and there are no other foci of ventricular 
ectopic activity and "no bursts of more rapid ventricular 
tachycardia as described above. When this rhythm distur-
bance is due to digitalis excess, the medication should be 
discontinued. This possibility should be suspected in any 
patient on digitalis who develops the rhythm disturbance. 
When pharmacologic treatment is necessary, either atro-
pine or xylocaine are preferred. If xylocaine is utilized, 
one needs to be careful that one docs not suppress the only 
pacemaker rhythm a patient has, and one probably should 
remain by the bedside of the patient as xylocaine is 
administered, ready to insert a temporary pacemaker 
should that be necessary. The administration of atropine 
is based on the recognition that this rhythm disturbance 
generally occurs by default, i.e., the accelerated ven-
tricular rhythm usurps pacemaker control from a slower 
sinus or A V junctional pacemaker. 
Bedside examination of the patient may be very help-
ful in correctly identifying ventricular tachycardia. 
Clinical manifestations are those produced by the A-V 
dissociation. The physical findings include cannon A 
v. ;ives in the jugular venous pulse, varying intensity of the 
first heart sound, and variations in systemic peak systolic 
blood pressure. Atrial gallops, ventricular filling gallop*, 
and summation gallops that may be of constant or vari-
able intensity may also occur as a manifestation of the 
A-V dissociation. Wide splitting of both the first and sec-
ond heart sounds is also frequently noted. Another helpful 
clue of A-V dissociation may be obtained from the elec-
trocardiogram itself if one can identify the presence of 
Dressier or fusion beats which represent a "hybrid beat" 
between a partially conducted supraventricular impulse 
and a ventricular ectopic beat. The presence of fusion 
beats identifies independent supraventricular and ven-
tricular pacemakers and, in the opinion of the authors, 
helps to prove the presence of ventricular ectopy. Occa-
sionally AV junctional tachycardia may also be 
characterized by A-V dissociation and demonstrate the 
same clinical signs, but this phenomenon occurs in-
frequently. As a practical point, the presence at the 
bedside of signs of A-V dissociation in association with a 
rapid regular tachycardia with bizarre QRS complexes in-
dicates the presence of ventricular tachycardia 
Atrioventricular Block 
The dilTerent types of atrioventricular block (AV 
block) are ordinarily classified into three degrees. First 
degree AV block represents that situation in which there 
is a delay in atrioventricular conduction manifest by a 
prolonged PR interval on the electrocardiogram 
(generally one longer than 0.20 sec) but each atrial im-
pulse is conducted into the ventricles. Second degree 
heart block represents that situation in which some atrial 
impulses are not conducted into the ventricles. Third 
degree heart block represents complete inability to 
conduct atrial impulses into the ventricles and the 
existence of a totally independent ventricular pacemaker. 
Third degree heart block needs to be difTerentiated from 
complete A-V dissociation in which instance independent 
atrial and/or AV junctional and ventricular pacemakers 
do exist but only for temporary periods of time since the 
mechanism of the A-V dissociation is an accelerated AV 
junctional or idioventricular pacemaker, slowing the sinus 
rate, digitalis excess, ischemia, etc. Third degree heart 
block implies complete inability to conduct supraven-
tricular impulses into the ventricles while complete A-V 
dissociation suggests conduction would' be possible if 
physiologic circumstances were appropriate. 
First degree heart block. As previously discussed, 
first degree heart block is recogni/ed by identifying a 
prolonged PR interval on the resting electrocardiogram. 
In both normal and diseased hearts atropine, exercise, and 
catecholamines tend to shorten PR intervals. In addition, 
in normal hearts physiologic increases in heart rate tend 
to shorten PR intervals although in diseased hearts 
physiologic and artificial increases in heart rate may 
result in PR prolongation. Prolonged PR intervals in first 
degree heart block may be caused by vagal stimulation, a 
number of different pharmacologic interventions, includ-
ing importantly digitalis and disease processes, such as 
ischemic heart disease, infiltrative myocardial diseases, 
acute myocardial infarction (especially acute inferior or 
diaphragmatic myocardial infarcts), myocarditis. Ad-
dison's disease, congenital heart disease (especially atrial 
septal defect and Fbstein's anomaly), rheumatic fever, 
and streptococcal infections. Prolonged PR intervals are 
occasionally found in apparently otherwise normal sub-
jects and in well-trained athletes. 
The presence of first degree heart block generally 
does not constitute an indication for any particular form 
of therapy. In children the development of first degree 
heart block may represent ^digitalis excess, and car-
diologists usually decrease the amount of digitalis a child 
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DHECT^R 
bNOERViRlTlNG AND INSURANCE SERVICES 
March 29, 1983 
Re: Agent's Responsibility 
• Don C. Painter, FTSA 
Detroit Agency 
Insured: Barbara Sullivan 
Policies.: 34 986 134 
34 998 589 
This case involves two Whole Life insurance policies on the l ife of 
Barbara G. Sullivan written by Full Time Special Agent, Don Painter. 
Policy 34 986 134 is a Life Paid-Up at Age 65 plan for 512,000 applied 
for on January 22, 1981. Policy 34 998 589 is a Modified Whole Life 
policy for $35,000 applied for on March 16, 1981. 
The Insured died on June 14, 1982, within the two year contestable period 
on both policies. The cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest due to 
scleroderma, A routine contestable investigation was conducted and we 
determined that the scleroderma had been diagnosed in 1978* 'This history 
was not included in the answers to the Part II health questions on either 7 
application. Had this health history been admitted, both applications-* 
would have been rejected at.Underwriting time.. 'On August 11, 1982 we 
informed the Co-Conservators of the minor beneficiary that because of 
material misrepresentations in the applications for insurance, our only 
l iabi l i ty was the return of premiums paid plus interest ($909.03). 
We subsequently received a le t ter dated February 5, 1983 (copy enclosed) 
from an attorney representing the Guardian of the minor beneficiary. This 
le t ter contained serious allegations about Agent Painter's knowledge of 
the Insured's poor health as Veil as allegations that the Prudential policies 
replaced coverage the Insured had obtained from Agent Painter when he had 
been an agent for Equitable. These allegations were subsequently investigated 
by Home Office Representative Marsano. A copy of his March 11, 1983 report 
is attached. 
. Because i t is apparent that Agent Painter not only did not follow replacement 
, regulations and Company guidelines but was also cognizant (and had been fo r 
Vsome time) of the Insured's poor health at the time he toote'jehft*applications^ 
/ we have dropped our misrepresentation action and are accept+n^fu'U death claim 
i liability.at.$47,000. t ~ •--•• ^ •- ~ 
* 
In addition to a $47,000 claim loss, Agent Painter's actions made the Company 
highly vulnerable to an expensive lawsuit. 
OQ 
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Mary Burke 2 1 3 - 9 9 2 - 2 
FLOYD, XDA G. •""SSgfflStt T a c o m a r ^ A BRANCH C 
Grays Harbor , V/A—1104 E McBride 
R e t i r e d *™^ rfc.q"™S 206-752-469;> 
(Area code <k Branch Office phone no. > 
SPECIAL CONTESTABLE I 
on phone, call. 
Type Report-
D.t,ofblrtb 7 , 3 9 , 2 0 Datefs) of this Investigation. 12-31-31 
1 STATUS: 
A- D ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. Your Claim request dated... wis rtc( 
OIL.... .~. If poasibie, final report will be sent on or before.-.. (Explain below any mail or other Irregular delay encountered thus far.) 
B
* D PARTIAL REPORT A partial report Is included covering our findings to date. If possible, final report will be sent ywi on 
before 
O. O CASE IS STILL PENDING An Acknowledgement or Partial Report was last sent you on If possible, final »p-
will be mailed to you on or before. -. (Qlre reason for delay below.) 
& SP FINAL REPORT Investigation by this office Is being closed with this report. 
X. PL TRANSFER CASE: You will receive (or may have already received; reportisi from our . . . jQlOTini i i . . i
-
r
 Officers). * 
2
- C1KC I MSTA_\CES: Give brief resume of pertinent information such as date of issue or loss, date oi disability, amount & nature of dlasbiiii 
or loss. (If circumstances previously given, so state; do not repeat. If customer request contained in ietter. refer tc date of letter & writer wm 
out repeating enure letter. Do NOT repeat any special attention points here.) 
• Please refer to report from this office dated 12-l3-£l. 
3. CLAIM HISTORY (Give all Claim History. If already given, so state; do NOT repeat.) 
QY. 
Date Name & Address of Company Type Report Claim, Pol. I, etc 
EJ N ° 
IKVSSTIOATIOK 
fax Inc. 
fax Serri/ 
This case was transferred to our Aberdeen Sub Office for 
further handling at the St* Joseph Hospital in Aberdeen 
and Dr. M.C. Lindell of Montesano, WA. 
Attached are out-patient emergency room record, in-patient 
admitting form, and doctor Reedfs summary, as well as EKG 
tracing and nurses constant care record. 
Note Dr. Reed's comments on Mrs. Floyd's past health history. 
In view of our good relations with Dr. Lindellfs office, as 
well as to expedite handling, field representative f i rs t 
telephoned Dr. Lindellfs office in Montesano 10 miles east 
of our Aberdeen sub office. There was no record of recent 
treatment of Mrs. Floyd by Dr. Lindell. A check was then 
made of past files in storeroom where i t was found that 
Dr. Lindell last saw Mrs. Floyd as a patient in October 1973. 
Since this i s well beyond the five year limit, we did not 
contact Dr. Lindell's office in person. 
Our Aberdeen sub office i s closing handling with foregoing. 
ROY HOVTLA, Claim Specialist, Aberdeen Sub Office 
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Prudential 
9 
Mr. Lennox F. Pruitt, CLU July 16, 1982 
Director, Claims 
General Actuarial and Claim Division 
9 Gib - CORP Insured: Manfred Mandelbaum 
Policy: 70 743 521 
Dear Len: 
We are referring this $300,000 death claim to you in accordance with 
existing Corporate authority limits. 
On April 4, 1981, this 52-year old drapery store owner completed Part I 
of the application for a 5-year R&C policy with a face amount of $300,000 
on a COD basis. It is interesting that the agent noted Policyholder Service 
as the source of the sales lead. On April 10, 1981, the insured completed 
the required physical exam; the application reflects treatment at Kaiser 
Foundation, Cadillac and Sunset locations, for annual physicals, a URI, 
a right inguinal hernia for 15 years, and a kidney stone in 1966. The 
underwriter obtained the records of Kaiser-Sunset, which reflected a 
history of vague chest pain, an abnormal stress test, and PVCs. The 
underwriter recommended issue at Special Class 2, which our Medical Dept. 
liberalized to standard, and the policy was issued June 3, 1981. It was 
not placed until August 19, 1981, when the agent visited the insured at his 
place of business and collected the initial premium. The agent confirms that 
he asked the insured the usual "placement1* questions. 
The insured died on May 2, 1982, of ASHD, and the death certificate was 
certified by Dr. Jerry Drexler of Kaiser-Cadillac, who had been the AP since 
1974. (An irrelevant note to this is that Dr. Drexler is the husband of 
our Associate Counsel Ruth Drexler.) We received the proofs on May 25 and 
immediately began our investigation. The HOR (whose investigation was 
unfortunately delayed and, we feel, pretty sketchy) obtained the records 
from Kaiser-Cadillac and a Dr. Alpern, who the insured consulted in February 
1981 for exertional angina and a stress test (abnormal). The records reflect 
that the insured consulted Dr. Drexler on July 6 — during the COD period — 
with a request for a hernia repair, and complaints of angina after dancing. 
Coincidentally, the insured was dancing when his fatal attack occurred. 
Marilyn Reed, Mike Zevin, and our Dr. Ketchum have all reviewed this file 
and agreed that, had the underwriter gotten the completed Kaiser records, 
Special Class 3 would have been an appropriate rating. Given that we 
waived a recommendation for Special Class 2 on the information we did have, 
which included references to the cardiac abnormalities, Tom Potter and I 
feel that we would have no basis now for declaring a misrepresentation to 
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Mr. Pruitt 
July 16, 1982 
Page Two 
either the Part II information, or the COD placement, and that we should 
pay the claim. 
As well as the subject policy file, we are also enclosing the files for 
policy 33 917 120 and 70 924 993 (both descended from 33 586 892). These 
policies totalled $160,800 and were cash surrendered in November and October 
1981, respectively. The subject of insurance replacement was not taken up 
with the agent (who has been the servicing agent since the 1960fs), and 
under the circumstances, I don't think we need do so now. It is interesting 
to note that in connection with a 1978 <t\^f\6^t^oX we obtained the records 
from both Kaiser Cadillac and Sunset, showing the insured's lengthy history 
of angina pain. 
Policy H9 2 74 546 is a 2-year S&A policy issued in 1968, for which we have 
no record of ever receiving a claim. We enclose it just to complete the 
package. 
Please feel free to call if you would like to discuss this case any further. 
As always, I look forward to hearing from you. 
Sincere ly , 
I c < w - ^ - . _ 
^ * 
Susan A. Frankel (Mrs.) 
Senior Claim Consultant 
Life and Health Claim Div is ion 
(213) 992-2127 
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MEMORANDUM FOR: SUSAN FRANKEL 
SENIOR CLAIM CONSULTANT 
LIFE AND HEALTH CLAIM 
WHWH 
S. A. F, I 
• w _ .1 - •^•^>C 
1 '}L\PL 
July'21, 1982 
Insured: Manfred Mandelbaum 
For our records, these are the details of the large amount claim you sent 
for our review. 
Manfred Mandelbaum, 4-13-28, applied on 4-4-81 for a 5 yr. R&C for 300,000 
naming his wife, Nili, as beneficiary. On the exam taken on 4-10-81 the 
insured gave a medical history of 1) annual physical exams by Kaiser-
Permanente the last being 11-80 2) a kidney stone in 1966 and 3) a right 
inguinal hernia still present. The exam and ECG taken for the policy were 
within normal limits. 
Medical records were requested from Kaiser-Permanente at the Sunset location. 
The insured had stated that annual exams were done at either of two 
locations, Sunset or Cadillac. The records sent by Kaiser-Sunset only 
contained records through 1976. These included a 12-4-74 stress ECG 
interpreted by our medical department as abnormal. Kaiser had also 
interpretated the ECG as abnormal and indicative -of ischemic heart disease. 
In addition, underwriting attached and reviewed two older policies on the 
insured - 33 917 120 and 70 924 993. As you mentioned, during underwriting 
of a long form reinstatement in 1S78« records were obtained from Kaiser-
Cadillac through that date which revealed that the insured occasionally had 
anginal symptoms after exertion. 
The case was referred for acceptance at Special Class 2 rates based on the 
abnormal stress ECG. It was decided, however, to issue the policy at 
standard rates based on the recent normal resting ECG. The policy was issued 
on June 3, 1981 and was placed on August 19, 1981. 
Mr. Mandelbaum died on 5-2-82 of an acute myocardial infarction. 
The H0R obtained the medical records from Kaiser-Cadillac which included 
details of medical visits through 2-82. They revealed that the insured had 
anginal pain with exertion for several years and that in July 1981 he had 
requested a hernia repair. 
Based on this underwriting advised that had they had these records the policy 
would have been issued at Sp CI 3 rates for the angina and the hernia. 
Because it was decided at issue to waive a Special Class 2 ratina based on 
the insured's cardiac abnormalities you are recommending that we pay the 
claim. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I agree. As I see it, there is no basis for a misrepresentation defense. 
At underwriting^'me we were on notice that 1) the insured suffered from 
anginal paid ofPexertion, 2) hjjs^jfress ECG's were abnormal and 3) 
i^rhemir heart" disease ha^ h O A n H^Tjnncon m e insured stated on the 
application that he had annual physicals with the last one only four months 
before the application date.- Underwriting received records only through 
1976 and, in spite of his medicaThi story, did not pursue obtaining his 
medical records for the period between 1976 and 1981. In addition, the fact 
that the insured had an inguinal hernia present for 15 years was stated on 
the application and the medical records obtained referred numerous times 
to the hernia and the symptoms and treatment of it. His physical condition 
did not change significantly during the placement period. 
Full proceeds may be paid to the beneficiary, Nili Mandelbaum. 
I also agree that, since we are paying full benefits of this policy, the 
question of whether this policy is a replacement of the previous two is a 
moot one. It is questionable since policy loans were taken to pay premiums 
on those two policies after this one was issued and it is unlikely that this 
would have been done if replacement and cash surrender were contemplated 
when this coverage was applied for. 
q^y 
yOan Drosendahl 
Claim Consultant 
General Actuarial and Claim Division 
CORP 
JD/gh 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed to the 
Respondent by depositing them in the United States Mail on 
this /Sjh^ day of August, 1985, to the following counsel 
of record: 
Richard Ferrari 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
310 South Main Street - Suite #1200 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101 
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